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THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY
H.J .1!cCARNEY.
Ph.D. Degree. !21Q
ABSTRACT.
The aim of this study is to reach a philosophical understan-
ding of the concept of morality. The contemporary literature is dominated
by a series of contrasts; 'individual' morality and 'social' morality,
a morality of 'sensibility' and 'insight' and one of 'rules' and 'princip-
les', 'formal' as against 'material' characterisations. In reviewing it
the suggestion arises that this dualism is systematic and depends upon
some more fundamental feature of the concept. A point of general agreement
is that there is an intimate relationship between. morality and the world
of human actions and activities. This world makes two major intellectual
demands on us. There is the need to decide how to act in particular
Situations, and there is the need to see one's actions as invested with
a larger significance, as elements in a meaningful pattern. Morality is
a response to both demands. Thus, it consists of a dimension of assessment
of action, a sphere of practical judgement, and of a way of interpreting
its significance, a mode of vision. These aspects may be distinguished
by speaking of 'moral assessment' on the one hand and of 'moral understan-
ding' on the other.
Moral understanding may be characterised in terms of the
kind of significance it offers and the kind of reasons it can recognise.
A striking feature of the distinction between moral and non-moral forms
of'understanding is its tendency to cut across conventional categories.
This can be illustrated in the case of religious belief and of what may,
loosely and provisionally, be called 'humanism'. But it is also possible
to find familiar modes of thought l"1hichbelong wholly and unequivocally
to each side.
(ii)
,(lhenthe lesser contrasts are examined in the light of the
understanding-assessment distinction it is found that the claims made
for the fundamental significance of that between the 'individual' and
the 'social' cannot be sustained. Only the 'individual' half can comprise
both understanding and assessment and so qualify as a wholly adequate
conception of morality. There are some residual problems here which in.volve
the issue of'form'versus'content'. This controversy dissolves, in its
turn, once it is recognised that while moral understnnding is contentless,
moral asses~ment is necessarily tied to certain material considerations.
The stress on the contrast between 'sensibility' and'rules' may be interpre_'
ted as an oblique vlay of drawing attention to that between understanding
and assessment, and, more specifically, of warning against the danger of
identifying morality with practical reason. The element of truth in this
is safeguarded by assigning talk of 'sensibility' to understanding and
of 'rules' t~ assessment. A general conclusion that emerges from the
discussion of these antitheses concerns the need for moral philosophy
to work with an adequate conception of what it is to be human, a philoso-
phical theory of man.
The final task is to draw together the elements of the
fundamental distinction, and so exhibit the unity of the concept of
morality. It is best pursued through a discussion of some problems
connected with education. There is an important tendency in the philosoph-
ical literature which may be interpreted as a regognition of the conceptual
link between education and moral understanding. Horeover the concept of
education provides a bridge between the category provisionally known as
'humanism' and a reconstructed one from which the non-moral elements have
been excluded. ~·1hatremains are moral understanding and moral aesesamerrt,
The essential link between them is that they constitute a coherent and
systematic approach to a particular area of experience. Using a terminology
that needs careful explication, morality may be characterised as the
response of humanism to the demands of the practical world.
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Chanter 1.
A PERVASIVE DUALISM.
A striking feature of recent writings on the concept of
morality is their tendency to revolve around a few well-worn antitheses.
There is, for instance, the contrast between a morality of insight and
sensibili ty and one of rules and principles. Frequently, attention has
been drawn to it in a polemical spirit by those who feel that the first
half has been unduly neglected in recent moral philosophy. The alleged
result is that it has been forced to work with an inadequate picture of
what a morality is. This is held to be unfortunate, and not only on
conceptual grounds. It is felt that the moral life of a man dominated
by the rules-principles model must be arid and shallow. The model can
only be maintained by blinding oneself to certain areas of human experience.
or by distorting ones apprehension of them to fit its abstract categories.
The·remedy lies in recognising its limitations and becoming receptive to
the more elusive language of 'vision', 'insight', 'imagination' and so on.
A second contrast runs roughly as follows. On the one hand there is the
conventional moral code of a society or group, a 'positive' or 'social'
morality. On the other there are the principles and standards which any
member of society may choose to regulate his conduct by and which constit-
ute his' in.dividual' or 'autonomous' morality. This distinction too has
received most attention from people who wish to protest against what they
take to be orthodoxy. Now it is its 'Protestantism', 'liberalism' or
'individualism' which comes under attack. Many contemporary philosophers,
it is alleged, assume a picture of the moral agent as a rational mind
operating in a social and cultural vacuum. He is free to contemplate in
a detached way the whole field of human activity and to make an autonomous
choice of the ultimate principles by which to live. Thereafter his behaviou~
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is regulated by this choice in conjunction with an awareness of the facts
of his situation. The objection to this view is that it obscures the
primary importance of the morality of the group and ignores the role of
the social framework within which the individual must think and act.
Besides, in plucking individuals and theories out of their historical
context, it may lead us to treat the great figures of the past as though
they were our less enlightened contemporaries. In this .ay, it is claimed,
the history of moral thought is distorted to the point of becoming uninte-
lligible. A third disagreement exists between those who hold that morality
has an inescapable 'material' element or subject matter and others who
think it may be characterised in purely'formal'terms. Is it, for instance,
a sufficient condition of having a morality that one has practical rules
which one is prepared to live by and to commend to others? Will any such
rules do or is the range limited by considerations of content? Is it,
perhaps, necessary that they should display a cencern for human well-being
in order to be properly regarded as 'moral'? There are persuasive arguments
on both sides, and the issues involved are perhaps the mostcomplex and
fundamental of all that arise in current discussions of the nature of
morality. It will be necessary to make a serious attempt to come to grips
with them later.and all of the debates outlined above will be documented
when they are discussed individually in detail. They have been introduced
here by way ~f providing a sketch of the background to the discussion.
The problem is set by these claims and counter-claims and, in the end,
one must return to them to test the validity of any solution that is
offered. Our aim is to provide a characterisation of morality in which
all the partial insights represented by them will be accounted for and
reconciled.
It seems reasonable to describe the main impression made
by recent discussions of morality as one of pervasive conceptual dualism.
In trying to account for it the suggestion naturally arises that it is
systematic and might be exhibited as such if one could find the key. This
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must surely lie in some division within our conception of morality at the
most fundamental level. The first requirement is to identify a starting
point from which this suggestion may be explored. A plausible approach
consists in asking whether there is any common element in the conflicting
views described above.It seems clear that there is, And it is not hard to
formulate it in a rough and ready way. A basic assumption shared by all
is that there is an intimate connection between the concept of morality
and the world of human action and activities. ilhatever is dil'Puted about
the concept there is general, though usually tacit, agreement t~t its
raison d'etre derived from its significance for the conduct of life. A
claim that the analysis of morality should start with human actions may
seem banal, even if unobjectionable. This is a price one must be prepared
to pay for securing a base. Besides, when the suggestion is looked at
closely some positive clues to the way ahead begin to emerge.
The world of action makes two distinct kinds of intellectual
demand on us. On. the one hand there is the need to resolve difficulties
which call for practical decision. This leads us to seek knowledge of how
to actr~d of what constitutes a reason for doing one thing rather than
another. t-/e look for ways of analysing and assessing the alternatives open
to us and try to find or devise a rationale for the pro and contra attitudee
we adopt towards them. The existence of the various spheres of practical
judg4ment is a reflection of this aspect of our situation: morality is
one such sphere of judgement. But, as human beings, we cannot rest content
with a techn.ique for deciding What to do. We need to see our actions as
possessed of a larger significance, as elements in a meanin.gful pattern.
Religion, ideology and metaphysics offer ways of achieving this. A man
may see his activities as instruments of God's purpose, or as blows in
the class struggle, or as stages in the progressive self-realization of
the Absolute. Morality also has a vision of this kind to t3ffer- it ena.bles
us to see our a.ctions as invested with a distinctive kind of significance.
Thus, it reflects both aspects of our situation as thinking beings confron-
ted with the exigencies of practical life. To understand the concept one
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has to distinguish between morality as a particular dimension of criticism
and assessment of actions, a sphere of practical reasoning, and morality
as a mode of vision, a general way of interpreting human behaviour. It
functions, so to speak, both as a Bet of tools for measuring things of a
certain kind and as a pair of spectacles through which to view them. Its
complexity and distinctiveness stem mainly from this dual nature, and from
its links with other spheres of reasoning on the one hand and with other
ways of viewing the world on the other. For convenience in exploring these
issues, let us use the term 'moral aSEessment' of morality as a sphere of
reasoning, and speak of 'moral understanding' when we wish to refer to the
other half o~ the .concept. It is worth noting how the distinction is
reflected in the familiar vocaburary of our talk about morality. Two
distinct kinds of expression tend to be employed in it. There are those
which are most at home in contexts of understanding; 'the moral point of
view', 'the standpoint of morality', 'the moral outlook', 'moral attitudes',
'moral vision' and so on. There are also those which are more characteristic'
of assessment; 'rules', 'principles', 'good', 'right', 'ought', 'duty',
and so on. l·!oreloosely, but still significantly, linked with the distinc-
tion are the contrasts between the 'moral' and the 'non-moral' or 'amoral',
and between the 'moral' and the 'immoral'. The moral-immoral contrast is
used more naturally of rules and principles while the other applies primar-
ily to attitudes and points of view. Thus, there is some awkwardness
involved in speaking without qualification of non-moral or amoral practical
principles. For what one person sees as falling outside the realm ~ of
morality may be located very definitely within it by another. What is
'moral' as opposed to 'non-moral' is not so much the principle itself as
the agents conception of it; the stance he adopts in relation to it, so
to speak. At this point, of course, we are beginning to use the language
of understanding. Similarly it would be odd to speak of the 'immoral point
of view' while talk of the 'non-moral point of view' presents no such
difficul ty. Here the problem arises from a transfer in.the opposite direct-
ion: an epithet appropriate to assessment ('immoral') is being used in a
context of understanding. These linguistic remaitks may be useful in showing
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how the broad outlines of the distinction between understanding are discern-
able in ordinary usage. But a complete grasp of their significance must
wait until that distinction has been thoroughly explored.
The most pressing need is to elucidate the nature of moral
understanding. Recent literature has dealt generously with aspects of
assessment; its status and regulative principles, the conditions for engag-
ing in it, its relations with prudence and other branches of practical
reason and so on. No comprehensive agreement has emerged from these writings.
Nevertheless it would be false to suggest that the impression they give is
merely chaotic. They do serve to delimit the concept in a very general way.
If one maps the various theories, taking account of all the alternatives
that are canvassed, one does get a rough idea of the region of conceptual
space it occupies. Besides, the materials are there for anyone who wishes
to make up his own mind on the issues. This is not tee case with moral
understanding. It has usually been ignored and when its existence has been
acknowledged this has been dome inadvertently and without an awareness of
its significance. Hence, it is desirable to try to rescue this aspect of
morality from neglect and misunderstanding. Such an attempt will not leave
our view of moral assessment unchanged. A new insight into any aspect of
the concept of morality must affect the rest. At the very ieast the persp-
ectives will be altered by the location of moral assessment in a new setting.
Besides some significant questions will force themselves on our attention.
Given that a certain account of moral understanding is correct, what must
be true of moral assessment in order to make sense of current discussions
of the undifferentiated concept of morality? What does on.eneed to assume
in order to understand the things that are said about morality in general?
One can hardly claim that a particular view of moral assessment forces
itself on any reasonable person who considers the issues in this light.
It will always be necessary to allow for the element of arbitrariness that
is inescapable on such an approach. It may seem that certain assumptions
are demanded by the phenomena but the possibility of accounting for them
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in a quite different way can never be absolutely excluded. Nevertheless
a particular theory can be made to seem extremely plausible and part of
our aim will be to achieve this for moral assessment. We shall then go
on to offer some independent arguments in the hope of establishing it.~
decisively.
The first step is to offer a characterisation of moral
understanding. Following lines suggested by the introductory remarks on
method, this will be given in terms of the distinctive kind of meaning
or significance that is involved. To have moral understanding of an action
is to see it ~s part of an activity or mode of behaviour whose significance
derives from its 'ownnature rather than from anything external. It should
be contrasted with any interpretation of the world of human action in
terms of transcendental objects and any tendency to see the 'sense' of it
as located outside that world itself. The notion of 'meaning' or 'signifi-
cance' which is used here may be explained by sayin.g that to see an activity
as 'meaningful' is to see that there are reasons for engaging in it. The
contrast between moral and non-moral understanding may now be drawn in
terms of the kind of reason appropriate in each case. To see an activity
in a moral light is :tosee it as meaningful in terms of reasons involving
no reference to concepts which are fully intelligible outside the framework
of the activity itself. Thus, no characterisation of the entities or states
of affairs referred to in the reason will be adequate without invoking
the activity for which it is a reason. The point may be expressed by using
the familiar distinction between internal and external relations. To hage
moral understanding of mne's activities is to Bee them as meaningful in
terms of reasons which make no reference to concepts except ones to which
the activity is internally related.
Reasons of this kind may well strike an unsympathetic critic
as odd. He may feel that they merely serve to emphasise a particular aspect
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of the activity or offer a redescription of it from a different point of
view. Because the 'reasons' never involve any external point of reference
they may exer~ no leverage on someone who is dubious about the activity
as a whole or wishes to call it into question. In the end, it may be said,
all such reasons are tautologous - they come down to the assertion that
one engages in the activities one engages in because they are what they
are. There is a difficulty here which can be explaine4 but perhaps not
diSSOlved. Nevertheless a clear statement of it throws some light on the
nature of moral understanding. It is not surprising that the resources of
language should often fail us when we try to get someone to share our
moral attitude towards a certain activity. Internal reasons may not satisfy
him because of the difficulties mentioned above and, in the nature of the
case, he cannot successfully be given external ones. For to be moved by
such considerations is to be excluded from moral understanding by defini-
tion. In some cases the limits of rational debate may be reached very
quickly and one may have to admit that no further considerations capable
of determining the intellect of one's interlocutor are available. The
reasons one gives for engaging in an activity towards which one adopts
the moral point of view may not seem to him like reasons at all unless
he knows from his own experience what it is like to engage in other activ-
ities in the same spirit. If he does, then he is merely being asked to
extend the range of his sympathies. If he does not, talk of 'reasons' may
be out of place: to persist in it is to try to say what can, at best, only
be shown. A wiser plan would be to describe, with as much concrete detail
as possible, the way of life of a man who is accUstomed to viewing his
activities in the light of morality. Or, better still, one might advise
the objector to observe such a person for himself. The force of the example
may lead him to take the first steps on the same path, and, if it does,
he may come to see the point of the reasons which were offered earlier.
There is an element of paradox here. It consists in the fact that the
reasons are now likely to be redundants they can only be appreciated when
they no longer satisfy any serious need. This phenomenon may be explained
by attending to the initial characterisation of moral understanding. It
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is precisely because the reasons it demands are internal ones that they
can get no grip on someone who stands entirely outside the moral scheme
of things. What he needs is a new way of looking at his life, a different
mode of vision, and reason by itself may be helpibess to bring such changes
about. They depend, for most people, upon the natural development of one's
response to experience and so must await the fullness of time. The paradox
described here has striking affinities with certain problems that arise
in the philosophy of education. In teaching children one encounters parad-
igmatic cases of reasons being either unintelligible (before they have
mastered a subject) or otiose (afterwards). This state of affairs may be
a source of concern to the teacher who wishes both to respect the children's
autonomy and to impart something of value to them. Some light may be thrown
on it by exploring further the analogy with moral understanding. Besides,
the thesis we shall present has a more general relevance to the problems
of moral education. An attempt will therefore by made in a later chapter
to come to grips with these issues.
A formal characterisation of moral understanding has been
given, the main need now is to clarify it and to draw out its implications.
The first step is to bring it in.tobetter focus by marking it off from
certain other positions with which it might be confused. Then, in the next
two chapters it will be given Bornecontent by establishing which of our
familiar ways of looking at the world it includes and which ones it excludes •.
'IOnly by getting down to detail in this way can one hope to show what subst- 1
ance the thesis has. r
I
I
!
I
i
One might be tempted to think that the central point could
be expressed as follows: to take the moral point of view is to regard ones
activities as constituting their own end. The main objection to this
formula is not that it is positively incorrect but that it is difficult
to see what precisely it amounts to and, hence, it is liable to mislead.
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A plausible gloss would be to take it as asserting that to adopt the moral
point of view is to see ones activities as worth pursuing for their own
sake. This is still, however, not completely clear and seems capable of
at least two interpretations. One would involve taking the phrase 'worth
pursuing for their own sake' to mean 'worth pursuing just for the sake
of the pleasure they give, regardless of any other consideration.' This
would fit in well with the ordinary notion of what it is to do something
for its ovm sake. But the suggestion that one takes the moral point of
view when one considers activities purely in the light of the pleasure
they give is quite implausible. The paradigm of a moral attitude would
be provided by the glutton or lecher. Another view would take 'worth purs-
uing for their own sake' to mean 'worth pursuing as things good in themselve.
and not because of their consequences, possessing intrinsic as opposed to
instrumental value~. The results of such an interpretation are close to
what usually seems intended whenever the moral point of view is referred
to in the recent literature. This.however serves primarily to reveal a
failure to come to grips with the problems. For the result of taking such
a line is that the distinction between understanding and assessment becomes
blurred. To see ones activities in a moral light is simply to be disposed
to make a particular kind of favourable moral assessment of them. Clearly
it is assessment which benefits from this conceptual erosion and the
tendency to concentrate on it at the expense of understanding is an import-
ant source of weakness in contemporary philosophy. To arrive at an adequate
conception of morality it is essential to preserve the distinction and
keep a balance between its elements. Any view that threatens this must
be rejected.
There is another misinterpretation which should be guarded
against: as before it consists in tryint to characterise 'the moral' in
terms of the distinctive ~ kind of ends involved. The suggestion
is that to take the moral point of view is to interpret the meanin.gfulness
of ones activities in terms of ends which are constituted by states of·
affairs internally related to one's conception of the activities. An
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example may be given which serves both to illustrate the reasoning behind
this formula and to suggest why it will not do. Suppose that a man seeks
in all he does to promote God's will. Such an end cannot simply be read
off from his behaviour or empirically established by attending to the
effects of what he does. To understand it one has to take account of the
way he himself characterises his activities. If his conception of them
changes, his view on what constitutes the attainment of the end will change
also. Thus, an, adequate characteril!:;ationof the end will necessarily involve
reference to what the agent conceives himself to be doing in struggling
to realise it. The case fits the formula being discussed but it would
surely be implaasible to suggest that the man must have a distinctively
moral form of understanding of his activities. To do so would bring the
concept of moral understanding in danger of vacuity. Indeed the feature
in question might well be thought of as serving to distinguish human
actions in general from those of animals. Thus A.Phillips Griffiths has
argued that:
'••the ends of beasts must be discovered - and this is true however
resolutely teleological our descriptions of animal behaviour - by
attention to the effects of their activity; whereas the ends of men
are intelligible, not in terms of the actual effects of what they do,
but in terms of obiects internally related to their conceptions of
their activities'.
A similar point underlies the advocacy of verstehen in the social sciences.
What distinguishes social action, and hence all characteristicallj human
action, it is alleged, is that it is, in Weber's phrase, action to which
a x 'subjective meaning' is attached. It is precisely because the ends
men have are internally related to the meaning they give their actions
that a grasp of it is felt to be a necessary condition of sociological
understanding. Now claims such as the8e are not uncontroversial: they
would, no doubt, be rejected by a thorough-going positivist. Fortunately
there is no need to argue ther. merits here, for the important point so
far as this discussion is concerned is quite clear. It is that, if they
are true at all, they are true of human behaviour in a very general sense;
one far wider than anything that could reasonably be claimed as denoting
I
1. Kant on Ma!turbation, (Unpubl. paper).
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the realm of the moral. It is perhaps worth noting in conflusion that the
use of our original criterion enables one to avoid having to attribute
moral understanding to the man in the example. For the way he justifies
his activities involves reference to a concept ti ('God') which he may
well think of as wholly external to them. Thus if he holds a traditional
view of religious truth he may believe that the path to an understanding
of the concept is through metaphysical speculation rather than through
the socioloGY of religion.
A feature cornman to all of these misinterpretations is that
they involve explicit reference to 'ends' and implicit reliance on the
notion of 'means to ends'. This sugGests that the ends-means category may
be ~~ unsuitable weapon in the present case. There are general considerat-
ions which might be taken to support such a view. No doubt people do some-
times find themselves in the kind of situation which the classification
fits perfectly. They have a clearly defined goal and feel free to choose
whatever method offers the best hope of achieving it. But it is at least
equally characteristic of human activity that the value attached to an
end should not be independent of the means used to attain it. What is
desired is a state of affairs seen not as a detached and self-justifying
goal but as a destination that must be reached by a particular route. One
could say of such cases that in them the means are an integral part of
the agents conception of the end. But clearly the ends-means distinction
does not constitute the most natural way of de.cribing them and in etre.ch-
ing it to fit there is the risk of draining it of all its sharpness and
utility. Other difficulties sternnot so much from the agents attitude as
from the nature of the activities themselves. Sometimes it is possible
to draw the ends-means contrast in a fairly unproblematic way; the taking
of unpleasant medicines, for instance. But in m~ other cases the distin-
ction is harde~ to apply, for no determinate end can be specified apart
from the means used to attain it; for instance, rearing children, listening
to music, defending the fatherland. This difficulty is important when
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discussing the moral point of view. To take this viewpoint is to see the
sense 0"£ one's activities as located with the activities themselves. This
is at least to say that they do not derive their point from being directed
to an external goal. But there is a kind of dualism about the possibilities
of giving a further description of the situation. Since there is no deter-
minate goal to be achieved one might say that success in the activity
consists simply in taking part. Or one might hold that the notions of
success and failure have no application here. Similarly one could say that
to see one's activities in the light of morality is to see ends and means
as indissolubly fused: the means become ends and no ends can be distingui-
shed apart from the means. Or one might say that to take the moral point
of view is precisely to see one's activities as no longer subject to the
category of ends and means. On grounds of clarity and economy t the second
kind of description is preferable in each case. The concepts of success-
failure and ends-means do not apply naturally to the material. Their use
is liable to mislead unless accompanied by special explanations and satis-
factory alternatives are readily available. Hence we do well not to try
to cram the phenomena into these alian categories.
The conclusion seems to be that our approach to moral
understanding must continue to centre around the distinctive kind of
'meaning' and "reasons' which it involves. The problem is to show how a
fully satisfactory account of it can be built around these concepts. A
particular thesis has been advanced here and the subsequent discussion
has done something to sharpen our apprehension of it and guard against
misunderstanding. The biggest hurdle remains to be surmounted. The crucial
test is whether the thesis has explanatory value when applied to the comp-
lexities of ~ intellectual life. We must therefore turn to examine the
relation between it and the phenomena that force themJIelves on ones atten-
tion when one considers the varied ways in which men have tried to make
sense of their experience.
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Chapter 2.
BELIEVERS AND HmtANISTS.
A striking feature of the distinction between moral and
non-moral understanding is that, in practice, it cuts across many of our
conventional categories. To begin with, it will be shown how the process
works for religious believers and for others who might loosely be called
'humanists'. A certain conclusion may seem to emerge irresistibly from
the discussion. It is that a general transition from non-moral to moral
forms of understanding characterises the intellectual history of the last
hundred 7e~rs. The phenomena are, however, very complex and only some
aspects of them can be dealt with here. Besides we are concerned with the
history of ideas not for its own sake but only in so far a.sit helps us
to draw out the implications of certain conceptual distinctions and to show
their relevance to human experience. The evidence to be considered ma.y seem
to point decisively in a particular direction and one can hardly avoid
noting that this is so. But any historical thesis that is suggested by it
must be regarded as highly tentative. It should be seen not as the conclu-
sion of an excursiDn into history but, at best, as a suggested starting
point. Perhaps the hypothesis of a general transition from the non-moral
to the moral might be of heuristic value to the historian of ideas. But
to explore its implications he would need to engage in a large scale indep-
endent study.
Traditional religious views provide the clearest paradigms
of non-moral understanding. Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition at lea.st,
God has generally been thought of as a transcendent personal Being entirely
distinct from His creation. Thus, as E.L.Mascall notes, although the Bible
is not directly concerned with metaphysics, it 'does in fact rest upon a
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profound metaphysical assumption, namely that of the absolute transcendence
and independence of Cod,.l Within this tradition the world of human action
is seen as co-existing with, and permeated by intimations of, another
world in which its meaning and fulfilment are to be sought. Someone who
belonged to it would tend to interpret the significance of his activities
in terms of concepts which are wholly external to them. They may, perhaps,
be seen as fragments of a cosmic plan which men have no part in shaping
and which is only partially and fitfully intelligible to them. The approp-
riate attitude to the author of the plan is one of worship, but God would
still be Cod whether or not Re possessed the relational property of
'being worshipped by men' I it is not an essential element in Ris nature.
Clearly, someone who views his actions in this way does not have a moral
understanding of them.
However, this position is not the only one which can claim
to be 'religious' and which allows conspicuous room for talk of Cod. Some
recent work on the philosophy of religion presents a very different picture.
The contrast may be illustrated dramatically. P.T.Geach has revealed one
pillar of the :braditional view in.noting that Aquinas, having a distaste
for philosophical sounding arguments, took for his starting point 'a
notion more familiar to ordinary believers in God - that God made the
world and keeps it gOing,.2 Against this may be placed the Eer,omt remarks
by D.Z.Phillips in the introduction to a collection of essays on the fact
that: 'People still seem tb think of Cod's relation to the world as that
of artificer to artifact,.3 Re mentions some of the difficulties ~~maxmf
his contributors finds with this notion and adds: 'Perhaps I should want
to go further and say that to be in the grip of such a belief is to be in
the grip of evil,.4 It would probably not be unfair to regard Phillips as
1. E.L.Mascall, Existence and Analogy, Longmans 1949, p.18.
2. P.T.Geach and G.E.M.Anscombe, Three Philosophers, Blackwell, 1961,
p.169.
3. D.Z.Phillips ad., Religion and Understanding, Blackwell, 1967, p.4.
4. 6;b1d. p.4.
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belonging to the school of thought which Kai Nielsen has, rather tendent-
iously, labelled 'Wittgensteinian Fideism',l and the volume he has edited
contains many of its key texts. For present purposes the important point
about these thinkers is that, in Nielsen's words, 'they stress that relig-
ious concepts can only be understood if we have an insiders grasp of the
form of life of which they are an integral part,.2 Norman Malcolm, for
instance, writes:
'I am sure therfl cannot be a deel'understanding of that concept (ie.
the concept of an infinite being) without an understanding of the
phenomena of human life that gives rise to it,.3
and:
'••1 suspect that the argument (ie. the ontological argument), can
be thoroughly understood only by one who has a view of that human
·form of life" that gives rise to the idea of an infinitely great
~eing, who views it from the inside not just from the outside and
who has, therefore, at least some inclination to partake in that
religious form of 1ifet.4
Peter Winch asserts that what God's reality amounts to 'can only be seen
from within the religious tradition in which the concept of God is used ••'
For, 'it is within the religious use of language that the con.cept of God's
reality has its place ••'5 Phillips takes'.the connection between understand-
ing religion and being actively concerned with it as a believer further
than mDst of the others. In his view, 'understanding religion is incompat-
ible with scepticism,.6 It is not even sufficient to have been an active
believer in the past: to stop believing is to step under_tanding.
'To nollonger believe in God is not to disbelieve one thing among many
of the Bame kind, but to see no sense in anything of that kind. What
has become meaningless is not some feature of a form of life, but aform of life as such.'7
1. 'Wittgensteinian Fideism', Philosophy, July 1967, pp.19l-209.2. ~.cit. 1'1'.191-192.
3. Religion and UnderstandiI!,g,1'.68.
4. ibid. p.61. 5. ibi4. 1'.12. 6. ibid. 1'.79.
7. From World to God, P.A.S. Su1'p.Vo1. 1967, 1'.141.
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Although there are considerable differences of emphasis
among ~1ittgensteinian Fideists their views have enough coherence to
justify the classification. It may advance the discussion if the common
core is set out clearly:
(a) Religious concepts in general, and that of God in particular, are
only fully intelligible if one has grasped the nature of the character-
istic human activities which revolve around them; for example, prayer
and worship.
(b) One cannot understand these phenomena unless one has a participants
knowledge of them.
(c) Hence, one cannot understand the basic concepts of religion unless
one knows what it is like to participate in ~eligious activities.
The second premise is best understood as part of a gen.eral thesis which
haswide implications for the study of society. Its fullest and most
persuasive exposition is to be found in Peter Winch's The Idea of a
~l SCience,l To discuss it would take us far afield, and this is
scaruely necessary since proposition Ca) is the crucial one for our
purpcses. The claim is that religious concepts cannot be fully understood
in isolation from certain modes of human behaviour. Thus, activities such
as praying, worshipping, and working out one's salvation are internally
related to the idea of God. A man who takes this view may well use the
same words to characterise and justify his actions as would the traditional
believer. But on his lips their significance is quite different. FOD the
interpretation he gives them satisfies the criterion of moral understanding
which the other conspicuously does not.
1. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
The difference between these two versions of the religious
attitude are worth exploring further. Some of the most interesting
concern. the question of whqt is involved in understanding and accepting
the existence of God. The traditional view implies that to understand
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certain human activities one must have a grasp of the key concepts around
which they revolve: God, Hell, Heaven, salvation, eternal life and so on.
The alternative viel-ris that to understand religious concepts one needs
to have an insiders knowledge of certain human ~tivities. The implicat-
ions of this contrast are far reaching. One of them is explicitly stated
and accepted by Phillips: it is that, on his account of things, 'there
can be no theoretical knowledge of God,.l That is, there can be no know-
legds of Him apart from an active involvement in religious life. It
follows that rational arguments can never suffice to achieve conversion.
For someone who was outside the religious scheme of things could not e~en
understand them. It also foIl ows that ~quinas' s belief in a l-rayto God
through metaphysical reflection alone must be rejected. In general, any
attempt to establish His existence from facts about the w·orldmay be
ruled out in advance. For the data must either be viewed from within the
context of religious belief where God's existence cannot sensibly be
denied, or from outside it, and there His existence is unintelligible.
A statement asserting the existence of God can never be treated as a
claim to an ordinary piece of propositional knowledge. It must be taken
either as a piece of verbiage or as a shorthand description of a way of
life. In either case one cannot treat God's existence or non-existence
as a particular fact about the universe which can be grasped in isolation
from all others. It is this line of thought that seems to underlie
Phillips's assertion that 'It makes as little sense to say that God's
existence is not a fact as it does to say that God's existence is a
fact,.2 Sometimes, indeed, Wittgensteinian Fideists give the impression
that coming to believe in God involves no ontological commitment at all.
Thus, Phillips writes:
'Coming to see that there is a God is not like coming to see that
an additional being exists ••• Coming to see that there is a God
involves seeing a new meaning in one's life and being given a newunderstanding,.3
1. Religion and Understanding. p.79.
2. ~. p.66. 3.~. p.68.
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Again the conclusion follows naturally from the basic assumptions. The
essence of conversion cannot be a realisation that the proposition'God
exists' is true, for, in itself, this claim is no more acceptable than
its negation. It consists rather in learning to operate a form of disco-
urse which has the concept of God at its centre, and this development is
inseparable from a shife of perspective on one's own life and actions.
Phillips would be perfectly willing to admit that there is nothing part-
icularly original about his statement of these ideas. Essentially the
same points had been made by Kierkegaard when he said, 'God does not
exist, He is eternal', 1 and by Hittgenstein: 'To believe in a ~od means
to understand the question about the mean.i.ng of life•••To believe in a
.God means to see that life has a meaning'. 2 Nevertheless, the way Phillips
formulates the thesis is useful in that it brings out very clearly what
is for us the vital point. In the introduction to Religion and Understan-
ding he writes:
' ••1 did see as a common thread in all the papers, the centrality of
the concept of understanding in relation to religion. Furthermore the
analyses of religious beliefs g3ven by these philosophers seem to me
to show what true religion is'.
The argument of this chapter is that what Wittgensteinian Fideism offers
is indeed a mode of understanding and the verbal parallels with Phillips's
characterisation of his position are significant. The essence of it is
the view that 'true religion' should be thought of not as a corpus of
truths about God and the world but as a technique for organising human
experience and giving it meaning. The kind of meaning involved is such
as to bring this mode of understanding within the scope of the moral.
As an interpretation of religion it has the advantage of enabling the
apologist to sidestep many traditional criticisms, but it does lead to
problems of its own. A study of them lies outside the scope of this chaptet
but since our line of argument generates them in an accute form it may
be relevant to mention some in passing. In the past there have been
thinkers, such as Hurne, who wished to empty religion of its cognitive
1• ..£.2!!:cludingU .scientific Postscript, Quot4d by Phillips, ..2l2.,ill. p.69.
2. llotebooks, p.14.
3. p.6.
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content but they have not usually been regarded as its friends. Many
~'littgensteinianFideists, on the other hand, are Christians and seem to
feel that their arguments have a tendency to support the Christian scheme
of things. But, apart fDom all else, there is.surely a difficulty in
seeing what the donnection is between the concept of God they work with
and the traditional Christian notion of a transcendent personal being.
Horeover, if 'there is no theoretical knowledge of God' theology must be
an empty subject. All that could remain for the redundant theologians
is the study of certain forms of human activity; the sociology of the
religious life. Finally one might wish to inquire what issues of substance
now divide these religious believers from many who would call themselves
atheists. Obviously there ar-edifferences of vocabulary and of emotional
atmosphere but what else is involved? The issue becomes of particular
interest when, as is someti~es the case, each side may be seen to possess
a form of moral understanding. It has therefore a more direct relevance
to our thesis than the other questions raised above and we shall return
to it later.
********iC·******
It is not only for religious believers that the distinction
between the moral and the non-moral cuts across traditional categories.
!he process may be equally well illustrated by their humanist adversaries.
In this discussion 'humanism' will be used in a wide sense to include any
position which regards human beings as the sole rational occupants of
the earthly stage, with no help or hindrance to be expected from supernat-
ural agen.eies, and responds to this situation with something other than
despair. Non-moral versions of the humanist outlook depend characteristic-
ally, though not necessarily, on a doctrine of inevitability; the view,
for instance, that hunan development is leading inexorably to the classless
SOCiety or to some final state of evolutionary perfection. Thus, ~
,£ommunist Manifesto declared that 'the downfall of the bourgeoisie and
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the victory of the proletariat a.r.equally inevitable'. Darwin belie-ged
that 'as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each
bein.g, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards
perfection,.l In the hands of I.Iarxistsand Darwinians these claims Trlere
to take more grandiose forms. Thus, the biologist Joseph Needham, whose
views are an interesting combination of these versions of non-moral
humanist understa.."lding,writes:
'•••the new world order of social justice and comradeship, the
rational and classless world state is no wiLd idealistic dream,
but a logical extrapolation from the whole course of evolution,
having no less authority than that behind it, and therefore of
all faiths the most rational'.
and:
••••the organisation of human society is only as yet at the beginning
of its triumphs. and •••these triumphs are inevitable, since the~ lie
a.Long the road traced out by the entire evolutionary process ••'
Of course, if the goal of human history is inevitable then
it will come whatever any human being may do. A man who sees the signifi-
cnace of his activities as consisting in their location in such a series
can never conceive of any particular thing he does as internally related
to the final term. His conception of the classless society is fully
intelligible in isolation from the human struggle that precedes its
establishment. A characterisation of it may be fully adequate without
takinf any account of these preliminaries since tbey have no influence
OD. its nature. The contrast with the viewpoint of morality is obvious,
but like religious forms of non-moral understanding, doctrines of this
kind have run into difficulties in recent times. In the first place zi±2
attempts to establish general laws of human development are open to
serious theore1;ical Objections.3 Besides, inevitabili ty theses are subject
1. The Origin of Species, quoted in Antony Flew, Evolutionary Ethics,
Macmillan, 1968, p.IS.
2. Time: The Refreshing River, quoted in Flew, ~.£!1. pp.23-24.
3. See, for instance, Sir Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism;
Sir Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability.
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to the recalcitrance of events and this sort of pressure may come to
impose an intolerable strain. Thus, the history of the tlY'entiethcentury
has been unfavourable to the more facile kind of Victorian evolutionism.
Another difficulty, to which r:arxism is particularly liable, sternsfrom
a tension between the supposed inevitability of the goal and the desire
to promote the cause in practice. Marx took account of this to the extent
of allowing that revolutionary activities could lessen and shorten the
birth pangs of the new era. In the hands of practical men like Lenin t~e
doctrine was further diluted in the interests of political action. Event-
ually the English Marxist, R.Palme Dutt, was able to write:
'It is the very heart of the revolutionary Marxist underatan.ding of
inevitability that it has nothing in common with the mechanical
fatalism pf which our opponents incorrectly accuse us. This inevita-
bility is realised in practice through living human wills under given
social conditions, consciously reacting to those conditions, and
consciously choosing their line between alternative possibilities
seen by them within the given conditions'.
Antony Flew's comment on this passage is a reasonable one: it is to the
effect that the talk of inevitability without qualification is thoroughly
misleading. Once it is admitted that l",hathappens in history is the mm
outcome of human decisions then, even though one claims to know how in
fact people will decide, the strict inevitability thesis has been aband-
oned. More important from our point of view, one has given up the concep-
tion of history as the working out of a design which is independen~ of
human wills and purposes. Itsssignificance is no longer claimed to be
intelligible apart trom the actual course of events. Instead it is seen
to be latent in the story and on.lyto be divined by attending to the
details. tvhat these changes amount to is the abandonment of non-moral
understanding.
The transition to the moral can be traced even more readily
with Darwinian evolutionism. In his preface to Flew's Evolutionary Ethics,
W.D.Hudson refers to 'the confidence of some nineteenth century thinkers
1. Quoted in Flew, ~.£!1. p.25.
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that, by a process as inevitable as the survival of the fittest in the
animal kingdom, those principles of action and traits of character which
are morally best will progressively triumph over all other elements in
human nature till man becomes perfect', and he remarks that 'few, if any'
now share this confidence. Perhaps the most likely place to look for
those who do is atnpng the members of the British Humanist Association,
for organised humanism tends to trace its intellectual ancestry to the
nineteenth century background which Hudson has in mind. Even among its
ranks, however, there has been backsliding. Thus, A.J.Ayer, writing ~s
President of the B.R.A. in the Association's journal, discusses the
question 'what meaning can life have?' and comments:
'If What is sought here is an assurance that our lives play their
part in the fulfilment of some cosmic purpose, then the answer is
that this assurance cannot be given. Neither is it easy to see why
it should be sought, since there can be little satisfaction in the
idea that we play our allotted roles in a scheme the design of whiCh
is unintelligible to us and one for which we ourselves are in no wayresponsible,.l
Later in the same article he writes:
'I do not look forward to any millenium but only to a state in which
the vast majority of people have the material opportunity and the
moral and intellectual resources to lead satisfactory lives. I do
not know whether such a state will ever be attained, but I believe
that it is attainable. Even by granting the record of man's inhumanity
to man, and his proved capacity for self-destruction, I still have
more faith2in his intelligence and goodwill. In this sense I am a.Humanist'.
These passag4s contain an explicit rejection of two characteristic
features of non-moral understanding; the idea that we play our allotted
roles in a scheme the design for which we are in no way responsible and
the claim to possess a. guarantee of '\'lhatthe future will be like. For
Ayer, man makes his history and the meaning it has is inherent in the
process, not borrowed or imposed from without. Clearly what he is advoca-
ting is a form of moral understanding. His fellow humanist, Antony Flew,
has given a vigorous account of the way in which Darwinian. humanism, by
1. 'What I Believe', Humanist, August 1966, p.221.
2. ibid. p.22$
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a process parallel to the development of Christian thought, arrived at
a version of moral understanding. I Flew is sympathetic to the Darwinian
moralists but he concludes that the most one can salvage from their work
is a recommendation of what he calls 'seeing in an evolutionary perspec-
tive'. This kind of vision is intended as a way of satisfying the longing
which some men have 'to see things as a whole, to find some deep, compre-
hensive, unifying perspective against which they may set their everyday
lives,.2 'No philosopher', he argues, 'can afford either to despise or
not to share such yearnings' and he goes on to quote approvingly form
Julian Huxley:
'In the light of evolutionary biology man ca.nnow see himself as the
tole agent of further evolutionary advances on this planet, and one
of the fev-lpossible instruments of progress in the universe at large.
He finds himself in th4 unexpectedl position of business manager for
the cosmic process of evolution. He no longer ought to feel separated
from the rest of nature, for he is part if it - that part which has
become conspicuous, capable of love and understandin.g and aspiration.
He need ~o longer regard himself as insignificant in relation to thecosmos. 'j
On the Flew-Huxley view the significance which evolution can provide is
not to be thought of in terms of a static and inevitable goal, conceptually
distinct from the human strivings that precede it. Instead it is seen to
be inherent in a dynamic process of which man is in control. As 'the sole
agent of further evolutionary advances' and 'business manager- for the
cosmic process of evolution' the operations of the evolutionary processX%2,
are, as it were, constituted by the m~~er in which he discharges his
responsibilities. Human activities comprise a self-sufficient world whose
sense is not to be located in any external source. It is a distinctively
mODal form of understanding that is being advocated here.
*************
An attempt must now be made to clarify the relations
between the ~arious theories that have been discussed. To begin with,
1. Evolutionary Ethics.
2. ~.£!!. 1'.60.
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one should note the conceptual gulf between traditional religious views
and the religious version of moral understanding. ~ On ene side the
essence of religion is seen as consisting in a set of cosmological and
ontological truths, and on the other in its solution to the problem of
how men can be given a means of conceptualising their experience. It is
not just the details of the traditional scheme that are found wanting by
adherents of the latter viel". They would reject the suggestion that any
story of that kind could possibly be regarded as satisfactory. Perhaps
the central objection is to the tendency to think of God as a discrete,
individual item in the furniture of the universe, very different of course
from all the others but equally capable of being apprehended in is~lation.
Hhat this overlooks, it is a.lleged, is the constitutive role of the
concept of God within a particular universe of discourse and the internal
nature of the relations between them. Thus, one is encouraged to think
that the concept can be understood apart from the form of life which
revolves around it and which gives it meaning. This in turn leads to
the assumption that evidence and argument san be brought to bear on the
question of God's existence just as they can for all other individual
entities in the world. The verdict which this suggestion provokes comes
out clearly in \Uttgensteins remarks on FT.O'liara:
'Iihat seems to me ludicrous about O'Hara is his making it appear to
be ~sonable •• I would definitely call O'Hara unreasonable. IIwould
say, if this is religious belief, then it's all superstition'.
The charge of superstition provides a useful clue to the attitudes of
Wittgensteinian Fideists to traditional believers. The basic objection
is that their views are caricatures of something which is of great impor-
tance and with which they profess to be vitally concerned. This feeling
is at times very near the surface, as in some of the remarks by Phillips
quoted above. It is, of course, notorious th~t disagreements between
people who claim to be devoted to the same things often have a certain
astrin,gency. But it is difficult not to see this particular one a.sa
reflection of the teneral schism which was referred to earlier. Thus it
may be tha.t any belief in transcendent entities or cosmic plans which
1. Lectures and ~onversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious
~elief, ed. Cyril Barrett, Basil Blackwell, 196b, pp.59-59.
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are independent of human control will strike many contemporary thinkers
as superstitious. That is, any:form of non-moral understan.ding will incur
this criticism. At any rate is seems clear that the failure to achieve
moral uhderstanding underlies it in the present case. The conceptual gulf
that has been described is in essence one between those who possess this
form of understanding and those who do not.
It is tempting to stress the closeness of the links between
the religious and humanist versions of moral understan.ding when they are
viewed against this background. The historical affinities are obvious:
the development of each seems to be explicable in terms of the general
transition from the non-moral. The recommendations arrived at, Phillips's
'seeing a new meaning in one's life' and Flew's 'seeing in a.nevolutionary
perspective' have more in common with each other than either has with the
views of Bishop Hilberforce or T.H.Huxley. Though they differ greatly in
the accounts they give of the world, they are united at a more fundameat.al
level; in their view of the kind of story thqt is a possible candidate.
Non of the views put forward in the Oxford debate of 1861 will do, and
neither will any other version of non-moral undee'standing. These conceptual
links between apparently opposite views are of great significan,ce and an.
awareness of it has implications for our picture of the contemporary
intellectual scene. Nevertheless the parallels can be taken too far. The
sense of propriety is easily offended by any facile lumping together of
people who feel themselves to differ profoundly. In the present Case there
seems tobe good reasons for such misgivings. Thus, someone who favoured
behavioural criteria of belief might very well be impressed by the need
to emphasise differences.'It is highly :probable that there are considerable
divergencies between the two groups in matters of church attendence, child
rearing practices, membership of voluntary associations and so on. On.
issues of public controversy such a.sabortion and euthanasia members of
each group may be found lining up with their traditionalist bretheren
~ather than with other exponents of the moral attitude. And, no doubt,
sociological questionaires would elicit other differences of outlook and
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behaviour. The point is that the particular version of moral understanding
which a man professes is not a trivial matter. His choice will tend to
foih.ourall his other attitudes and, with its ramifications, may be seen
as cohstitutive of a distinctive way of life. The observer may well be
struck by the radical differences between this way of life and those
associated with other forms of the moral outlook. Thus, moral understanding
does not seek to impose a single narrow vision of the world; within.it
there is room for great variety and freedom. This diversity exists, of
course, within a conceptual framework which is capable of sharp definition.
The combination o~ unity and multiplicity is an impoDtant feature of
moral understanding and in giving an account of it the central problem
is to do justice to both elements.
There is another, perhaps more fundamental, reason for
refusing to play down the differences between religious and humanist forms
od moral understanding. The conceptual gulf between Flew and Phillips on
the one hand and Huxley and Wilber~orce on the other has been remarked on.
It must now be noted that, in spite of the more urbane tone of their
discussion, there is an important sense in which our contemporaries have
less in common than their Victorian predecessors. Huxley and Wilberforce
differed profoundly in their view of the world but they took for granted
that it was the same world for both. Common to them was the tacit assump-
tion that they operated within a single universe of discourse whose function
was the objective delineation of reality. Thus if one was right about it
the other was wrong in a straightfor'1ard literal sense and all their
arguments and rhetoric were designed to securing a veriict on this issue.
Mankind was either created from nothing a few thousand years before Christ
or had evolved from more primitive forms over a much longer period. This
liasseen as a dispute over a question of fact and, in principle at least,
was resoluble by rational means. The situation of contemporary believers
and humanists is rather different. Enclosed within his own system of
internally related concepts each may well be incapable of coming to grips
in any significant way with his opp~ents case. The danger arises that
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intellectual controversy will tend to become the mere rehearsal of incomm-
ensurable views. The crucial change concerns the assumption that objective
standards are available in all disputes, that even for those between
different conceptual schemes there is the test of an independent reality.
Peter Winch has formulated·this aspect of the situation with particular
clarity. In 'UnderstC'.Ilding'a. Primitive Society' he takes the anthropologist,
E.E.Evans-Pritchard, to taSk for 'his attempt to characterise the scient-
1ific in terms of what is "in accord with objective reali tyllt• Evans-
Pritchard goes wrong in that 'although he emphasises that a member of a
scientific culture has a different conception of reality from that of a
Zande believer in magic' he 'wants to go beyond merely registering this
fact and making the differences explicit, and to say, that the scientific
conception agrees with what reality actually is like, whereas the magical
2conception does not'. The complaint is that, not content with explicating
the differences between Zande and European-scientific conceptions of
reali ty he wishes to go further and add, •the European is right and. the
Zande wrong'. This addition ~iinch stigmatises a.s'illegitimate'. 3 The
reason he gives is that the notion of the 'independently real' by which
mens ideas and beliefs can be checked only has application within a part-
icular universe of discourse, such as science or religion. It has none
where the thing to be assessed is itself in llinch's phrase a 'form of
the conception of reality,.4 Thus he writes:
'We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with
reality and test this by observation and experiment. Given the exper-
imental methods, and the established use of the theoretical termsentering into the hypothesis, then the question whether it holds or
not is settled by reference to something independent of what I, or
anybody else care to think. But the general nature of the data revealed
by the experiment can only be specified in terms of criteria built
into the methods of experiment employed and these, in turn, make sense
only to somevne who is conversant with the kind of scientific activity
within which they are employed ••• What Evans-Pritchard wants to be
able to say is that the criteria applied in scientific experimentation
constitute a true link between our ideas and an independent reality,
whereas those characteristic of other systems of thought-in particular,
magical methods of thought - do not. It is evident that the expressions
1. Americal Philosophical Quarterlz, Vol.I (1964), p.308. Reprinted in
Religion and Understanding.
2. ~.cit. 3. ~.~. p.3l3. 4. ~.~. p.315.
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"true link" and "independent reality" in the previous sentence cannot
themselves be explained by referen.ce to the scientific universe of
discourse, as this would beg the questi on. vie have then to ask how,
by reference to what established universe of discourse, the use of
those expressions is to be explained; and it is clear that Evans-
Pritchard has not answered this question'.
Ultimately, what underlies these claims is the Wittgensteinian thesis set
out in !!2.!._Ideaof a Social Science •.The Tractatus has stated that:
'To give the essence of proposition means to give ~he essence of all.description, therefore the essence of the world'. t5.4111).
and:
'That the world is !l1l world shows ,itself in the fact tha.tthe limits
of m~ language (of '.the on1:rlanguage I can understand) mean thelimits of ml world~. (5.62).
The moral drawn by Winch is that:
'••there is no way of getting outside the concepts in terms of which
we think of the ~orld •• The world i! for us what is presented throughthese concepts'.
The essence of the mistake that people like Evans-Pritchard are supposed
to make is now clear. It is that, in speaking of the superiority of
science to magic, they are assuming an objective reality which is indepen-
dent of our conceptual schemes and in terms of which they can be compared
and judged. On the Wittgensteinian-:Unch view of things no sense can be
given to this assumption.
The rele~ance of all this to the problem of the relationship
between religious and humanist versions of moral understanding is quite
direct. It lies in the ~act that within the realm of the moral all disputes
conform to the 1iinchian model of one between a scientific materialist and
a Zande. The merits of his general thesis are irrelevant here. One may
or may not approve of the tendency to represent intellectual disagreements
as, essentially, conflicts between universes of discourse which allow no
room for appeals to a higher authority. The point is that the parties to
a debate between different forms of moral understanding are necessarily
bound to such a view of their situation. This is so in virtue of the
2. The Idea ()f a Social Science,:p.15.
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peculiar nature of moral understanding. The essence of the moral attitude
lies in a refusal to justify one's activities in terms of concepts which
are wholly external to them. To adopt it is to be committed to an indepen-
dent and self-contained form of discourse. Hence discussions with adherents
of other versions of moral understanding are likely to have a special kind
of futility. If one remains within one's chosen world of discourse one
never engages with their concerns at all, and if one steps outside it to
seek mutually acceptable ground one has abandoned the moral attitude. Thus
the disagreement is not even in principle capable of rational resolution.
This is an important difference between the controversies of Victorian
believers and humanists and some contemporary ones. It may perhaps be seen
as another way of marking the extent of the conceptual gulf discussed
earlier. If there is anything in the suggestion that moral understanding
is to a significant extent characteristic of contemporary intellectual
life, one would expect to find that our disagreements in general are m
marked by this opacity to reason and the peculiarly interminable air that
.goes with it. It would not be hard to produce evidence which seems to
suggest that this is so. Thus one might be tempted to think that the thesis
advanced here could shed some light on the ~uch-discussed fragmentation
of our culture. But to pursue this suggestion would take one outside the
limits of the present inquiry and into the empirical study of society.
I
i
• I
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Chapter 3.
POLITICIANS AnD A..llTISTS.
In order to give examples of moral and non-moral understan-
ding distinctions have had to be made within traditional categories. It
would round off'this discussion neatly if one could now cite viewpoints
which belong unequivocably and in their entirety to each camp. iii th regard
to non-moral understanding there is, however, a difficulty to be noted.
It is highly :probable that most human beings, now as at'~all times in the
past, come within this category in so far as they can.be said to possess
any kind of comprehensive understanding of their activities. Their mater-
ial conditions have made it easy for them to see their lives as governed
by mysterious powers independent of human wills and purposes. Thus, a
community whose existence is thought to depend on the whims of the Rain-
God is not we1l placed to view human activity as an integral, self-su:f'fic-
ient realm, and its intellectual experience is perhaps not untypical of
most human communities throughout history. Nevertheless, in spite of the
universality of non-moral forms of understanding one encounters problems
in trying to unearth articulated modern versions of it. For the historical
developments discussed in the previous chapter have had most influence
on those who reflect systematically and present their conclusions in
public. Hence, it is not easy to f'ind expositions of non-moral understand-
in.gwhich are free of extraneous elements and have contemporary rather
than merely historical interest, and enough intellectual content to merit
serious discussion. In this situation one runs the risk of neglecting or
caricaturing the manner in which a large part of mankind conceptualises
:l!"sexperience.
Perhaps the best way to overcome the difficulty is by
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considering people whose outlook is dominated by various forms of what
might be called 'political' understanding. Thus, some versions of na.tion-
alism exemplify non-moral attitudes in a fairly clear-cut way. 'Nationalism'
is a protean and elusive term and it would be well to start by making
clear how it will be interpreted. S.I.Benn has usefully distinguished
five senses and the last of these is the most significant for our purposes.
In this sense nationalism is:
'••a political and anthropological theory which asserts that mankind
is naturally divided into nations, that there are determinate criteria
for identifying a nation and for recognising its members, that each
nation is entitled to an independent governl':lentof its wwn, that states
are legitimate only if constituted in accordance with this principle,
and that the world would be rightly organised, politically speaking,
only if every nation formed a single state and every state consisted
exclusively of the whole of one nation,.l
The authorities agree fairly closely in dating the origins of this complex
of ideas and doctrines. Benn attributes them to the end of the eighteenth
2century. In Hans Kohn's view they are 'not older than the sedond half'
of that century.3 Elie Kedourie begins his study by statihg flatly: 'Nation-
alism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth
century'. 4 ,- K.R.lUnogue agrees with Kedourie and remarks that 'his dating
of the emergence of these ideas would command general acceptan.ce.'5 It
seems reasonable therefore to take the second half of the eighteenth and
the beginning of the nineteenth century as the crucial period. There is
a similar measure of scholarly agreement ihat the key figures are the
writers and thinkers of the German Romantic movement: Fichte, Herder and
Schliermacher in particular. It was these man who created the conception
of the nation as a metaphysical entity, the expression of a particular
aspect of the Divine Nature. Schliermacher puts the claim in this way:
'Every nationality is destined through its peculiar prganisation and
its place in the world to represent a certain side of the divine image~ ••
For it is God who directly assigns to each nationality its definite
task on earth an~ inspires it with a definite s~irit in order to glorify
Himself through each one in a peculiar manner'.
1. 'Nationalism', ~cyclopaed~~ of Philosophy, General Editor Paul EdwardsVol.5. pp.442-443.
2. ibid. p.443. 3. The Idea of Nationalis.,!!!.
4. Nationalism, Hutchinson University Library, 1960. p.9.5. Nationalism, B.T.Batsford Ltd., 1961, p.18.
~. Quoted in Kedourie, ~.c1t. p.58.
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The nation demands the supreme loyalty of its members and, in.return,
gives their lives coherence and meaning. An illustration of the process
is provided by this extract from Ernst l!oritz Arndt written in 1813:
'I have known misfortunes; I have suffered; it has scarcely moved me
to tears. But when I ha~e thought of the ~ I have always had to
weep in the depth of my soul. Ttlhena great crowd moves before me,
when a band of warriors passes by with flmving banners and sounding
trumpets and drums, then I realise that my feelings and my actions
are not an empty illusion, then it is that I feel the indestructible
life, the eternal spirit, and eternal God ••• Like other men I am
egotistic and sinful but in my exaltation I am freed at once from all
my sins, I am no longer a single suffering individual, I am one with
the Volk, and God. In such a moment a:n.ydoubts about my life and work
vanish' .1
This passage is in.structive for it suggests strongly that
it would be a mistake to regard nationalism as 'political' in a narrow
sense, xxx as a form of understanding appropriate only to a limited ran.ge
of humrul activities. On the contrary, it transcends mere politics, or
perhaps more accurately one might say that it extends the political to
cover all of life. Fritz stern has said of the German nationalist Paul
de Lagarde that 'through politics'he 'sought to gain spiDitual ends, to
reach and transform the moral life of man,.2 A similar concern is evident
in the work of many nationalist lv.riters.The extravagant demands it makes
on political activity are among the most characteristic features of the
doctrine. Elie Kedourie offers a penetrating analysis of how this carne
about. He traces its intellectual origins to a combination of the Kan.tian
concern with freedom and the widespread emphasis in German thought on
tha value of the whole at the expense of its parts. Post-Kantians such
as Fichte were led to insist that the individual can realise his freedom
and hence his destin;t as a moral agent, only by absorption into an entity
greater than himself. The work of Herder and others was widely taken to
have shown that nationalities ane the ftUldamental, divinely-established,
units of mankind. Thus, the whole into which indilfiduals should merge
1. Quoted in IUnogue, .2£.cit. p.67.
2. The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley, 1961, p.101. Quoted in
Minogue, ~.ci~. p.78.
. )
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their separate wills and purposes came to be identified with the nation-
state. On the sociological side Kedourie argues that much can be explained
if one lbpks at the position of German intellectuals at the time. Deprived
of influence, and forced to endure what seemed to them the stifling
provincialism of the petty states, they longed for a transformation of
society which would lead to their worth being recognised and their alien-
ation cured. Such a change could only come through the establishment of
a single state for the whole German nation, a state of the kind foreshad-
owed in their metaphysics. In the 'Addresses to the German Nation' Fichts
had rejected a state which merely maintained 'inteTnal peace and a
condition of affairs in \"lhioheveryone may by diligence earn his daily
bread and satisfy the needs of his material existence so long as God
permits him to live'.'All this,' he went on to say, 'is only a means, a
condition, and a framework for what love of fatherland really wants to
bring about, namely, that the eternal and the divine may blossom in the
world and never cease to become more and more pure, perfect and excellen.t,l.
Politics, the process embodying th4 individuals relationship to the nation-
state, becomes on this view a matter of supreme importance. It is the
mean.s through which 'the eternal and the divine may blossom in the world',
and political issues involve man's deepest interests. No longer is politics
seen as a secular activity with the modest aim of ensuring certain external
preconditions of hum~~ freedom and the good life: it is itself the process
through which these values are realised. The end-product, absorption in
the organic unity of the nation-state.is the proper destiny of man. Many
people would, no doubt, agree with Kedourie in h~lding that such a view
radically misconceives what politics can do for us and is likely, in
practice, to lead to confusion and disaster. Whether or not one accepts
this valuation or the analysis that accompanies it one can hardly doubt
.that he has focused attention on a vital element in the ideology. The
extravagant ethical and metaphysical demands it makes of politics largely
account for the plausibility of the various attempts to interpret nation-
alism as a kind of religion for societies in which traditional beliefs
have lost their hold.2 However different in. other respects it shares with
1. Quoted in Kedourie, ~.cit. p.47.
2. See Hans Kohn's discussioh in The Idea of Nationalism.
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religion the ability to provide a comprehensive interpretation of expe~
ience and it can come to occupy a similar place in the believer's life.
The only form of understanding offered by the kind of nationalism consid-
ered so far falls wlnl outside the realm of the moral. S~I.Benn is being
quite uncontroversial in remarking that:
'As these writers sav ita nations existence did not depend on its
members choice or recognition; or rather because it formedltheir
consciousness they could hardly choose not to be members'.
Obviously to interpret one's activities in terms of such a concept of
the nation is to take a non-moral view of them.
Nationalism has provided 8.. convenient illustration of non-
moral understanding. But it would be false to conclude that nationalists
are necessarily committed to such a viewpoint. Here again the tendency
of the fundamental distinction to cut across other categories asserts
itself. In the present case everything depends on how the central concept
of the nation is understood. The writers we have discussed relied on
the so-called 'objective' criteria of nationality; language, race, culture I
and territory. Language in particular was taken to be an infallible guide.
Fichte in the 'Addresses to the German Nation' declared that:
'••we give the name of people to men whose organs of speech areinfluenced by the same external conditions, who live together,
and who dev~lop their language in continuous communication with
each other "t •
and:
'Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a
multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any
human art begins; they understand each other and have the power to
make themselves understood more and more clearly; they b&ong
together and are by nature one and inseparable whole •••'
The concern of these writers with language goes far beyond what might be
expected if it were merely a convenient way of identifying one's father-
land. Thus Herder argued that for a man to speak a foreigh language was
2. Quoted in Kedourie, ~.£i!.p.64.
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to live an artificial life and Fichte tried to show that the mere presence
of foreigh elehlents in a language can do moral harm to the speakers of
it.l Yet, though language is a vital strand in nationalist thought one
can go astray by trying to differentiate sharply between it and the other
obiective cr.iteria. This may direct attention away from essentials, as
Kedourie warns:
'In nationalist doctrine, language,race, culture, and sometimes even
religion, constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity,
the nation. The theory admits here of no great precision, and it is
misplaced ingenuity to try and classify nationalisms according to the
particular aspect which they choose to emphasise,.2
The truth is that the founders of nationalism never saw the need to
distinguish clearly between the various indices of nationhood. They took
for granted that although one or other might be convenient at different
times there could be no tension or conflict between them: all pointed
unambiguously in the same direction.
Later critics have found this assumption less than compelling.
Indeed, the difficulties associated with objective criteria have become
a commonplace of the literature. An obvious one is that there are groups
such as the Swiss which have good claims to be nations but do not satisfy
the criteria. And there are gro~ps which do satisfy one or other of them,
for instance, Scandinavians and the English-speaking peoples, yet do not
form single nations. Besides it has become widely realised that attempts
to take objective criteria seriously are likely to prove unworkable or
disastrous in areas of mixed race and language such as the Balkans and
l-lestAfrica. Considerations of this kind have envouraged a radically
different approach to the basic concept of the 'nation'. Ernest Renan's
lect1il.re'~ihatis the Hation?' (1882), is one of the earliest examples.
Renan saw the defects of linguistic and ethnic criteria very clearly and
drew the conclusion that, in the end, only the will Ibfits individual
members could determine whether a nation exists or not. This is the view
1. See Kedourie, ~.£i1. ch.5.
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summed up in the famous slogan: (the nation is a daily plebiscite'. The
implications of this reliance on will are sometimes Been very clearly.
Thus, the Jewish nationalist, !had Ha'am (1856-1921) declared that onee
the 'spirit of nationality' has come into being:
'••it becomes a phenomenon that concerns the individual alone, its
reality being dependent on nothing but its presence in his psyche,
and on no external or objective actuality. If I feel the spirit of
Jewish nationality in my heart so that it stamps all my inward life
with its seal, then the spirit of Jewish nationality exists in me;
and its existence is not at an end even if all my Jewish contemporar-
ies should cease to feel it in their hearts,.l
Essentially what these writers are claiming is that the nation exists
if people think it does. It is constituted by the wills and consciousness
of its members and has no independent life apart from them. This is a
quite different view of the nation from that held by Fichte and Schlier-
macher. The significance of the change is that it embodies the operation
within nationalist thought of the general trgnsition from the non-moral
to the moral. Once more we seem to have confirmation of the suggestion
that any tendency to interpret hlli~anactivities in terms of external
concepts is antipathetic to an important strand in modern thought. To
the man who has renounced 'superstition' the nation of Fichte is at least
as objectionable as the God of traditional Christianity. Both lead us to
seek the sign.ificance of our actions in an ontology that transcends them
and so direct attention away from the only kind of meaning they can
legitimately have.
The recourse to 'subjective' criteria has not silenced
criticism. Kedourie, for instance, cQmplains that the metaphor of a
daily plebiscite shows 'how inadequate the doctrine is in.describing
the political process, for a political community which conducts daily
plebiscites must soon fall into querulous anarchy, or hypnotic obedience,.2
Benn argues that if one accepts subjective criteria there can be no defence
against the national claims of sub-groups, however small or hetrogeneous.
1. Quoted in Kedourie, ££.£i1. p.8l.
2. ~.ill. p.81.
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Indeed, 'there is no good reason for stopping short of individual self-
determination,.l Clearly, it is not easy to weld the elements of national-
ism into a plausible or even coherent theory. Its!merits or defects as
an ideology do not directly concern us but we must take account of their
implication.s for the form of understanding of experience that issues from
it. Perhaps one should ~~ start by asking what precisely the
incoherence of the doctrine is supposed to consist in.~ straightforward
answer is available here. Benn, in a passage already quoted, described
nationalism as 'a political and an anthropological theory'. The essence
of the charge of incoherence is that the political and the anthropological
elements can never be got to lie down together. Given that nationalist
anthropology is correct, that the basic divisions of mankind are certain
ethnic and linguistic groups, it is not at all clear what political signif-
icance this fact has, and it may be thought that a serious attempt to
give it some is likely to have undesirable consequences in practi~e. On
the other hand a reasonable assessment of the kind of entities that might
form the elements of a viable political order seems unlikely to coincide
with the principles of nationalist anthropology. Thus, the nationalist
is faced with a choice. He can insist on the anthropology and neglect the
political implications, like the older kind of ~~elsh linguistic nationalist.
Or he can retain the link with political realities and be prepared to
ignore at least some intimations of the anthropology. In practice, much
seems to depend on whether he has power OD not. Nationalist governments
usually opt fot the latter alternative, while nationalists in opposition
often succeed in obscuring from themselves and others the need to make
a choice. Notoriously, when the new nation-state is actually established
the pressures that result may become intolerable. It seems fair to conclude
that the dynamic appeal of the doctrine rests on the joint acceptance of
two claims. The ethnic and linguistic groups called nations are, in fac;,
the natural and fundamental divisions of mankind and the political order
ought to be constructed in accordance with this fact. Its success depends,
one might say, on the way in which it seems to bridge the gap between
facts and values, between the condition of the world as it really is and
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the forms of human organisation ~hat ought to prevail in it. To note the
necessity for choice is to be reminded of the continued existence of the
gap. Of course one is then free to take a stand on one side or the other.
A man may continue to interpret the significance of his actions in terms
of the 'nation' and understand by this an ethnic grouping with ho political
significance. Or he may regard it as a political entity which may roughly,
but need not exactly, coincide with an ethnic division. But it is not
easy to see why anyone should regard the meaning of his life as inextric-
ably bound up with such a notion. Besides it seems doubtful that if these
features of it were generally recognised it would continue to arouse the
sarneenthusiasm as at present.
In the l:arxist tradition ideologies as forms of 'false
consciousness' are characterised by the illusion of being more solidly
grounded in reality than in fact they are. lihatever the truth of this
thesis in general it seems to provide a useful insight in the case of
nationalism. J'luchIilfits appeal does rest on the conviction that its
vision of how the world ought to be is somehow founded on, and guaranteed
by, the facts of how it actually is. To note the hiatus between the anthr-
opology and the politics is to reveal that this is not so. Someone who
has realised it may continue to operate with a merely anthropological
or a merely political nationalism. In either case he may choose to have a
moral or a non-moral understanding of his activities. For the objective
and subjective criteria are equally available to both. Thus, the units
of one's anthropology may be those groups whose members regard themselves
as constituting a nation and are determined to maintain it. The political
nationalist may agree with the Abbe Sieyes in holding that a nation is
'a union of individuals governed by .2!'!! law and represented by the same
law-giving assembly,.l Here, as so often elsewhere, rational argument
exercises no compulsion on practice. But it does serve to make clear the
1. Quoted in Benn, ~.2ii. 1'.443.
-39-
implications of our choices and the price to be paid for them.
********-l<.***
It is easier to find a clear-cut and unequivocal example
of the moral than the non-moral. The one to be discussed here is provided
by what might be called 'aesthetic' understanding. Any form of understan-
ding may involve seeing one's actions as elements in a pattern to which
aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic epithets are considered appropriate. Thus
it amy hinge on grasping their place in what is significantly called the
'story of one's life'. For the religi ous believer the backbone of the
story might be said to consist in his progress towards union with Cod.
He will ~ot, however, be primarily interested in assessing the plot in
terms of economy, symmetry, or elegance, though he may be aware of the
presence or absence of these qualities. His real concern is with its
effectiveness in bringing about the denouement. In aesthetic understanding,
on the other hand, the rationale of the p~ern is provided by concepts
whose standard application is to the products of art. People who take
this view often speak as though a man's life could be regarded as an
artefact: his situation, talents, character and desires are the raw
material on which he imposes order an.ddesign, and success or failure
is judged by the usual standards of aesthetic evaluation. It is, of
course, not necessary for a man to be a creative artist in order to view
his life in this way. Nevertheless the relationship between the two
enterprises is a complex one. Practitioners of aesthetic unde retanddng
have sometimes felt a tension to exist between them. The idea is that
if the aesthetic impulse is satisfied by life nothing \Olillbe left over
for art. This suggests that aesthetic understanding will have most appeal
for those with a strong urge to express themselves in abme form of art
and no talent for the usual ones. Thus, a passion for order has sometimes
been regarded as characteristic of the Nazi approach to politics and it
has been thought significant that so many of its leaders were themselves
failed artists. This example suggests a line of criticism of aesthetic
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understanding which demands attention; the claim that its practical
,
implications are likely to be disastrous. Later an attempt will be made
to show that it rests on a confusion. For the present we shall merely
note the plausibility of the suggestion that unless someone possesses
a fairly strong aesthetic sense he will not be greatly attracted by this
view of life. But this does not amount to anything like a conceptual link
between aesthetic understanding and artistic creation in general. It will,
nevertheless, be found that our illustrations of aesthetic understanding
draw heavily on people who were themselves professionally concerned vd th
literature. In part the reason for this is a simple technical on.e.Such
men are often exceptionally candid and articulate and so make good
subjects for discussion. Another part of the explanation may be given
in terms of a commonplace psychological mechanism. The shift from thinking
of one's life as a source of raw material for art to thinking of it as
itself an entity with aesthetic properties is easy to make. But there
is also a profounder link between art and moral understan.ding and some
preliminary discussion. loTiII be needed before it can be understood.
A convenient starting point is offered by the Bareer of
the poet Edwin Il:uir.The first version of his autobiography was called
The Story and the Fable. R. :i.Hepburn has commented on this vrcrk as followss
,Significantly titled; for lfuir contrasts the "story" of his life (the
bare narration of events) with its "fable" - a slowly developing,
often elusive, cluster of personal symbols, compounded of childhood
memories, foci of aspiration, discoveries in literature, with reference
to which his whole life is orientated, and his autobiography knitted
into a natural unity, a unity different from any conventional articula-
.tion into a life's phases,.l
_,. C:'.:.
Things can go wrong with an enterprise of this kind, as Hepburn notes:
'There is nothing easily won in this pattern-~ZAXiKg realising:
indeed there ar4 desolate tracts in the autobiography wher~ the
"story" stubbornly refuses to be transmuted into "fable"'.
Assan example he cites nuir'a years in Glasgow which:
'•••saw the shattering of his Orkney pastoral dream, the deaths of
1. 'Vision and Choice in l~orality', )\A. S. Supp.Vol.30. 1956. p.15.
2. ~. pp.15-l6.
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several intimate relatives and a general disorientation. of his
intellectual and imaginative life. With these barren years he can
"do nothing": they lie in his memory "like a heap of dull immovable
rubbish". They are eccentric to the fable; that is to say, he has
no symbol which can cope with, give him"command"over these events;
no "image, "motif", "theme", is available through which his reSOUDces
may be organised and initiative recaptured,.l
lluir's intellectual history may be regarded as representative of one form
which aesttetic understanding is likely to take in.practive. The picture
it represents is of a continuous struggle to reconcile 'story' and 'fable'.
He endures disappointments, setbacks, uncongenial surroundings, even the
complete 'br-eakdown of the undertaking, yet always recovers and continues
with it. Though this is in human terms a highly attractive model it is
not the only one available. To do justive to the possibilities afforded
by aesthetic understanding we must look further afield.
An obvious alternative would be provided by a case of
consistent success untroubled by the difficulties which l:uir records.
It will not be easy, however, to point with assurance to actual examples.
A amn may succeed in presentin.g an image of absolute competence but one
can hardly ever be sure that behihd it there are no lacun~ or incoheren-
ces. Notoriously, the effect of ~I±x honest biography is often to
disillusion us about these matters. We shall, perhaps, be justified in
regarding the goal of complete eucaess as merely an abstract possibility
so far as most human beings are concerned. Nevertheless, some have come
close enough to it to make their position significantly different from
that represented by l1uir. If Wallace Stevens is right, the life of Santay-
ana provides an illustration. In his essay 'Imagination as Value' Stevens
discusses such topics as the nature of imagination, its relations with
reason and with the pressures of society on the individual, its implicat-
ions for morality and so on. 'Imagination' ie for him ,'the power that
enables us to perceive the normal in the abnormal, tho opposite of chaos
in chaos,.2 He contends that 'the operation of the imagination in life
1. ibid. 1'.20.
2. 'Imagination as Value', The Uecessary Angel,Faber & Faber, 1960,p.153.
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is more significant than its operation in or in relation to works of art'
and that, 'the imagination penetrates life,.l He seems to recognise that
these claims have a paradoxical air:
'In spite of the prevalence of the imagination in life, it is probably
true that the discussion of it in that relation is incomparably less
frequent and less intelligdmt than the discussion of it in rela.tion
to ar1Band letters. The constant discussi on of imaginati on and reality
is largely a discussion not fO~ the purposes of life but for the
purposes of arts and letters'.
An explanation is suggested:
'I suppose that the reason for this is that few people would turn to
the imagination, knowingly, in life, while few people would turn to
anything else, knowingly, in arts and letters. In life what is impor-
.tant is the truth as it is, while in.arts and letters lvhat ie important
ie the truth as we see it••• Again in life the function of the imagin-
ation is so varied that it is not well-defined as it is in arts and
letters. In life one hesitates when one speaks of the value of the
imagination. Its value in arts and letters is aesthetic. ~lost men's
lives are thrust upon them. The existence of aesthetic value in lives 3
that are forced on those that live them is an improbable sort of thing'.
'Nevertheless', he argues, 'there can be lives •• which exist by the
deliberate choice of those that live them' and he gives an illustration:
'It may be assumed that the life of Professor Santayana is a life
in which the function of the imagination has a function. similar to
its function in any deliberate work of art or letters. ~ie have only
to think of this present phase of it, in which, in his old age, he
dwells in the head of the wor14, in the company of devoted women in
their convent, and in the company of familiar saints, whose presence
does so much to make any convent an appropriate refuge for a generaus
and human philosopher. To repeat', there van be lives in which the
value of t.heimagination is the same as its value in arts and letters
and I exclude from consideration as part of that statement any thought
of poverty 04wealth, being a bauer or being a king, and so on, asirrelevant'.
Stevens's'imagination', that 'power that enables us to peroeive ••• the
opposite of chaos in ohaos' is the power that makes art possible and his
remarks about its role in life leave no doubts about the accur-acy of
classifying him as an advocate of aesthetic understanding. His intellectual
oareer seems, like Santayana's, to poin.t to the possibility of a measure
1. i'i)id.1'.146.
3. Loo, cit.
2. ibid. 1'.141.
4. loc. cit.
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of achievement in the enterprise quite different from anything intimated
by Muir's. It is easy to suggest reasons for this contrast. It may be
that the material conditions of Santayana's and Steven's lives were more
fortunate, that they were not 'thrust upon them' to the same extent.
Perhaps their powers of will and imagination were better adapte~ to the
task. Or it may simply be that their official pers~ is harder to penet-
rate. At any rate they convey the impression of comin.g much closer than
he to exemplifying the ideal of complete success. In doing so they
illustrate some of the characteristic dangers to which aesthetic underst-
anding is liable. Practitioners of it run the risk of becoming so profic-
ient at pattern-weaving that the manipulation of symbols shuts out the
ordinary world. Thus, it might be thought that the kind of tension between
the 'story' and the 'fable' that Muir talks about is something important
to maintain. One may also suspect that the danger of losing sight of the
particular and the concrete is especially serious for a writer of imagin-
ative literature. In an essay on Stevens, Randall Jarrell has vigorously
expressed misgivings of this kind:
'•••Stevens has the weakness - a terrible one for a poet, a steadily
increasing one in Stevens - of thinking of particulars as primarily
illustrations of general truths, or else as aesthetio, abstracted
objeots, simply there to be comtemplated; he often treats things or
lives so that ther seem no more than generalisations of an unpreoed-
ently 101-1 order'.
No attempt will be made here to argue the merits of this case against
Stevens directly. The difficulties of resolving such an argument without
having to resort to an arbitrary endorsement of one style of life at the
expense of another are well known. Instead we shall try to offer a fresh
perspective on the whole business by considering another of the myth-
makers referred to by ~epburn. The case of W.E.Yeats seems to offer a
possibility of mediating between Huir and Stevens. Besides it has other
distinotive features that make discussion of it a suitable way of oonclud-
ing this partial and schematic survey of the varieties of aesthetic
understanding.
1. 'Reflections on Ifallace Stevens', Poetrl and the Age, Fa.ber and Faber,
1955. p.130.
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Hepburn, drawing on the Autobiographies characterises
Yeats';s position in this way:
'Yeats, IIdeprived•• of the simple minded religion of•• chilHhood",
could not live without some fable, and constructed "almost an
infallible Church of poetic tradition, of a fardel of stories ••Itt1
This preoccupation has become a much discussed topic in the literature
on Yeats. In his case talk of life as an artefact is particularly ~
appropriate. George Russell, his close friend for many years, observed
that:
'He began about the time of liTheiiind among the Reeds" to do two
things consciously, one to create a "stylellin literature, the
second to create or rather re-create W.B.Yeats in a style which
would harmonise with the literary style,.2
Projects of this kind are commonplace enough: what distinguishes Yeats
is the thoroughness and imaginative power with \"hich it is carried.:.th
through. A.striking contrast with }lIuiris that he seems never to have
encountered any periods that were 'barren' or 'fallow' to the same extent.
The vividness and fertility of the symbols at his command enabled them
to cope with every kind of material. Thus the Autobiographies are the
portrai t of a man whose imaginative life is remarkablY independent of
how things go in the world. li!entionof this work suggests another contrast
with Muir. In writing of his life J;Iuirseems to have conceived of himself
as disengaging from the struggle in order to tell the truth about it from
an external, objective standpoint. For Yeats, Autobiography is itself an
essential element in the fable. It is the crucial episode in the process
of recreating himself 'in a style which would harmonise with the literary -
style,' for it integrates and crystallizes the whole enterprise. A recent
commentator has caught this aspect of the work in the title of his study,
Yeats's Autobiography; Life as Symbolic Pattern.3 The most striking
feature of the pa.~tern is that nothing in the life is eccentric to it;
it is co-extensive withhis experience. The very task of making it explicit
is itself a contribution. Thus, if one judges in terms of comprehensiveness
1. ~.cit. p.16.
2. Quoted in Joseph Ronsley, Yeata!.s Agt9biogra,phy;Li:t:eas Symbolio
Pattern, Harvard University Press, 1968, p.2.
3. Ronsley, £P.cit.
------ -~----~---------------------~---- - -----------------
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and f'lexibility Yeats's myth-making must be deemed an almost unqualif'ied
success. But, as was remarked above, success in this enterprise has its
dangers and to note them reveals something important about its nature.
The business of'patte~n-weaving may proceed too smoothly so that one loses
sight of'the disorder and contingency of'the world. Aesthetic understanding
then becomes a kind of distorting lims that transforms everything into
a symbol before it is seen as a datum. Ultimately, one's apprehension of
experd:ence may become abstract and mechanical in the '!traythat Yeats saw
and detested among his fontemporaries in the nationalist movement. l:any
readers have felt that something rather similar happened to hitialso;
that both in art and lif'e too much was sacrificed to the exigencies of
the formal pattern. Thus far the parallels with Stevens are fairly close.
The difference in Yeats's case, that which makes it so significant for
any study of the forms of aesthetic understanding, must now be noted.
It is that in old age he carne to realise the f'orce of these objections
for himself and to make the case against the undertaking that had dominated
, his intellectual life as convincingly as any of his critics. In.his first
published book of poems he had proclaimed that 'Words alone are certain
good'. In the end he came to think that this belief and the ideas under-
lying it are false and inadequate. It is perhaps the presence of this
insight in the 'Last Poems' that largely accounts for the standard
tributes to the exemplary nature of his development. 'The aircus Animals
Desertionl- reviews the whole story and in.doing so, provides a classic
commentary on aesthetic understanding. It begins, significantly, liith
a confession of imaginative failure:
'I sought a theme and sought for it in vain,
I sought it daily for six weeks or so'.
Instead he goes on to 'enumerate old themes' and in the process oonveys
his dissatisfaction at the facile way in which experience has been
transformed into myth:
'I thoucht my dear must her own soul destroy,
So did ganaticism and hate enslave it,
And this brought forth a dream and soon enough
This deeam itself had all my thought and love.'
The crucial failure, to whdch the aesthetic understanding of life is
1. Last Poems, 1936-1939.
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always liable, is then admitted:
'Players and painted stage took all my love,
And not those things that they were emblems of'.
Finally a kind of resolution is achieved. He announces the end of myth-
making and the acceptance of a view reminiscent of Lear on his plight
as a 'poor, bare, forked animal'.
'Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began"?
A mound of refuse or the sweepin.gs of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that m~ ladder's gone,
I must lie down lihere all the ladders start,
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.'
The pattern of Yeats's development is that of a transition from a brill-
iantly succeseful US3 of the technique of aesthetic understanding to the
explicit abandonment of the whole enterprise. As a model it has many
features of great interest. His involvement 'l-lith aesthetic understanding
illustrates all its main elements while hhe eventual break with it provides
an additional insight by showing the kind of difficulty it characteristi-
cally encounters.
A final comment on the aesthetic version of moral understan-
ding concerns its special position within the general category. To take
this viewpoint is to see one's activities in a way normally reserved for
objects of art. It is the creation and appreciation of l-Torksof art which
provide the clearest examples of activities internally related to the
foncepts in terms of which they must be characterised and justified. One
would be inclined to say of someone whose reasons for being concerned
with art involved purely external concepts that he had misunderstood the
nature of the enterprise. His interest lies in some element to which the
aesthetic experience is only contingently related, and to approach it
in this spirit is surely to fail to see what it really has to offer. Thus,
one who knows what it is like to be genuinely concerned with ar~ possesses
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a valuable clue to moral understanding. The attitude to art provides a
kind of paradigm of the moral point of view. Aesthetic understanding is
the most obvious XXL~ and straightforward way in which the lessons of
the paradigm can be applied to the ralofmaterial of morality, that is,
human actions. This explains why it sup:?lies the best illustration of
the moral attitude. ~e point involved here is im~ortant for it raises
the general question of the relationship between aDt and morality. It
may be expressed in another way by reformulating the distinction bett-leen
non-moral and !'!loralunderstanding. On one side are those ,...ho think that
the meaning our actions have is something there to be discovered, provided
that we can first establish the existence of God, or the nature of the
evolutionary process, or the laws of history. On the other there are
those who believe that the meaning has to be created by man, that the
only significance our actions can have is the significance we care to
give them. A.J .Ayer states this view explicitly in the course of expound-
ing his humanist version of moral understanding. After the passage quoted
in 6hapter 2 in which he describes and rejects a form of non-moral under-
standing, he goes on:
'It does not follow, however, that our lives must be empty or
futile, but only that liehave to assume responsibility for them.
Life has the meaning that we succeed in givin.g it,.l
Conservative religious thinkers make claims like Ayer's the basis for
criticism of their radical c~llea.gues. Thus A.D.Adcock writes:
'•••one very important theme of Old Testament religion was theCovenant between man and his creator. If we omit the covenant, as
we must do if we deny the transcendent God, then we have to say
that all the "meaning there is in the universe is the meaning that
we put into it, and that the only purposes are our purposes. It is
certainly not easy to ~ake sense of the religion of the 6ld Testament,
if we t~ce this line'.
Yeats draws the distinction in.a similar way in a passage in which he
recognises that some people are forever excluded from aesthetic understan-
ding. He has been discussing' one of his central ideas, 'Unity of Being' ,
that state in whi.ch 'all the nature murmers in response if but a single
1. op.cit. p.221.
2. 'The Will of God', Hibbert Journal, Swnmer 1965, p.174.
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note be touched' and he has done so in terms of his usual vocabulary of
Image, r.:askand Anti-Self. Ee goes on to admit that there are people to
whom all this is irrelevant, for whom unity can only be a gift of God
or Nature, never a construction of the human minds
'I now know tha.tthere men who cannot possess "Unity of Being", vlho
must not seek iltor express it - and who, SO far from seeking an
anti-self, a !:ask that delineates a being in all things the opposite
to their natural state, can but seek the suppression of the anti-self,
till the natural state alone remains. These are those who must aeek
no image of desire, but await that which lies beyond their mind -
unit'es not of the mind, but unities of Nature, unities of God - the
man of science, the moralist, the humanitarian, the politician, Saint
Simeon Stylites upon his pillar, Saint Anthony in his cavern; all
whose preoccupation is to seem nothing •••their imaginations grow more
vivid in the expression of something which they have not created,.l
One could go back over the controversies discussed earlier and re-interpret
them in the light of these new ways of drawin,g the fUndamental distinction.
For present purposes, however-,the important thing is to note the close
link between moral understanding and the insight that the significance
of his actions must be supplied by man himself. This is an insight '"hich
the artist is uniquely placed to grasp. Someone whose vocation is to
impose order and design on the formless materials of his art can hardly
doubt that meaning is something man invents and does not discover. Thus,
although moral understanding in general is only possibly in re1a~ive1y
advanced societies which have escaped from the grosser forms of supersti-
tion and fanaticism, the germ of this way of apprehending experience may
be found among the creative artists of all periods. In this special sense
art is the clue to morality.
1. W.B.Yeats, ~utobiographies, JiIacmilla.n,1955, pp.247-248.
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Chapter 4.
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL. I.
The next task is to show the relevance of the distinction
between understanding and assessment to the lesser antitheses referred
to at the beginning. This chapter will be concerned with the contrast
between. 'individual' and 'social' morality. Some large claims for its
significance may be found in the recent literature. Neil Cooper, for
instance introduces a discussion of the subject in this way:
'It is a surprising fact that moral philosophers have rarely examined
the distinction between what I shall call 'positive' or 'social'
morali ty on the one hand and 'auton.omous' or 'individual' morality
on the other. Accordingly, conce~tual and moral issues of the greatest
importance have been neglected'.
A little further on he includes H.L.A.Hart's paper on 'Legal and ~1oral
Obligation' among the rare texts which provide 'a glimpse of one of the
main issues of moral philosophy and of morality'. 2 Turnin.g to Hart's 1J
paper one finds a similar sense of the weightines~ of the issues, as
this passage shows:
'To characterise morality (as eg. R.M.Hare does in his illuminating
book,' The Language of Norals') as primarily a matter of the application
to conduct of those ultimate principles which the in.dividual accepts
or to which he commits himself for the conduct of his life seems to me
an excessively Protestant approach. Important as this aspect or kind
o~ moral judgement is, we need to understand it as a 4evel~pment from
the primary phenomenon of the morality of a social group',
Versions of this contrast have been employed by a number of recent writers,
but it ma.ybe well to take Hart and Cooper as our main guides. Their use
of it is particularly explicit and ambitions. Besides they illustrate in
1. 'Two Concepts a1J Morality', Philosophy, VolXLI, 1966. pp.19-33.
2. loc.cit.-- '3. 'Legal and "loral Obligation', Essays iilMoral Philosophy, ad.
A.I.lt1eldon,p.lOO.
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varied but equally striking ways the dangers of operating in this area
without the help of that fundamental distinction which is our main
concern.
Perhaps the best source for Hart's views is the chapter on
'Justice and l10rality' in The Concept of Law. The starting point for his
discussion is a recognition that, for the sake of his main thesis, it is
n.ecessary'to characterise in general terms those principles, rules and
standards relating to the conduct of individnals which belong to morality
~ and make conduct morally obligatory'. I He goes on to
draw attention once more to 'the social phenomenon often referred to as
"the morality" of a given society or the "accepted" or "conventional If
morality of an actual sovial group,.2 These phrases, it is explained,
refer to 'standards of conduct which are widely shared in a particular
society and are to be contrasted l·Tith the moral principles or moral ideals
which may g~vern an individuals life, but which he does not share with
any considerable number of those with whom he lives,.3 We are then given
descriptions of 'four cardinal related features which collectively serve
to distinguish morality not only from legal rales but from other forms
of social rule'. 4 lTany of the difficulties one encounters in Hart's
discussion may be traced to a crucial uncertainty about his intentions.
It is never clear whether he wishes the four features to relate to the
concept ~f social morality alone or to morality in general and all its
varied forms. This uncertainty is already detectable in the passages
quoted above and persists throughout the discussion. In support of the
narrower interpretation one might cite such apparently conclusive evidence
as the reference to the four features ae ones to which 'might be taken
as defining characteristics af social morality,.5;Tet at times he seems
to regard himself as offering a perfectly general characterisation of
morality, as pointing to features which any genuinely moral rule or stan-
dard must possese. Thus he remarks that the four features are 'constantly
found together in those principles, rules and standard of conduct which
&:1 • .2,;£.cit.p.163. 2. ibid. p.165. 3. loc.ill.
4. ~. p.169. 5. ibid. p.222.
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are most comnonly accounted "moral,"," He continues:
'These four ~eatures reflect different aspects of a characteristic
and important function which sulh standards perform in social life
or in the life of individuals'.
Besides, he refers to the first feature as 'an essential element of any
moral rule or standard' and one ~'Vhich'cannot be omitted in any faithful
account of the morality of any social group or individual,.2 Some degree
of vagueness on this issue is excusable and, up to a point, may be :bt:tDL-
±xMRBkt2 intentional. Hart's primary concern is with the concept of law
and with morality only in so far as the two are connected. On the whole
he seems content to aim at a bland, generalised account which any reason-
able person could accept. That he fails is, perhaps, not in itself either
interesting or surprising. The precise manner of the failure is however
significant in the context of our general argument. ~lemust therefore
go on to examine his discussion of the subject in some.detail.
The first feature 'Importance' is introduced as follows:
'To say that an essential feature of any moral rule or standard is
that it is regarded as something of great importance to maintain may
appear both truistic and vague. Yet this feature cannot be omitted in
any faithf'ulaccount of the morality of any social group or individual,
nor can it be made more precise,.3
The way this feature is treated fits in well with the suggestion that
Hart wishes to characterise morality in a completely general way. To say
that any moral rule or standard must possess 'importance' is indeed to
say something that appears truistic and vague. As the quotation shows,
Hart is pessimistic about the prospects of refining it further and makes
no serious attempt to do so. This puts severe limits on the value of a
close study of his discussion. Nevertheless sornegeneral features of it
are wo~th noting. Thus, an attempt to apply his own individual-social
distinction here yields interesting resulte. }'~ostnotably, the suspicion
arises that 'importance' must pertain to each half in a different way.
There is, for instance, a temptation to say that the rules of individual
. 1. ibid, 1'.164. 2. ibid. p.169. 3. ibid. p.169.
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morality are inportant in the sense of being 'overriding', ~hat what
makes them elements in someone's moral code is precisely the fact that
he accepts them as suprene guides for the conduct of life. A corresponding
claim in the case of social morality is rather implausible. Hart and
CooDer seem, reasonably enough, to regard the 'conventional morality' as
just one of the social institutions whose function is to influence behav-
iour. In this respect it does not differ fundamentally from law, religion,
ettiquette or custom. Hence, it would be difficult for them hot to admit
that in a particular cornnunity legal or religious rules might be regarded
as more important guides to avtion than those of the conventional moral
code. Of course, the moral rules must have 'importance' in the sense of
occupying a respectable position on its sca~e of priorities. But it would
be wilful to insist that they must always be supreme or that 'Ylhatever
,I
rules are, as a matter of fact, most important constitute the group's
morali ty. The conclusion that seems to emerge is that 'importa.nce' is I,'
not really a feature of much significance in the context of social morality.
IWhen it comes to individual morality, however, the claims made for it can
be given a precise meaning and must be taken seriously. It may be that
the unacknowl edged influence of the individual concept is responsible
for the emphasis laid on 'importance' by Hart. Such a suggestion fits in
well with other aspects of his discussion as we shall see.
Taken at face value this claim is rather dubious. Surely it is not at all
inconsistent with the part played by morality in the lives of individuals
that moral rules should be regarded as liable to deliberate change. On
the contrary I am perfectly free to change any elements of my individual
moral code at any time. This ability is an important part of what is
The second feature is called 'Immunity from deliberate chaneal
Hart explains it in this ways
'••it is inconsistent with the part played by morality in the lives
of individuals that moral rules, principles or standards should be
regarded, as lawf are, as things capable of creation or change by
deliberate act'.
1• .i!?i2:. p.11l.
- ---------"
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in.volved in speaking of 'my moral principl es' and of m)tself as a moral
agent. Furthermore, unless one ~iishes to hypostatise 'society', and to
do so would be foreign to the spirit of Hart's approach, it is hard to
see why any sharp distinction should be dra.wn in this respect between the
individual and the social. Hence~ if individual morality is not immune
from deliberate change then social morality will 'in principle not be
immune wither. A rule or standard which is generally accepted in a social
group ma.y come to be generally rejected as the result of many acts of
private legislation.
In reaching the c oncLuad ora he does Hart is influenced by
an apparent contrast between morality and law. Thus he writes:
'It is perfectly good sense to say such things as "As from 1 January
1960 it will be no longer illegal to do so-and-e o" and to support
such statements by reference to laws which have been enacted or repea-
led. By contrast such statements as "As from tomorrow it will no
longer be immoral to do so-and-so" or " On 1 January last it became
immoral te do so-and-so"t and attempts to support these by reference
to deliberate enactment would be astonishing paradoxes, it not sense-
less,.l
Let us look at these claims in the light of Hart's notion of social morality
the'''accepted" or Itconventional" morality of an actual social group.' It
is not at all difficult to conceive of a situation in which it would make
perfectly good sense to aay: 'On 1 January last it became immoral to do
so-and-so' if immorality is to be assessed in terms of whatever standards
are, as a matter of fact, aCGepted by a particular social group. It is,
perhaps, part of the conventioaal mor&l code in the United,States that
the possession of firearms by private citizens is a praiseworthy exervise
of their rights. This attitude might change suddenly if it was seen to
have contributed to some national disaster, say the simultan.eous assassin-
ation of the President and all the members of Congress. The historian of
American mores might well wish to claim that on that day the conventioaal
moral code ceased to con.done the indescrimina.te sa.leand possession of
guns. The position is less clear in the case of Hart's other example:
1. ibid. 1'.111.
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'As from tomorrow it will no longer be immoral to do so-and-so'. The
oddness of this locution springs, however, not from the fact that it is
senseless but fDom the difficulty of imagining a situation in which
anyone could have a reason tor uttering it. Nevertheless, this is not
a conceptual difficulty and with a little ingenuity one could no doubt
fill in a suitable background. If the murder of all the leading American
politicians had been planned by one organisation, its leader might well
have been in a position to predict that 'as from tomorrow the conventional '
code will regard private ownership of guns as immoral'. On one of the
interpretations of 'imMoral' which Hart accepts this is, of course,
equivalent to, 'as from tomorrow it will be immoral to keep a gun'. The
contrast between social morality and law lies not in.any irnmunity from
deliberate changes but in the fact that ilL~ with the former there are
no esta.blished and recognised procedures for making them. No doubt a
sociological explanation of this difference could be given and it may
well have great significanve in some contexts. But from the standpoint
of the present discussion the existence or non-existence of machinery
for implementing change does not constitute an. importa.nt conceptual dist-
inction between a society' s morality and its law. Hence, Hart's reliance
on the contrast between them has 11.0 tenden.cy to prove his case. nothing
else in his discussion seems fapable of providing any grounds for holding
that either individual or social morality are immune from deliberate
change.
At this point it might be objected that by interpreting
Hart in too literal and unsympathetic a way we haveefailed to do him
justice. For, it might be said, it is not at all dificult to see what
really underlies his concern witt immunity. It is not that the actual
content of an individual or social morality should be regarded as immune
from deliberate change but that its status and truth-value must be seen
in this way. The correctness of a moral principle is independent of
whether or not a particular individual or social group accepts or rejects
it. To say this is surely to pick out a genuine feature of our concept
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of morality. The difficulty, however, is that such a defence of Hart
takes one outside the in.dividual-social dimension with which he is offic-
ially concerned. It goes beyond the merely positive, the moral beliefs
that people actually have, and points towards a conception of morality
as the source of standards in terms of which such things may be judged.
Thus, in place of a neutral attempt at delineating the field assumptions
are being made about the status of at least some moral principles. There
are other elements in Hart's work which might seem to encourage such a
development. Here and there one finds the presence of another conception
of morality which he in inclined to contrast to the individual and the
social. This is morality in the sense of 'the true morality' which consists
of whatever objective and universally valid principles there may be. Thus,
he refers with approval to John Austin's distinction between 'positive
morality' that is 'the actual morality observed within a society' and
'the law of God' which 'constitute for him the ultimate standards by
which both positive morality and positive law are to be tested,.l Hart
comments: 'This marks the very important distinction between. a social
morality and those moral principles which transcend it and are used in
criticism of it,.2 Elsewhere in the book we are offered 'crude tormulat-
ions' of two extremes in moral philosophy. One tendency is to regard
moral rules as 'immutable principles which constitute part of the fabric
of the universe'. The other is to see them as 'expressions of changing
human attitudes, choices, demands or feelings.,3 The connection between
talk of 'immunity from deliberate change' and the notion of morality as
consisting in those 'immutable principles which constitute part of the
fabric of the Universe' is too obvious to need comment. It is in this
context that Hart's second feature has its natural home. Indeed it is
temptin.g to suggest that the entire discussion of it is conditioned by
his awareness of those transcendent and objective principles which are,
in the truest sense, the principles of morality. This suggestion at leastpr0:t>erlyserves to explain why he never gets his official subject-matter ~.rat~
into focus. Besides the general line of thought is reinforced by a consid-
eration of what he says about the third feature, 'Voluntary character of
moral offences'.
1. ~. p.252.
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The notion is introduced in this way:
'If a person "rhose action, judged ab extra, has offended against
moral rules or principles, succeeds in establishing that he did
this unintentionally and in spite of every precaution that it was
possible for him to take, he is excused from moral responsibility,
and to blame him in.these circumstances would itself be considered
morally objectionable. rIoral blame is therefore excluded because
he has done all that he could do,.l
What Hart is describing here is surely not an essential characteristic
of social morality. At this level the assertion that 'I could not help
it' will always excuse is simply untrue. A society with an institution
of vendetta may not allow any plea of this kind to mitigate failure to
carryon the family tradition. In our own society relics of a similar
attitude still linger in some areas of sexual morality. Eut empirical
evidence is perhaps not essential here. The fact that a conventional code
contain.ing elements of 'strict liability' analogous to those in some
legal systems is perfectly conceivable seems to tell decisively against
the claim that 'voluntary character' is an essential feature of Bocial
morality. It might be possible to get round this by frankly stipulating
a definition ~or s 'social morality' but this could only be a rather
implausible ad hoc device and would be quite alien to Hart's mode of
argument.
A question now arises as to whether 'voluntary character'
is a nevessary feature of individual morality. The obvious answer is that
this can only be the case if one insists that there must be no overlapping
of content between the individual and the social. ]ut it would surely
be implausible to restrict a person.'s individual morality to those areas
where he differs from the conventional code. Ho',..could such a fortuitous
collection of beliefs have any conceptual sign.ificance? Besides the moral
assumptions current in one's society are not things to be taken or left
in any facile way. '1hey provide the individual with a starting place and
framework for his moral thinking. It might well be thought exceptional
1. ~. p.113.
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if he succeeds in escaping from their influence to any si~ificant extent.
Hence, it is hard to see why individual morality should have the import-
ance that many wish to attach to it if it is merely co-extensive with
the individuals success in shedding the conventional wisdom. On the
contrary it may be argued that the distinctive feature of individual
morality consists in, for example, a special kinn of commit'ment o~ the
part of th4 moral agent, and the extent to which this is shared by others
is irrelevant. Whatever the mebits of this particular suggestion i~ seems
clear that a distinction between the individual and the social in terms
of content will not do. If this ie eo one cannot exclude the possibility
that a person's autonomous morality may agree with that of his social
group in refusing to acknowledge 'voluntary character' in the case of
eome offences. There is surely nothing paradoxical or incompatible with
ordinary moral experience in this conclusion. The tragedy of Oedipus lies
in the fact that not only does the conventional morality condemn him for
what he could not help but he also accepts this judgement himself. Our
response to the drama only makes eense on the assumption that we find
nothing absurd in such a view of his situation.
As before t it seems that there is a contrast to be drEJW'l1
between individual and social morality on the one hand and 'true morality'
ad the other. The believer in eternal and universal standards will be
thatconvincedAat this level,at least, justice is done and no one condemned
for what he cannot help. In the light of these standards he might wish
to characterise as undesirable or evil those elements in individual and
social morality which militate against 'voluntary character'. J3ut it
would surely be unreasonable to exclude them by fiat from the realm of
morali ty altogether. 'Volun.tary character' although no doubt an integral
and constitutive element of the 'laws of God' ie something that positive
morali ty only achieves by accident or inspiration .•It is difficult to
account for Hart's sponsorship of it except in terms of allunnoticed
tendency to oscillate between the two kinds of fonception.
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The last feature 'the form of moral pressure' is explained
in this way:
'A further distinguishing feature of morality is the characteristic
form of moral pressure which is exerted in its support ••• moral
pressure is characteristically, though not exclusively, not by threats
or by appeals to fear or interest, but by reminders of the moral
character of the action contem~lated and of the demands of morality •••
emphatic reminders of what the rules demand, appeals to conscience,
and reliance on the operation of guilt and·remorse, are the character-
istic and most prominent forms of pressure used for the support of
social morality,.l
The last sentence suggests that Hart wishes to confine the scope of this
feature to social morality. It is obviously a wise limitation, for my
fellow-ci thiens may well be ignorant oft or indifferent to, the tenets
of 'true' morality and my efforts wo live in accordance with my own. But
difficul ties remain even on.the most modest interpretation of Hart' El E
claim. In the first place it is not merely breaches of moral rules that
tend to be met with social press~re. Some rules of BXiXmwMx etiquette
may be backed in this way, and 'boycotting' may be done for purely pruden-
tial reasons. How is one to characterise the particular form of pressure
that is distinctive of morality? The difficulty is to achieve this without
circularity, to avoid formulas that reduue in the end to the assertion
that it is a'characteristically moral' form of pressure. Unfortunately,
as the passage quoted suggests, it is a difficulty which Hart can hardly
be said to have overcome. But even when it is granted that social pressure
cannot in itself be a s~iBient condition of the moral status of a rule
one might go on to inquire whether it should even be regarded as necessary.
It is surely not irnpossibl~ to imagine a social group whose members ware
tolerant or diffident enough not to offer any reproaches against offenders,
at least in respect of some rules of the code. Would it always be feasible
to take a strong line here and deny that such 'rules' could be regarded
as components od the social morality? It is open to doubt whether the
conceptual link between rules and sanctions is as close as this would
imply, and a high price might have to be paid for insisting on it.
1. ~. 1'1'.175-176.
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There is another aspect of Hart's account which may cause
misgivings. He tends to write as though the typical situation is one
in which breaches of social morality are reEldily identifiable and meet
with unanimous disapproval. But the notions of a clearly defined and
universally accepted moral code has little relevance for modern pluralis-
tic societies. On most issues it will be found that there are individuals
and groups holding widely divergent views. Seldom or never is it possible
to regard the community as speaking with one voi ce , givin.g the verdict
of ~ social morality. One must, it seems, acknowledge the existence of
a multi.plicity of moral codes which mayor may not need to be understood
as operating within some loose consensus. \f.batare their criteria of
identity and how are they to be related to the general distinction between
the individual and the social? Hart, of course, makes no attempt to deal
with these questions and it might be said that they fall outside the
scope of his inquiry. Eesides, it may be added, there is obviously some
substance in the suggestion of a conceptual link between social morality
and neighbourly pressuee. To decide precisely what it amounts to would
require a mo~e detailed discussion than one has a right to expect in
The 60ncept of Law. Nevertheless, Hart has made a useful contribution
in showing the need for such a study and in providing it with a starting
point.
A similar comment is appropriate in the case of'the first
feature 'importance'. It may well turn out to have more significance in.
the context of individual than of social morality. But clearly the idea
deserves to be taken seriously. On the other hand, the case made for
'voluntary character' and for 'immunity from deliberate change' is not
at all plausible in respect either of the individual or of the social
concepts. Much 'of what is said about these features is intelligible only
on the assumption tha.tunderlying it is the notion of a morality that
transcends the merely positive, the moral beliefs and attitudes that
belong to individua.ls and groups as a matter of empirical fact. :Many of
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the deficiencies in Hart's case may be traced to confusion. in this area.
Ironically, the other ~ain source of weakness is the failure to take
seriously that distinction between individual and social which he explio-
itly recognises and indeed insists on.elsewhere. The true signifioance
of this failure beoomes apparent when it is looked at in the light of our
main thesis and, in its turn, it helps towards a better understanding of
the thesis by revealing its detailed implications for a specific area.
]efore discussing these matters, however, it would be useful to widen
the scope of the inquiry by turning to oonsider a rather different acoount
of the individual-social oontrast.
***************
In his paper 'Two Concepts of Nora1ity', Neil Cooper develops
a particu~Dr view of the distinotion through an elaba.rate process of
argument. The main outlines of it may be eet out as follows:
(1) He begins with a number of distinotions which form the basis of the
later discussion. These include Hart's oontrast between the 'external'
and the 'internal' pointe of view.l l~ore importa.nt is a version of the
individual-social contrast and a distinotion between 'supervenient' or
'critioal' autonomous judgements and 'non-supervenient' or 'immediate'
ones.
(2) He then argues that it is more r 'rational' to make autonomous moral
judgements oritioally than to make them immediately.
(3) He goes on to ask 'whether it is rational in ooming to decisions to
prefer the social ooncept of morality to the autonomous oonoept, where
the autonomous oonoept is represented by oritica1 autonomous moral judge-
ments,.2 He deoides that no olear-out 'yes' or 'no' answer oan be given
to this question. Eaoh is a genuine concept and both are nevessarya
neither oan be dispensed with in any rational process pf deoision making.
1. The Concept of La~, pp.86-81.
2. ibid. p.25.
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Cooper aocepts a version of Hart's 'form of moral pressure'
as the distinotive feature of sooial morality. He explains it in this way:
'Just as there are objeotive oriteria tor determining what the law
of a particular country is, so there are objective criteria for
determining what the morality of a social group is. We have to study
customs of a certain kind, those customs deviation trom which is met
with a distinctive kind of socail pressure or sanotion, "the reproaches
of one's neighbours ..,.l
The difficulties that arose from Hart's discussion of this feature are
again relevant here. Thus, someone may incur the reproaches of his neigh-
bours for a wide variety of reasons. Dooper does not say what is distinctive
about the moral cases, nor does he deal with any of the other problems
that were mentioned. His explanation of 'individual' or 'autonomous'
morality has a similar weakness. He tells us that:
'We emp10j the autonomous concept whenever we stand back from the
positive morality and try to make up our minds whether to aocept or
reject some part of it••• An autonomous moral judgement is•••a .oral
judgement made from an autonomous point of view, it is a judgement m
made off one's own bat, whioh mayor may not ooinoide with the
positive moralitY20r moralities of the social gr~p to which the
speaker belongs'.
This may be acceptable as an explanation of the foroe of 'autonomous' in
the phrase 'autonomous moral judgement' but it offers little help with
the rest. We have some idea of what a moral judgement is when the context
is that of sooia1 morality. It is, roughly, a judgement which is ultimately
baoked by the threat of some kind of so~ pressure. But what is involved
in making autonomous moral judgements as distinot,say, from autonomous
judgements of other kinds? How is a persons autonomous morality to be
distinguished from the rest of his beliefs and attitudes? Cooper makes
no attempt to answer suoh questions. The laok of preoision on this orucial
issue of what it is to have a morality in the autaaomous sense is, as we
shall see, a souroe of diffioulty later on.
The problems that arise over the automomouB-sooia1 distinotion
2. ibid. p.23.
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are of a different kin.d. Now we are embarrased by a profusion of criteria.
At least four are offered in this passage:
'Now autonomous moral judgements admit of two different uses, a
supervenient use and a non-supervenient use. An autonomous moral
judgement is said to be used 'supe~venient1y' or 'critically' if
the speaker can give reasons for making it, if the moral word in
the judgement is applied to aCts or people in virtue of their
possessing vertain characteristics of which the speaker is aware.
An autonomous moral Uudgement is said to be used 'non-supervenient1y'
if the speaker is not ready to give reasons for it, if he applies
the moral word in the judgement to something 'immediately' without
analysis of the objects characteristics. Someone who used an auton-
omous moral judgement 'superveniently' or 'critically' may be said
to be making an autonomous moral judgement 'from the critical point
of view'. On the other hand someone who uses an autonomous moral
judgement 'non-superveniently' or 'immediately' may be said to be
making an autonomous moral judgement 'from the immediate point of
view'. Which of these two points of view someone is Spetking from
• depends on whether he is ready to give reasons or not'.
Later a fifth criterion is introduced. Reliance on it is implicit through-
out the attempt to e.tab1ish the conclusion of the second section.2 The
nature of it comes out most clearly in passages such as the following'
'Someone who makes an"immediate"use of the word "wrong", the non-
criterionist, invites the retort, "llhy should we take any notice
of what you are saying? You are merely expressing your personal
likes and dislikes". The non-Cri terionist has no anStver to this
retort and this is a shortcoming in his use of moral language,.3
It would seem from this that the distinguishing feature of non-supervenient
judgements is that they are mere expressions of emotion. Supervenient
ones amount, in some unspecified way, to something more than this. Perhaps
it may be useful at this stage if the other four criteria are listed with
the help of quotations.
(I) 'An autonomous moral judgement is said to be used "non-supervenientlyll
if the speaker is not ready to give reasons for it'. '~ihich of these two
points of view someone is speaking from depends on lY'hetherhe is ready
to give reasons or not'.
(2~ 'An autonomous moral judgement is said to be used "superveniently" or
a "critically" if the speaker can give reasons for making it••'
1. ibid. p.23. 2. ibid. pp.26-27. 3. ibid. p.27.
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(3) It is said to be used 'superveniently' or 'critically' if 'the moral
word in the judgement is applied to acts or people in virtue of their
possessing certain charafteristics of which the speaker is aware'.
(4)' An autonomous moral judgement is said to be used "non-supervenientlyll'
if the speaker 'applies the moral word in the judgement to something
"immediately" without analysis of the objects characteristics'.
Some comments on the differences between these ways of
making the distinction may be useful here. The first suggestion is
difficult to take seriously. A lack of readiness to give reasons may
stem from many sources, including perverseness and taciturnity. It seems
unlikely that Cooper can really wish to make the distinction depend on
foibles of this kind. There is a similar objection to the second sugges-
tion: that all depends on whether a person is able to give reasons or
not. A person ma.ybe inartiCUlate or bad at explaining and yet it will
sometimes seem appropriate to say 'he has his reasons ~ though he
cannot communicate them'. To make the distinction depend on such factors
would turn it into something of merely psychological interest. At this
point the third suggestion begins to seem attractive for at least it
offers a criterion with some conceptual significance. There are, however,
two points which should be made about it. The first is that to assess
the criterion one should observe the uses to which it is put in practice
and the way it links up with other elements in the general argument.
Unfortunately, Cooper fails to provide the necessary evidence, for after
introducing it, he neglects the suggestion entirely. Secondly, one should
note that it is a rather different criterion from that offered in (4).
According to (3) a man makes a non-supervenient judgement unless he
judges as he does in virtue of some feature of the situation of which
he is aware. According to (4), to judge non-superveniently is to judge
'immedia.tely, without an.alysis of'the objects characteristics'. But it
is surely possible, even after a prolonged and partially successful
analysis, that the final decision will not be made in virtue of some
fea.ture of'which the agent is aware. He may be convinced that a particular
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course of action is the right one and yet not know what the crucial
factor in the situation is. In such a case we may, perhaps, say that
the complexity of the situation has defeated the men's powers of analysis,
but it would often be misleading to say that he had decided without any
analysis at all. This example will also serve to reveal the differences
between (3) and (5). For the man's judgement may be quite unlike a mere
e.pression of emotion. Thus, he ~ay be prepared to universalise it. He
may insist that the feature, whatever it is, which constitutes the reason
for his moral judgement, will also be a reason for any similar person in
similar circumstances. Finally, it is worth noting that Cooper's fourth
and ~ifth suggestions differ substantially and may lead to conflioting
results in practice. It is by no means safe to assume that a judgement
±E made i~mediately and without analysis can be identified with expressions
of emotion. Some people have, for instance, claimed to be able to intuit
the existence of simple non-natural properties. They would presumably
agree that their judgements are made 'immediately' and 'without analysis'.
Yet they would indignantly deny that they merely serve to express personal
likes and dislikes.
Although the preoise nature of Cooper's distinction is
unclear it is not diffioult to form a general idea of what he is driving
at, and this should be enough to justify taking the discussion a stage
further. What underlies his approach to the problem is the notion of a
contrast like this. On the ~:r hand there is the person who, after refl-
ection, makes a moral judgement in virtue of certain olear-out features
of the situation, and is then able and willing to justify it with reasons
formulated in.terms of them. On. the other there is the case where judge-
ment is made spontaneously, without refleoti~, and the judger is unable
or unwilling to give reasons for it, or to offer any serious defence to
the oharge that he is merely expressing likes and dislikes. Surely,it
may be said, we have here examples of oritical and immediate jUdgements.
The difficulty, however, is that we cannot be certain. which features are
defining and necessary and l-lhichare not. Some, such as the readiness to
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give reasons, are fairly obviously inessential while others present a
problem. Is it really necessary, for instance, to be aware of the feature
in virtue of which one's judgement is made before it can be a critical
judgement? ~ie have been able to feel confidence in the model situation
only by building into it every feature tha.t could conceivably be taken
as a criterion for the distinction. Eut while as a result we may be sure
tr~t one of the judgements is supervenient and the other is immediate we
are still unable to say precisely what constitutes membership of either
class. Hence the distinction cannot safely be used outside artificial
paradigmatic situations. It might be thought that this is a serious weak-
ness, but in practice it does not prove much of an obstacle to Cooper.
For what he does is to ignore all criteria except the fifth when it comes
to appl~ing the distinction. That is, he identifies, in effect, non-
supervenient judgements with expressions of emotion.
The argument which constitutes the second main division of
Cooper's paper may be summarised as follows:
(a) 'To choose means which will promote one's ends or what one wan,ts is
rational; to choose means which will frustrate or fail to promote one's
ends or what one wants is irrational,.l
(b) It is 'an invarient end of moral language to aim at agreement about
2what to do'. When we pass an autonomous moral judgement in an interper-
sonal situation, Hhen, say, we aall someone's proposed action "wrong",
it must be the case, if Ne are sincere, that we want him to avoid that
action and take up towards it an attitude similar to our own'.3
(c) '••critical uses of autonomous moral language offer ~eater hope of
obtaining agreement than immediate uses,.4
(d) Hence, 'it is rationa.l to prefer the critical uses to the immediate
uses of moral language,.5
1. ibid. p.25. 2. j_bid. p.26.
3. loc.cit. 4• .iill. p.27.
5. lQ£·£it.
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Stages (b) and (c) of this argument are highly dubious.
It is n.ot eaS"tto accept that a desire to gain the agreement of one's
hearer can be a test of sincerity in calling his proposed action 'wrong'.
It seems reasonable to allow that a man may be perfectly sincere in
judging something to be 1<-Irongwhile not caring in the least what others
think or do. Indeed, we may begin to suspect his sincerity precisely
when he shows himself toosensitive to such considerations. Claims and
counter-claims of this sort are, of course, notoriously difficult to
settle. A point which may however be made with some confidence is that
Cooper's view is far from bein~ self-evidently correct: it needs to be
argued tor. He comes nearest to supplying what is required in the following
passage:
'It is, I suggest, an invarient end of moral langua~e to aim at
agreement about what to do. True, we use moral language not only
prospectively and prescriptively, but also in ways which are less
imperatival, less obviously relevant to questions about what to do
here and now, as when we consider what somebody ought to have done
or whether somebody long since dead was a good man or not. But such
uses of moral language derive their interest from their connection
with moral talk which is more closely related to the question ··,lhat
are we to do?" tihether a moral judgement about the past is actually
relevant to any live question about what to do depends on how much
the present resembles the past, but even a moral judgement about a
temporally remote event is capable of being relevant to present
action. The general purpose of ufing moral language is, then, to
obtain agreement on what to do'.
llhat is the force of 'then' in the last sentence? At best Cooper can
claim to have given an argument to show that prescriptive uses of moral
lan.guage have some special status; that, ultimately, its point is derived
from its relevance to the practival question 'what are we to do" Even
if this argument were sound it would hot e.tablish the conclusion he
requires. It is one thing for language to be prescriptive and quite
another for it to have the function of securing inter-personal agreement.
As R.M.Hare makes clear, our US8E of language may be fully prescriptive
when it is directed at influencin.g no one but ourselves.2 It is true that
1. ibid. 1'.26. 2. See Freedom and Reason, oh.5.
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if a man refused to regard his judgement about the wrongness of an action
as in any sense prescriptive, as having any implication.s even for his own
future conduct, we might legitimately begin to question his sincerity.
But to admit this is not to admit that any case has been made for Cooper's
second ~remise. The assumption made in (c) is even less plausible. In
support of it he writes:
'If in using the word "wrong" in an interpersonal situation we do
no more than express an adverse reaction to the action, we neither
have nor can hope to have any hold or leverage over our auditors.
For the direct conftontation of one persons emotional reactions
with anot~er's does not of itself produce agreement, rather the
reverse'.
No doubt there is legitimate room for disagreement here though presumably
the issues involved would in the end have to be settled empirically. But
at least one can say that many shrewd observers have been unable to share
Cooper's faith in the effectiveness of reason as against rhetoric. It
would need more discussion than he provides to persuade one of its correct-
ness. One must conclude that the argument in this part of the paper is
not very compellin.g. :Sutbefore going on one feels obliged to raise the
issue of why it was thought necessary to produce any formal argument at
alll If our interpretation of the immediate-critical distinction is
approximately right then the question with which Cooper is concerned
may be formulated as follows: is it more rational to make judgements
which are the products of reflection and which can be supported with
reasons than to make them unthinkingly and in a way that serves only
to express emotion? Surely the description of the first method tells us
what constitutes rational behaviour in this context: to judge in this
way is to judge rationally. Hence, the question does not present ue with
genuine alternatives between which we are free to choose and to defend
our choice by argument. No argument is needed to establish Cooper's conc-
lusion: it must be accepted by anyone who understands the concepts involved.
In the last part of the paper Cooper, drawing on his earlier
conclusions, declares that he will ignore the immediate uses of autonomous
1. i£..id.1'.21.
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moral language. He goes on:
'The question, then, which we have to consider is liTowhich concept
the positive or the autonomous, is it ration.al to give priority in
coming to moral decisions?" or, to put it differently, n\-lhichkind
of moral judgement, positive or autonomous (critical) is it rational
to regard as overriding in coming to a moral decision?"'l
This question has a strange and rather artificial air about it. It would
surely be odd if a person with a moral difficulty were to ask himself,
'should I use my autonomous concept of morality or the social concept in
deciding about this?' For Cooper, social morality consists of customs of
a certain kind, those from which deviation is met by 'a distinctive kand
of social pressure'. The autonomous concept ia, on his vie\-I,employed
whenever we stand back from the social morality and try to make up our
own minds: an autonomous moral judgement is one made 'off one's own bat'.
In the light of these suggestions Cooper'a question might be rephrased
aa follows: 'Should I decide to be guided by what I think I ought to do
or by what most people in my society thiru( I ought to do?' Not only is
he committed to treating this as a genuine question but he also wishes
to hold that it would sometimes be rational to answer it in one way and
sometimes in another. But this liberality is surely misplaced. Even for
one who does not subscribe to the principle that people ought always to
do what they think they ought to do there can be no general problem about
deciding whether it should be preferred to what others think they ought
to do. That is, there can be no rational disagreement when the only
specified difference between the two prescriptions is their source; the
one issuing from the agents personal beliefs and the other from the conv-
entions of his society. Cooper's question is therefore an empty one in
that to understand it is to see that only one answer is possible.
Turning again to his original versi on of the questi on one
finds another way of displaying its oddness which has the merit of raising
general issues about his conception of the individual-social distinction.
The point involved might be expressed by saying that to raise the question
of whether to be guided by the autonomous or the sodial concepts is already
1. ibid. pp. 27-28.
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to have decided in favour of autonomy. A serious concern "lith the question
must involve that degree of detachment from the positive code and the
attempt to mru~eup one's mind whether to accept or reject some part of
it which Cooper regards as characteristic of employing the autonomous
concept. Hhatever decision is reached in this situation will be expressed
by an autonomous judgement, made 'off one's own bat'. If it conflicts with
what had hitherto been regarded as one's autonomous code the proper way
to describe this is in terms of the extension or regision of the code,
not in terms of its abandonment for something else. Hence, if one is
faced with a moral problem, it can only be a confusion to think of autono-
mous morality and social morality as rivals for the job of solving it.
-'!'healternatives oannot present themselves to the moral agent in this
§\lise. For in so far as he is seriously concerned with what he ought to
do he is necessarily committed to the enterprise of autonomous moral
reflection.
At this point it may help to advance the disoussion if
Cooper's own treatment of the question is looked at in more detail. For
it might be thought that he suooeeds in giving it substanoe through his
use of a contrast between two 'oonceptual sohemes'; 'the traditionalist
conceptual scheme which emphasises the positive or social concept, custom
and tradition., and recommends that we should derive our moral decisions
from positive morality, and anti-traditionalism which emphasises the
autonomous oohcept, private judgement and reflection,.l He argues that
'both positions, if maintained in their extreme forms, have consequences
which we ought to condemn as"irrational "'.:and that therefore a rational
morality should contain elements of each.2 The argument runs as follows:
'•••the extreme anti-traditionalist will argue that if someone thinks
that there is an evil in a moral rule or an institution, then he .!.2
ipso wants to get rid of it, and that therefore it is always rational
for him to try to get rid of it more quickly rather than less quickly •••
This view is superficially attractive but false. For there are situat-
ions in which the very attempt to get what one wants more quickly will
produce consequeBces more unwelcome than the original evils ••• But
1. ibid. p.31.
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because it is not always rational to try to get rid of an evil more
quickly, it does not follow th~t we should accept the extreme trad-
itionalist viewpoint that it is never rational to try to get rid of
an evil more quickly ••• To believe that we should always get rid of
evils more quickly is irrational because it sometimes leads to the
frustration of one's ends, namely in those situations where "the
cure is worse than the disease". To believe that we ahou.ld never :t
take deliberate stept to get rid of evils will also sometimes lead
to irrational behaviour, namely in all those situations in which it
is possible to get rid of evils by speedy but relatively harmless
means. Since both positions are irrational in that they commit the
holder to irrational behaviour, the rational procedure is to sDeer
a middle course,.l
There seems to be some confusion in this passage. Cooper
reaches his conclusion by conflating two separate distinctions; that
between the traditional and the autonomous moralist on the one hand and
that between what we may call the 'ideological conservative'and the ~
'ideological radical' on the other. The ideological conservative belongs
to that familiar school of thought which likes to contrast the individuals
stock of reason unfavourably with the 'funded wisdom of the ages'. Hence,
it emphasises the value of a tradition of gradual development and the
danger-s of sudden change. Perhaps it may serve as an illuminating piece
of shorthand if we label him' the follower of Burke'. The ideological
radical, on.the other hand, tends to be sceptical or contemptuous of
the claims of tradtion as presented by the conservative. He is sympathetic
tvwards the method of drastic innovation in dealing with problems and his
in.tellectual ancestry goes back to Bentham or l'1arxrather than to Burke.
The crucial point to note is that these distinctions cut across each other.
A man may be both an ideological radical and a traditional moralist, if,
for instance, he belongs to a society whose tradition is sympathetic to
change. I.ioresignificantly, he may be an autonomous moralist and an ideo-
logical conservative in that he may include among the elements of his
autonomous morality a hostility to change and a reaainess to be guided
by the well established conventional standards of his society. Cooper's
1. ~. pp.3l-32.
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argument ma~{have shown that it is irrational to be either an extreme
radical or an extreme conservative, to believe that evils must always be
got rid of as quickly as possible or to believe that one should never do
anything about them. But this establishes nothing about the rationality
of autonomous or of social morality.
To note the possibility of being both an ideological oonser-
vative .and an autonomous moralis. serves not merely to draw attention to
a weakness in Cooper's argument but also to raise issues of general
signifioance. It is conceivable that such a person, if he were a thorough-
going Durkean, might believe that he would generally do best in mor.al
matters by trusting to 'the funded wisdom of the ages', as it reached him
in the shape of the traditional standards of his own society. That is,
he might Dake it xxx as a basic principle of his autonomous morality that
he should regulate his conduot in accordance with the social code. The
suggestion made earlier that we need a quite different conception of the
autonomous-social distinction from Cooper's has nOl.,been strengthened.
For we are able to reinterpret what his 'establishment moralists'.X2 were
trying to achieve. He represents them 'as advooating that in deciding Qhat
to do one should employ the social in prefenence to the autonomous
concept. There is a gain. iilclarity if we see them not as wishing to
establish a hierarchy among the concepts but as advocating that their
practical implications should be harmoniously aligned, that the individual
should make the content of his autonomous monality identical with that
of the social code. The ideal of the moral life which dominates these
men is,±D:t in Oakeshott's phrase, the 'unself-conscious following of a
traditional mode of behaviour'. :But they recognise that once this habit
has been broken and th4 demon of self-consoiousness had made its entrance,
the next best thing is a deliberate decision in favour of traditional
standards. Cooper misrepresents them in holding the essenee of their case
to be the claim that the social concept is 'the only real or genuine one'.
Basically their position is itself a moral one and not primarily the
result of conceptual analysis at all. What underlies it is th( conviction
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that any attempt to ignore or transcend traditional values must prove
disastrous in practice. The warnings given by Burke and Bradley to which
Cooper refersl fit in perfectly with this interpretation and indeed it
is difficult to see how they can be accounted for at all on his view of
their case. At this point the doubts about the propriety of Cooper's
question have been confirmed. The view that the autonomous and social
concepts are rivals between which the individual moral agent may have
to adjudicate is the result of confusion. Furthermore there are no good
grounds for attributing this error to those illustrious members of the
traditional camp who have insisted most strongly on the gen.eral signifi-
cance of a distinction between individual and social.
Cooper's thesis is built around the assumption of a close
and sustained parallelism between the autonomous and social concepts of
morality. Its failure stems ultimately from the insistence on a symmetry
where it is inappropriate, at the point where one has to describe the
situation of the individual moral agent tryin.g to decide how to act. This
suggests that there may be a kind of category mistake here. The suspicion
arises that the autonomous and social concepts cannot be rivals because
they are not entered in the same competition. Hence an adequate account
of them would have to respect the radical nature of the differences. A
similar conclusion emerges fDom our discussion of Hart. Having noted the
individual-social distinction he proceeds to offer a generalised account
of morality which will avoid the need to take it seriously. Such a proce-
dute might work where the distinction being ignored is not of any real
significance in the context of the enterprise as a whole. The manner of
Hart~s failure suggests that this condition does not hold in the present
case and, indeed, that no attempt made in the same spirit can hope to
succeed. Once again one is led to suggest that what is needed is an
adequate recognifion of the fundamental character of the gap between
individual and social. Until an attempt has been. made to say what gives
1. ibid. p.28.
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the contrast its special character, this can, however-, be at best only
an isolated insight. Hence our general thesis must nowbe invoked in
order to provide it with a context and a rationale. In doing so it will
also help us to see the real significance of the lessons to be learned
from Hart and Cooper.
~~~-----
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Cha"pter 5.
INDIVIDUAIJ AND SOCIAL. 2.
The discussion in the previous chapter concerned itself with
the details of Hart and Cooper's case while accepting in a general way
the conceptual framework it presupposes. If further progress is to be
made it is important that this limitation. should be overcome. Some fresh
perspectives are suggested by an issue which has received a certain amount
of attention recently. It is the question of whether every human community
should be credited with a morality. G.J~Warnock is prepared to give a
negative answer:
'Surely there have been individuals and even whole societies, of
whom or of which we should want to say that moral principles did
not play any large part in their lives - that, perhaps, both their
ideals of conduct and their actual conduct were shaped in accordance
with standards that were not moral standards at all. Homer, in
approving the ferocity, guile and panache of the warrior chieftain
might be said to have been employing moral standards different from
our own; but he might just as well, or better, be said not to have
been employing moral standards at all,.l
John Ladd in his study of the Navaho Indians takes a different line.2
Finding their conventional code of behaviour to be of a purely prudential-
ist character, and taking for granted that it is a moral code, he is
prepared to draw general conclusiona about the nature of morality. This
prooedure has been trenchantly criticised by W.K.Frankena.. Ladd, he writes,
'can only do this if he first assumes that every culture~ including the
Navaho, has a morality in our sense of the term and this is precisely the
question at issue.' He goes on to amplify the points
,
1. Contemporary };~oralPhi108~, Macmillan, 1967, p.54.
2. The Structure of a.Moral Code, Harvard University Press, 19;1, See
esp. pp. 16-17,80,313ff.
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'One cannot say that the Navaho have a morality until after OD.ehas
formed some conception of morality and :found that the navaho have
such an institution. The :fact that they have some kind of a code
which partakes of certain formal properties proves that they have
a morality only if these properties suffice to define morality. But
this is our question. No doubt one wants some term for all such codes
but it may be that to Ball them all f~moralitiesll is an undesirable
departure from our traditional conception of such an institution. The
fact that a certain code lacks a certain feature does not prove that
this feature is and should be no part o:four conception of morality; 1
it may in fact be a reason for not calling that code a morality at all'.
Frankena is surely wise to Ball attention to the dangers of question-
be~gin~ for they are endemic in this area. Let us try to see whether the
distinction between understanding and assessment can do something to
reduce them by making clear what the issues at stake really are.
The immediate effect of in.voking it is to split the original
question into ti'TOparts. Do all human comrrunfties operate codes of moral
containassessment? Do all of them ~XESXxmembers who possess moral understanding?
This way of distinguishing the issues may seem natural and obvious but
there is a feature of it which is worth noting. In the first case one
is asking whether something may be attributed to a social group ~ group
and, in the second, whether it may be attributed to individuals. If these
formulations are accepted the suggestion arises that the individual-
social and assessment-understanding distinctions do not cut across each
other in a completely symmetrical way. Clearly an individual morality
maycontain elements both of understanding and of assessment. Indeed, an
important part of our case is that it must do so before it can be said
to encapsulate the full concept of morality. It is equally obvious that
a code of moral assessment may be attributed to a social group. As we
shall see the only serious question about such an attribution is whether
it should be regarded as necessary on conceptual grounds. The pattern
seems to be disrupted, however, when one comes to the link between
understanding and social morality. It would surely be odd to ask whether
1. 'Recent Conceptions of lIorality', ~lity and the LanguMe of Condu6t,
ed by Hector-Heri Castaneda and George Naknikian, Wayne State
University Press, 1963, p.17.
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a particular comnund ty has moral understan.ding. One might protest that
such understanding is essentially a matter of how indi~iduals conceptualise
their experience and, unlike codes of moral assessment, not something that
a group may be 'said to pOSBess or not to possess. It might be tempting
to conclude that the understanding-assessment distinction does not apply
to social morality at all and can only be drawn within the individual or
autonomous concept. This conclusion would be attractive in a number of
ways. For one thing it seems to provide a rationale for our criticism of
Hart and Cooper. It does so by making clear what the radical difference
between the autonomous and the social concepts consists ins social morality
is a matter of assessment alone while autonomous morality necessarily
involves understanding as well. Hence, disaster might wel1 be predicted
for any attempt to treat the individual and the social as twin concepts
in the manner of Hart and Cooper. In spite of this explanatory usefulness,
hovrever, the suggestion will have to be formulated with more care before
one can proceed with any confidence. For in its present form it is open
to a serious objection.
It is that the whole position depends on a notion of
'Society' as an hypostatized entity with an existence independent of that
of its members. Only on the basis of such an assumption, it may be said,
is it possible to interpret talk about ascribing a morality to a social
group in a literal way and to go on to contrast it with ascriptions to
individuals. It is this contrast which in turn provides the grounds for
.#concluding that social morality is confined to assessment alone while
individual morality includes understanding as well. ~et, it may be argued,
the concept of 'society' employed here involves such notorious difficulties
that few would wish to subscribe to it except as part of a general metaphy-
sical thesis. Certainly it has little appeal as a conceptual tool used
in an ~ .h~ way to enforce a particular distinction. Ftirthermore, when
assumptions of this kind are abandoned, it becomes clear that everything
that can be said about the relationship between assessment and social
morality can be sa.id of understanding also. For it must ultimately be
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possible to analyse talk about social morality in terms of the beliefs
and attitudes of individuals. To ascribe a code of assessment to a social
group is, in the last resort, to ascribe something to the individual
members of the group. 'This is precisely the same kind of ascription that
one meets in the case of mo»al understanding. If On the other hand, while
accepting this point one sees no harm in continuing to speak metaphorically
in the case of assessment why cannot one do precisely the same with under-
standing? Thus one might wish to say that a particular community possesses
moral understanding if the dominant outlook and attitudes of its members
fall within the realm of the moral. It would perhaps not be inappropriate
to characterise in this way a cornnunity of ardent supporters of the
Flew-Huxley brand of humanism. Hence, there is no asymmetry whatever
between ascriptions of understanding and of assessment to social groups.
Neither should be taken literally: for both, the substance of the metaphor
is constituted by its connection with the individual case. At this point
it begins to look as though attempts to confine sooial morality to assess-
ment are quite gratuitous.In so far as the conoept is a legitimate one
at all its links with understanding will precisely parallel those with
assessment. Hence, the notions of understanding and assessment e.annot
provide the basis for a fundamental distinction between the individual
and the social ooncepts of morality. It follows that no rational support
has yet been given to the claim that Hart's and Cooper's troubles stem
from failure to recognise their radidal differences. It should perhaps
be noted that there is nothing strained or implausible about defending
Hart and Cooper along these lines: it in no way transcends the limits of
their own conoeption of the situation. Cooper in particular is fully
aware of the force of the considerations that have been urged here and
makes the case himself with vigour and olarity:
'••to say that something is a rule of positive morality is to say
something anaf.ysabLe in,terms of the behaviour-patterns of individuals.
If we unpack what is meant by "posi tive morali ty~.we come down to the
opinions of individual people, and this indeed is implied by calling
positive morality "the law of opinion". Prichard was making the s~e
point in his attaok on Green when he said (Moral Obligation. 1'.15)
of custom or the lali'of ppinion: -The phrase can only be a veiled
term for ihe thoughts held by individuals that certain actions are
duties"'.
1. op.cit. pp.29-30.
---~--~--
--..,..
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The substance of this case must surely be conceded and
hence the reasoning on which our conclusions have rested must be given
up. It may however still be possible to re-establish them o.fl a different
basis. One might hope to show that the relationship between the concept
of 'the social' and codes of assessment is significantly different from
its relationship with forms of understanding and that this is not the
case with the concept of 'the individual'. The objection has shown that
the asymmetry we seek does not pertain to the logical status of our
ascriptions. Pez-11apsinstead it may be found among the criteria on which
they depend? There is a fairly uncontroversial point which may help is
here. It is that possession of a system for making practical assessments
is bound up with the existence and identity of social groups in a wa~
that aereement on forms of understanding is not. This is a conceptual
not an empirical point. Unless there was widespread agreement on standards
for regulating inter-personal behaviour a collection of individuals could
not be said to constitute a human community at all. Their condition would
be that :Jlf.tk of the benign or ferocious states of nature described by
social contract theorists. Indeed it is perhaps this core of conceptual
truth that accounts for the durability of contractual ideas. In the classic
versions of the doctrinex it is the absense of agreed rules of conduct
that distinguishes the 8ta~e of nature and the process by which it is
remedied is what constitutes civil society. The genuine insight behind
this is that a code of assessment is essential before the concept of
'SOCiety' can have application. The case of forms of understanding is
quite different. Research might reveal some correlation between the
degree of cohesion of a social group and the extent to which its members
agree on basic ways of viewing the world. But one can set no ~ ~riori
limits on the extent to which fragmentation of understanding is possible
within a given social framework. Even the hypothetical case where all
the members of a group have radically different ways of interpreting
experience cannot be ruled out on.conceptual grounds. What I require if
I am to enter into social relationships with others is that their behaviou~
should in some degree be subject to my prediction and control. That is,
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I need some assurance that our practical assessments will have a tendency
to work together. It would be unreasonable to demand that we also share
those more elusive elements that go to make up a persons general conception
of the significance of his life. The social fabric could hardly be expected
to depend on agreement o~ this kind, whatever importance it may have in
personal relationships.
\"le nOV1have a new basis for our distinction. In so far as
the word 'social' in 'social morality' is taken seriously the rules
governing the use of the phrase must accord with those for 'society' and
'social grouP'. That is, the links with assessment are conceptually
necessary while those with understanding are contingent and empirical.
Viemay now proceed to draw the same conclusions as before though they
rest on different grounds. A social morality is essentially a code of
assessment. But this is not simply true, as it were, by default: it is
n.ot due to any special incoherence about talk of understanding in connec-
tion with such a morality. Instead, the conclusion is established by
considering the criteria which govern the use of the concept and give it
substance. It then becomes clear why any attempt to run such diverse
concepts as those of individual and social morality in harness must end
in failure. Besides we thereby re-establish the right to view the work
of Hart and Cooper as a rich smlrce of material wMj~m with which this
theme might be illustrated and develop.d.
At this point it may be well to inquire what light the
discussion has thrown on the original problem of whether a morality is
something possessed by all human communi ties. The main impression that
has emerged is of the variety and complexity of the issues that lie
behind its simple exterior. It may be useful to pick out one element in
this background which can now be treated with some confidence. This will
be no great gain in itself but it gets rid of a potential source of
confusion and helps to focus attention on the substantial issues that
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remain. The point is simply that the question, 'must every society be
credited with a code of practical assessment?' can have only one answer.
\fi thout a system of generally agreed procedures for regulating behaviour
one has no right to use the language of social entities at all' instead
one is faced with a collection of asocial individuals. When this point
is granted however it is still poasfb l,eto question whether the code of
assessment of a particular community must be accepted as a moral code.
Would it not be better in some cases to characterise it as 'religious'
or 'magical' or 'prudential'? Perhaps there are occasions when the use
of any label of this kind is liable to mislead. May it not presuppose
discriminations which are only significant in a very different social
context? These questions have implications \-,hichextend far beyond the
limits of our present concerns. They raise important issues in, for
instance, the philosophy of social science. Nevertheless, some aspects
of them have direct r-elevance for our argument and must be discussed i:
later. For the present however it will be more convenient to turn to
another issue embedded in the original question which we are now in a
position to resolve. This is the question of l-rhetherevery society has
members with moral understanding.
A short answer emerges readily from the preceeding discussion.
It is that, given our criterion of moral understanding, the issue is one
for the anthropologist to settle. There is no necessary link between the
concepts of 'society' and of 'moral understanding'. Nothing can be settled
here by philosophical inquiry and the empirical evidence alone must be
decisive. This answer- is correct so far as it goes. It might however be
unfortunate if matters were allowed to rest there. A closer look at the
conceptual aspects of the question will m~~e clear the sort of relevance
that empirical evidence can have and hence give some clues as to theresearchdirections in whichAZS should proceed. On the other hand, a glance at
what one might call the 'natural history of mind' will serve to place
the conceptual issues in a richer perspective.
--_
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The most important lesson of that history for :present
purposes is that the emergence of differentiated modes od understanding
is a comp~tively recent development. As P.H.Hirst has shownl even the
Greeks failed to achieve an adequate grasp pf the forms of thought and
a.wareness that we now readily, categorize as 'moral', 'religious',
'!!esthetic' and 'scientific'. For them the mind operated like a search-.lieht with a sitngle beam which can play in.dtscriminately over all aspects
of reality. The essential distinctions within the realm of knowlettge are
to be made at the level of its objects. A characteristic Greek view, as
Hirst points out, is that they are susceptible to arrangement in.a hierar-
chical series ranging from mere particulars to pure Being. But the faculty
by which they are apprehended is the same in every case. What is lacking
in this conception is a sense of the auton.omy and variety of what Hirst
has called the 'forms of knowledge'. These 'basic articulations by which
the whole of experience has become intelligible to man' include science,
matbematics, religion, history and morals. Two conclusions which emerge
from Hirst's work are of particular importance here. The first is that
the various 'forms of knowledge' are conceptually distinct from one
another in a number of important ways. They differ as regards the nature
of their central concepts, the ways in which these may be combined, the
techniques by which their work is carried on"and, perhaps most important,
the manner in which their findings may be tested against experience. All
of these differences may be illustrated readily by considerin.g, say, the
relationships between science, mathematics and history. The second point
is that it would be a serious error to think of the forms on the tempting
analogy of pipelines for oil or water, as SO many channels that facilitate
the flow of knowledge without affecting its nature. On the contrary, wha.t
can be known by us depen.ds on the :patterns of order ma.de avai1a.b1e by
the forms. The conceptual schemes which they embody determine the kind
of sense we can make of our experience. The world presents one face when
we consider i.tfrom a scientific viewpoint and a quite different one when
1. See eg. 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge', in Philosoph-
ical Analysis and Education, ed. R.D.Arohambault, Routlltdge and
Kegan Paul, 1965, pp.113-138.
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our interests are religious or historical. But we must apprehend it under
the guise of some fairly specific mode of consciousness before we can
begin to understand at all. Thus the mind is not an isolated essence
possessed of a searchlight for exploring reality. Instead it is a function
of complex factors whose operations are dependent on differentiated forms
of thought evolved over millenia. The resources of these forms of thought
are made available to the individual by the public traditions of his
society. Acquiring knowledge is not simply a matter of bringing the natural
powers of the mind to engage with reality. Essential to it is the process
by which the traditions are assimilated. The picture we form of the world
is dependent on the nature of this inheritance, in particular on the
richness and variety of the conceptual discriminations it incorporates.
One must not expect to find sophisticated versions of moral understanding
in a society in which morality has not fully disentangled itself from
religion and magic. Thus, to take the moral point of view is an achievement
which is only possibly within a certain kind of social framework.
The main features of t.is historical outline are, perhaps,
relatively uncontroversial and one scarcely needs the expertise of a
professional historian to interpret their significance. Indeed it might
be a mistake to think of one's conclusions as determined solely by the
facts, however vaguely and innocuously they are described. To do so would
be to underestimate the importance of conceptual factors in the situation.
The picture that has been presented is one of a progressive differentiation
of modes of thought and awareness. It is not eas:; to see how else the
development of understanding might be conceived, at least if it is to
take a form that is recognisably and characteristically human. The fundam-
ental features of the situation in which human beings find themselves
must surely dictate that they start with the simple, the concrete, the
undifferentiated, and if'there is change at all it will be in tl:edirection
of complexity, abstr~ction and articulation. ~ihat oher form could the
development of reflectiVe consciousness take? It is worth noting that
there are limits to what might conceivably be the case here. If this point
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is ta..."<:enin conjunction with the banality of the empirical elements in
the discussion, it may rescue us from anxieties about overstepping the
bounds of legitimate philosophical inquiry, however tightly they are
drawn. The services of a historian would however be needed if one wished
to map the details of the process described and, in particular, if one
wished to assign a chronology to it. There is however one point that
should be made briefly. In Ethios an.dEduoation Professor R.S.Peters goes
over some of the ground covered here though with different interests in
view. In the oourse of the discussion he refers to those 'specific modes
of thought and awareness' such as 'science, history, mathematics, religion
and aesthetic awareness' and 'moral, prudential and technical forma of
thought and action'. 'Such differentiations', he remarks, 'are alien to
the mind of a child or preliterate man - indeed perhaps to that of a pre-
seventeenth century man,.l It is difficult not to feel that Peters is
correct in suggesting the seventeenth century as the crucial period for
the transition. It was surely the rise of modern science in the period
from Bacon to Newton that sounded the death-knell for the traditional
view of the unity of knowledge. The differences between its procedures
and those of any subject which, like metaphysics and theology, relied on
a priori speculation were too striking to be ignored. The dramatic success
of the new science with its own terms of reference ensured that sooner
or later they would transform the intellectual scene. One is therefore
led to suggest that the seventeenth century might well tum out,m on
examination, to be the crucial episode in the development of that sense
of the fragmentariness of our understanding and the variety and autonomy
of its modes which is described by Hirst and Peters. The rearguard action
on behalf of the unity of knowledge, may perhaps be said to have begun
with the refusal of the theologians to look through Galileo's telescope.
It has been shown that talk of moral understanding only has
point in oontexts where the differentiation of modes of awareness has
beoome fairly sophisticated. There is nothing universal or inevitable
1. Ethics and Education, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966, p.50.
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about such situations: they are the products of a particular kind of
history. Even a superficial acquaintance with.:'the facts serves to indicate
that the concept of moral understanding cann ot be applied with confidence
outside the bounds of the modern period in Europe. This conclusion is
strengthened be noting that it seems to have little or no relevance to
the intellectual experience of primitive peoples. The anthropological
evivence suggests that they tend to vie\v their activities in a manner
which is no more and no less appropriate to call 'moral' than 'prudential'
or 'religious'. The reality if their situation seems to elude the grasp
of these categories, and one may have to struggle to devise more adequate
ones. Crawley, for instance, remarks that 'Primitive man has only one
mode of thought, one mode of expression, one part of speech - the person-
al,.l Clearly he lacks a 'morality' if by that is meant a distinctive
way of conceptualising experience, a mode of moral understan.ding. It may
well be that this deficiency goes a long way to account for the reluctance
of people like Warnock to ascribe a morality to primitive societies in
the sense in which ours might be saillto possess one. To note this point
serves to take some of the sting out of the disagreement with Ladd. It
now becomes uncertain whether the one is denying precisely what the other
wishes to asser,.-,for one suspects that Ladd is almost exclusively inter-
ested. in matters of assessment. Uevertheless, the controversy is not
thereby deprived of all its substance. For while it seems safe to deny
that the Homeric chieftains possess moral understanding, it is still open
to anyone to claim that their code of assessment is a moral code. tlhether
this is so or not has n.ow emerged as the crucial issue which underlies
disagreements over ascriptions of a morality.
Before turning to discuss this issue, however, something
more should be said about the relationship between the pairs of distinct-
ions 'individual-social' and 'understanding-assessment'. It was suggested z
above that moral understanding should be seen as a compar.tively late
development in the history of thought. To say the sarne of the concept of
1. Quot~d in Hsand H.A.Frankfort, !.1•.a!_., Before Philosopl1Y, PenguinBooks, 1949, p.14.
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'individual' or 'autonomous' morality would merely be to point out the
obvious. In the tribal society such a notion is entirely out of place
or, at best, finds expression in rudimentary forms. A comr:;entby Profiissor
E.B.Evans-Pritchard on the Azande makes this point succinctly: 'When
Azande say that an action or feeling is bad they,;;meanthat it is socially
deplorable and condemned by public oPinion,.l Among the Azande, as Evans-
Pritchard shows, the solutions to practical difficulties are thought of
as given in the natural order of things. In particular cases the answer
may be hidden from the layman and he may need the guidance of the oracle
to uncover it. But even then what is required is not reasoning but
observ.tion. In so far as geBaine intellectual difficulties do arise
they will typically be ones of casuistry: ~ow do the ~stomary rules
apply to this case? l'loreover,the vtrdict on such an issue is itself a
matter for the authorities of the tribe. ~lhat is missing here is any
awareness that a conflict between private inclination and social rules
might be a moral conflict, a clash of duties. Of course, people do not
always in practice behave as the oonventional rules prescribe. ]ut the
tragedy of the nonconformist in such a society is that he lacks the
ooncepts in terms of which an intellectual defenoe of his stand could
be given. The precise nature of the social conditions which facilitate
the emergence of such concepts is perhaps not entirely understood by
an.yone at present. Nevertheless, that some general relationship of
dependence is involved seems impossible to deny.
At this stage there is another point to be made whioh may
look liH an empirical generalisation but which, as we s~ll see, is not
entirely oontingent on the facts. It is that individual morality flourishes
in the same kind of social setting as does moral understan.ding. The
briefest acquaintanoe with the historical background suggests that their
development has been roughly contemporaneous as a matter of facti cruoial
for both is the post-medieval period in Europe. This is surely not an
accident of history. A social morality in the sense of a generally accepted
1. Wjtchcraft, Oracles and Ma£ic Am~ the AZande, p.llO. o.u.P. 1937.
-86-
code of moral assessment may function perfectly well without the aid of
any widespread sense of the distinctiveness of the moral point of view.
Indeed its effectiveness may depend to some extent on this being absent
or weak. For a diffused titz.t awareness that,there exist alternative ways
of looking at things may impede the task of ensuring a degeee of'uniformi~
and predictability in peoples behaviour. The task is made still more
difficult if it becomes generally realised that individuals may l~ve by
codes of behaviour which differ substantially from those current in their
community. Individual morality, no less than moral understanding, is an
obstacle to the smooth working of.the conventional rules. These function
best where the very possibility of conceiving of alternatives to the
official standards and attitudes has been minimised as among the Azande
and the imaginary societies of science fiction. Thus, one can say that
moral understanding and indfvidual ~orali ty are connected in that they
spring from the same source, the weakening or collapse of the monolithic
value-structure and outlook of the traditional community. They need the
same social environment it they are to develop to the fullest extent.
To state the condition crudely, it is one in which the rights of individ-
ual conscience and freedom of thought receive a fair measure of practical
recogni tion.
The links so far noted between individual morality and
moral understanding, although interesting in themselves,are not the
most important for present purposes. Much that is of philosophical signi-
ficance will be missed if the connection is thought to consist primarily
in the fact that, viewed from an external sociological standpoint, they
can be said to have causal antecedents in common. It has been shown that
social morality is essentially a matter of assessment while the individual
concept incorporates understanding as well. Hence, it is not a sutficient
condition for the emergenc* of individual morality that people should
begin to detach themselves from the conventional rales of their social
group and to contrast them unfavourably with the dictates of conscience.
This is merely the stage at which individual codes of assessment begin
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to operate within the social framework. Such a development is to be
expected whenever a decline in the authority of the social rules forces
people to rely on other resources. Periods of social unrest are convent-
ionally, and no doubt rightly, said to have this kind of effect. At an.y
rate it seems clear that this stage was reached by minorities in, for
instance, Ancient Greece. ~lithout a grasp of the dimension of limderstanding
however the full concept of individual morality was inaccessible to them.
As we have seen, moral understanding presupposes discriminations which
cannot properly be attributed to the Greeks in spite of their intellectual
sophistication and independence in other respects. It is this that accounts
for the frequently expressed feeling that th4ir moral universe differs
radically from ours. Such doubts are given point by the notorious difficul-
ties encountered in translating the words for Greek moral con.cepts.
Reflection on these difficulties has sometimes led to the fear that all
our translations may be systematically misleading. The legitimacy of
such fears should now be obvious. \'lhatis missing from the Greek view of
things is a sense of the distinctiveness of the moral point of view. This
in turn makes it impossible for them to possess the concept of automomous
morality. One may expect serious confusion to result from failuDe to see
how fundamentally our conception of morality differs from any that were
available to them.
The conclusion that we have reached is that moral understan-
ding is not related to individual morality simply as an effect of the
same cause: it provides one of the vital criteria governing the use of
the concept. Without the possibility of characterising the view an indiv-
idual takes of his life as a moral view the notion of individual morality
can have no application. To say this is merely to draw attention to some
implications of our concepts. It is not an attempt at ~ priori legislation
about the facts though no doubt it will influence the way they are concei-
ved and described. Eesides it does not by itself provide all we need to
know about the conceptual position. There is another condition to be
fulfilled before talk of individual morality becomes appropriate. Such
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a morality as we have seen involves assessment no less than understanding.
Hence, before a person can properly be said to possess one it is neeessary
that he should be capable of making autonomous assessments as well as
having a grasp of the moral point of view·. The emergence of the possibility
of large numbers of people being able to satisfy the two conditions
simultaneously is the source from which our concept of morality has sprung.
The PDece.ding discussion has placed a good deal of emphasis
on the social dimension of moral concepts. In doing so it might be taken
as lending support to the various critiques of 'individualism' in contemp-
orary moral philosophy. For an important element in them is the claim
that a misleading picture of the moral life has been built up by concent-
rating on the isolated autonomous agent making his unconditioned choices
in a kind of social vacuum. A trenchant statement of this line of argument
appears in Alisdair ~acIntyre's A Short Hiai~r~ of Ethics.l It will help
us tOvlards a conclusion if "IacInt¥;f.e's account is looked at in some
detail. A point to be made at the outset is that his general thesis is
capable of at least two substantially different interpretations. The
stronger one is sugGested by, for instance, his attack on the view that
'moral concepts can be examined and understood apart fron their history'.
'Some philosophers', he remarks, 'have even written as if moral concepts
were a timeless, limited, unchangingt determinate species of concept,
necessarily having the sam~ features throughout their history, so that
there is a part of language waiting to be philosophically investigated
which deserves the title "the language of morals" (with a definite article
and a singular noun),.2 This·may surely be taken as implying that a
concern with history is an essential and integral item of the philosophers
equipment. To conduct a philosophical investigation of a concept it is
necessary to inquire into its historical background and success in this
inquiry is vital for philosophical understanding. A weaker thesis seems
to be assumed in the following passage which is concerned to illustrate
the dangers of neglecting history:
1. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967.
2. ~.cit. p.l.
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'It is all too easy for philosophical analysis, divorced from
historical inquiry, to insulate itself from correction. In ethics
it can happen in the follolring way. A certain unsystematically
selected class of moral concepts and judgements is made the subject
of attention. From the study of these it is conoluded that specifio-
ally moral discourse possesses certain characteristics. Whenever
counter examples are adduced to show that this is not always so,
these counter examples are dismissed as irrelevant, because not K
examples of moral discourse; and they are shown to be nonmoral by
exhibiting their lack of the necessary characteristics. From this
kind of circularity we can be saved only by an adequate historical
view of the varieties of moral and evaluative discourse'.
What is being critioised here is the tendency to take too narrow a view
of the possibilities afforded by moral discourse. Philosophers, it is
alleged, have fixed all their attention on particular segments of the
field and then insisted on the necessity and exhaustiveness of the
criteria they have found. From dogmatio partiality of this kind we are
saved by an awareness of the wider perspectives which the study of history
reveals. The suggestion now is not that historical insight is an essential
or constitutive element in philosophical work but rather that it is a
safeguard against certain kinds of error, an ally that philosophers
dispense with at their peril.
•The uncertainty about MacIntyre's views on the philosophical,..
significance of history has an interesting parallel in that which surrounds
J.L.Austin's claims for 'ordinary language'. Is the conoern with it a
necessary and defining characteristic of philosophical inquiry or is it
merely a source of reminders and warnings, with the primary function of
recalling our speculations to reality? The analo~T here is a suggestive
one and we shall return to it later. It is fairly clear in 1,iacIntyre's
case at least that if the thesis is taken in the weaker sense it has a
great deal of plausibility. It does seem reasonable to suppose that a
total absenoe of historical or sociological awareness will have a debilit-
ating effect on philosophical inquiry. At times the simple reminder that
the concepts we analyse are ~ concepts, that they have a history and
that their first-order uses occur in a particular social setting may be
1. ~. pp.3-4.
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salutary. To put the case in a minimal way: it would surely be unwise to
exclude possible sources of inspiration and guidance in an arbitrary
manner, and to ignore the considerations to whdch r.1aclntryedraws attention
may well be to do just that. But the acceptability of this advice is
directly connected with its failure to raise fundamental issues. At best
it offers heuristic hints, rules-of-thumb which it might be imprudent to
ignore. One cannot seriously maintain that any of this is conceptually
necessary for the achievement of philosophical understanding. It is
precisely the presence of claims of this kind thatcdistinguishes the
stronger and more interesting thesis.
Before turning to discuss it there is however a preliminary
point to be made. The stronger thesis has been interpreted as the claim
that philosophical understanding presu~poses a grasp of the historical
dimension of the subject matter. ~:acIntyre, however, speaks simply of
'understanding' in this connection. It may be desirable to guard against
the danger that he or his readers may draw illegitimately on the resources
of this elusive though indespensible concept. For in one sense of'underst-
anding' his case is difficult to dispute. If what is sought is the kind
of understanding \'lhichcan only come through empirical study then acquain-
tance with the historical background may well be indtspensable. But,of
course, this does not have the implications for philosophical inquiry
which MacIntyre wishes to draw. Hence, to do him the justice of being
credited with a significant thesis, it may be well to naDrow the field
explicitly to forms of understanding which are distinctively 'philosophical'!
rather than, for instance, 'sociological' in character. When the claim
has been refined in this way it becomes clear that MacIntyre offers little
in the way of formal argument for it. On the whole he seems content that
a conviction of its truth should be built up through the accumulated
weight of historical detail: what is important for him is that 'we should,
as far as possible, allow the history of philosophy to break down our
present-day preconceptions, so that our too narrow vie..eof what can and
cannot be thought, said and done are discarded in face of the record of
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what has been thought, said and done,.l But however persuasive this proc-
edure may be it can hardly be made to bear the full weight of his thesis.
Indeed, it may prove a dangerous substitute for philosophical argument
in so far as it makes it easier to beg important questions. For until
the basic conceptual issues are clarified the import of his empirical
researches must remain, at best, ambiguous. At one point, however, he
does indicate the sort of rational backing he might be disposed to rely
on. Having noted that there is no precise English equivalent for the
Greek word usually translated as 'justice' he goes on:
'And this is not a mere linguistic defect, SO that what Greek
achieves by a single word English needs a periphrasis to achieve.
It is rather that the occurence of certain concepts in ancient
Greek discourse and of others in modern English marks a difference
between two forms of social life. To understand a concept, to grasp
the meaning of the words ''1hichexpress it, is always at least to
learn what the rules are which govern the use of such words and so
to grasp the role of the concept in language and social life,.2
p'Iaclntyremakes no serious attempt to supp ly arguments for these assertions.
but, f'ortunately, there is a full-scale reasoned defence of the position
available to us. It is contained in Peter \iinch''',_iTheIdea of~9..ejal
Sc~.3
From our point of view this work may be se.enas a sustained
attempt to elaborate and justify the links \ihiehJr-acIn.tyreasserts to
hold betvTeen the notions of understanding a concept, knowing a correspon-
ding rule for the use of a word and grasping the role of the concept in
social life. But the thesis which he has evoked may prove an.awkward
ally when its full implications are realised. For one thing {linch lays
great stress on the need for the stUdent of society to see forms of
social life from the inside. This peculiarly intimately relationship ~
with the subject-matter is Been as constituting a vital difference between
the natural and social sciences. Thus the relation of'the sociologist
of religion to the performers of religious activity 'cannot be just that
1. ibid. p.4. 2. ibid. p.2.
3. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
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of observer to observed'.
•It must rather be analagous to the participation of the natural
scientist with his fellow workers in the activities of scientific
investigation •• it is quite mistaken in principle tc compare the
activity o~ a stUdent of a form of social behaviouv with that of,
say, an engineer studying the workings of a machine •• If we are
going to compare the social student to an engineer, we shall do
better to compare him to an apprentice engineer whi is studying
what engineering - that is, the activity of engineering _ is all
about. His understanding of the social phenomena is more like the
engineer's understanding of his colleagues' activities than it is
like the engineer's understanding of the mechanical systems which
he studies'.
On this account it is not easy to see how understanding of, say, the
moral concepts of the Greeks is possible at all. The forms of life in
which they operated have vanished for ever. How could there be any signif-
icant analogy between one's ~derstanding of theavtivities of those who
engaged in them and the understandin.g one might have of the activities
of 'colleagues'? In what sense could one's relationship with them be one
of'participation'? The same difficulties, in a less hopeless form, con£ront
the student of contemporary societies which differ considerably from his
own. In this way the value placed on being an insider creates a problem
of explaining how anthropology and ancient history can be.genuine branches
of knowledge at all. The natural tendency of ~{inch's line of argument is
towards reducing all study of human society to a kind of informal sociology.
Hence, so far from supporting HacIntyre's claims for the study of Homeric
moral concepts it Beems rather to suggest that such an activity is quite
certain to be a waste of time.
There is an even more serious difficulty lurking in ~inch's
discussion. It is connected with the fact that the inside knowledge he
demands is of a quite untechnical and unsophisticated kind. To understand
the notion of prayer one must know what it is like to approach it as an
ordinary believer. No formal study or reflection is needed to·enjoy this
insight: it is the reward of intelligent participation in a religious
tradition. The implications of this :point for J.IacIntyre'sargument may
.. 1. ~. pp.87-88.
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be stated simply. To understand a particular moral concept one must have
a grasp of its ordinary 'first-order' use and for this it suffices that
one should be ~, active member of the moral cornnunity. Formal historical
study of the kind he advocates will be redundant where this condition is
met and sterile where it is not. Moreover'its nature is such that the
least historically minded of philosophers will have no difficulty in
satisflting it for a certain range of concepts and will be in.the same
hopwless position as anyone else for ones outside. The 'analytical'
philosophers whom 11aclntyre criticises are concerned to give an account
of our moral concepts, that is the concepts which have active roles in
the moral practices of our society. Like Bverythin.g else they have a
history and an acquaint~,ce with it will be indespensable for some kinds
of understanding and useful for others. :But, on ~'linch's shol·ring,the sort
of comprehension which is a necessary condition of giving philosophical
analysis of them cannot be supplied by historical study. It is part of
the heritage of the philosopher as of everyone else in the community
and he realises it by acquiring the language and learning to use the
moral concepts in the Course of everyday life.
Strangely enough, this requirement turns out to be not
very different from those which are implicit in the practice of people
like Austin. For them also it is important that the philosopher should
be on the inside of the traditions of his society. The rewards of this
position are conceived in terms of the sensitivity it confers for nuances
and distinctions embodied in ordinary usage. Since they had served the
purposes of generations of language-users and survived, it was assumed
that they must have enough substance to be philosophically significant.
This kind of emphasis on the importance of being an insider is rather
different in conception and purpose from what one finds in Winch. But
the spirit of the advice is strikingly similar and so too are its
implications for i'ractive. On both accounts what the philosopher is given
is, in the end, a certain conceptual structure embodied in the language
of a Particular social group. This structure has to be acc t d .
ep e as 1t
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stands: it is no part of his task to attempt radical revisions of it.
Instead he works within the limitations it ioposes and what matters is
not elaborate equipment but common sense and a feeling for the material.
This conservatism of intention and ini'orrnalityof technique serve to link
Austin and ~iinch"Iithin \-Thatis perhaps the central tradition of Eri tish
intellectual life. In many respects r:acIntyre's werk falls outside this
tradition and the sources of his inspiration are alien to it. At any rate,
it is clear that the intellectual background he invokes gives no support
to the stronger thesis. He offers no independent arguments in its favour
and it is sufficiently implausible to make them indispensable. On the
other hand, even the most individualistic of ~x analysts need
have no intellectual objections to the weaker thesis. A fe~iliar sort of
position has now been reached. The case being discussed has turned out
to consist of two major elements. One is uncontentious but trivial, and
there are no good reasons for accepting its sUbstantial and interesting
companion.
The tendency to erect a critique of contemporary moral
philosophy on concern for the social dimension of moral concepts expresses
itself in a variety of forms. Some have more specific and detailed implic-
ations for philosophical inquiry than MacIntyre attempts to draw in the
work we have been considering. This may be illustrated in a tiaywhich has
the incidental advantage of enabling one to make a final comment· on the
views of Hart and Cooper. The relevant aspects of their case are the.attempts to use the individual-social distinction as a tool of analysis
and the suggestion that what they are offering has important methodological
implications for moral philosophy. The general nature of the claim is
apparent from Hart's remarks about the 'excessive Protestantism' of
philosophers like R.¥.Hare with their tendency to concentrate on 'those
ultimate principles which the individual accepts or to which he commits
himself for the conduct of his life •••• Cooper is still more confident
about being able to show where moral philosophy has gene aetray. We have
already noted his concern with the •surprisin.g fact' that philosophers
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have 'rarely examined' the distinction between individual and social
morali ty and accordingly have neglected 'con.ceptual and moral issues o-r
the greatest import~~ce'. Later he illustrates the practical application
o-rthe distinction by trying to show hoN' it may be used to dissolve the
controversy over ~ohn Searle's alleged derivation of an 'ought' from an
'is'. Obviously these are ambitio~s and -rar reaching claims: how are
they to be assessed?
It may be said at once that i-rthe interpretation of the
individual-social distinction which has been developed here is correct
then they are all radically misconceived. Indeed, it becomes difficult
to see why 'social morality' should be thought to have any interest -ror
the moral philosopher. Only the autonomous half 0' the distinction can
exemplify the concept of morality in all its richness and complexity.
In the first :place, it alone can provide ultimate answers to the problems
of practical reason. The verdicts of social morality have always to be
understood as operating under a restriction. They are effective only
within the limits of'one's willingness to go along with the conventional
rules or the auto_emous moral decision that this is how one ought to
live. Thus, to push the questions of practical reason as far as they will
go is ne~essarily to arrive at autaaomous morality: the social concept
can be only an arbitrary resting-place. ~esides, the autonomous concept
alone is able to fulfil the other essential function of morality, that
of'providing a perspective within "Thich all one'a activities may be Been
as having purpose and significance. Even if social morality was accepted
as a useful, though limited, guide to action it could provide no help at
all with other questions which we are driven to ask and for an answer
to ~lhich we rightly look to morality. Here moral understanding iB ind~sp-
ensable. Thus, in so far as the philosopher's concern is with the question
of how problems of moral assessment may ultimately be resolved and liith
the limits and presuppositions of the moral ~oint of view it is to the
individual concept that he must turn. If he con£inas himself to the
level of 'positive' morality, the conventional rules of social groups,
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these problems can never be posed in a sufficiently fundamental wa:'l.A
morality in this sense is merely one of the institutions of society which
have an influence on the behaviour of its members. Just as in the case
of customs and rules of etiquette, the 'first-order' study of the phenom-
ena is the business of the social scientist. It is not easy to see why
there should be any asywnetry at the 'second-order' level. One is led
to sutgest that in so far as a concern with these institutions does give
rise to philoso~hical questions they belong to the philosophy of social
science. The realm of the moral philoso~her on the other hand is adequately
delineated if he is given the task of ex~licating the nature of moral
understanding and of the individual or autoaomous form of moral assessment.
Ue have been considering some of the forms taken by opposi-
tion to the 'individualism' of contemporary moral philoso}_)hy.One tenden.cy
is to emphasise the significance ot the historical aspects of moral
concepts. Another is to argue that the dimensiei of the social represents
an integral part of the concept of morality itself. Neither turned out
on examination to be really plausible and indeed doubts began to emerge
as to whether they represent coherent possibilities at all. It may be,
of course, that either or both might be reconstructed so as to escape
this criticism. But such an enterprise would have to be different in
scale and conception from anything we have been offered so far. It now
looks as though the 'Protestants' are left in possession of the field.
Such a conclusion can hardly be palatable to anyone who sees little room
for complacency in the present state of British moral pp.ilosophy or is
sensitive to the feelings of malaise that have been expressed so frequently
in the last decade. Besides it might be premature to insist on it at this
point. A clue as to how the discussion might be sustained is provided
elsewhere in If;acIntyre'swritings. In a paper entitled 'Hume on 'lis"
and "ought"',l he seeks to connect what he regards as the dominant tradi-
tion in moral philosophy from Kant to Noore and Hare with the Protestant
Reformation. This may well strike one as a legitimate and plausible use
1. Philosophical Review, 1959, Reprinted in The Is-Ought QUestion,
1i.D.Hudson ed,, r.lacNillan,1969, 1'>p.35-51.
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of historical insights and it is difficult to cavil when he goes on to
credit the Reformers with the introduction of 'a morality of law~ indeed
'a morality of law-and-nothing-else,.l At this point a hint as to the
real nature of the case against their philosophical descendents begins
to emerge. It rests not on their ignorance of history b~t on the thinness
and partiality of their conception of morality. This subject will have
to be discussed in detail in a later chap.er. It may do no harm, however,
if vIe anticipate our conclusions at this point to suggest that the basic
weakne aa of the 'dominant tradition' is not its neglect of the jejune
and unimportant concept of social morality but its neglect of moral
understanding. tUthin it, as !~a.flntyreclaims, morality has tended to be
regarded as exclusively a matter of law; that is,of assessment, of rules
for the guidance of conduct. The fundamental error, it might be said, is
the identification of morali t,Ywith practical reason. A discussion of
the important and difficult issues to which this suggestion gives rise
must, however, be postponed tor the time being.
lie shall now turn to reconsider the question with which
this chapter began in order to see what light the subsequel!ltdiscussion
has thrown on it. The question was whether all human communities lDllldlt
~~ should be credited with a morality. It Boon became clear that
one element in the problem could be disposed of fairly readily. It concer-
ned the connection between the existence and identity of social groups
and the agreement of their members on systems of practical assessment.
1r.helink was found to be a conceptual one in that codes of assessment
are partly constitutive of forms of social life. Another subsiduary
question was then identified; whether all communities possess members
with moral understanding. It was suggested that, in the end, the answer
could only be discovered empirically. Nevertheless the question does
raise some interesting conceptual issues and an attempt was made to
identify and explicate them. After all this ground had been cleared the
residual problem was formulated as followsf must the code of practical
1. ~~.D.Hudson, ed, on.cit. p.49.--
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assessment of every community be accepted as a moral code? It seems ~
possible to concede that the member-s of a particular community make
systematic assessments which, so to speak, take up the same room in their
lives as moral assessments do in the lives of other people and yet deny
that they are entitled to be called 'moral'. 'tlhetherthis really is
possible or not is the problem to which we must now turn. our attention.
A sue:eestion as to how one might proceed is provided by
liarnock's treatment of the subject. He is prepared to deny that the code
of Homeric society was a moral code primarily because for him the concept
of morali t:{is inseparably bound up with considerations to which Homer's
characters wer-e indifferent. The general nature of these considerations
is made clear in the suggestion that 'moral judgement is concerned by
definition or ~ officio, in one way or another, with hUman good or harm,
needs, wants, interests or happiness' .l·dhatunderlies i'larnock'sstand on.
the question of Homer's heroes is a particular committment in a more
fundamental debate. This is, of course, the general issue of 'formal'
versus 'material' delineations of the realm of'the moral.' It is the
belief that morality cannot be adequately characterised in purely formal
terms. that enables him to treat the peculiar nature of Homeric assessments
as a disqualification. A formalist, on the other hand, might vlell be
disposed to take a different view. PrOVided, for instance, that the
IIomeric heroes were consistently prepared to take their practical princi-
ples as supreme guides to conduct he might see no reason to deny their
moral status. Notoriously, similar disagreements arise over the interpre-
tation of Nietzsche. !"lashe recommending a morality in which strength,
cunning and ruthlessness replaced the 'Christian' virtues of love,
compassion and co-operation? Or is it preferable to regard him, as he
sometimes did himself, as putting forward a programme that goes beyond
moral good and evil altcDG'ether?Here again the supporters of 'form' and
'content' are likely to disagree. It seems that our pursuit of the
origin.al question about ascriptions of a morality to social groups has
1. 2.E_.cit.p.6l.
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led us to the point where we see it as being sl-1allowed up in a larger
controversy. Hence, if'we are not to abandon hope of'reaching a conclusio~
we must be prepared to widen the scope of'the inquiry. FortUnately it
should be possible to do this in a "Tay that fits in with the overall
pattern of'the argument. Form and content are the poles of'the second
of'the antitheses ref'erred to in Chapter One. There it was recognised
that \'1ewould eventually have to come to grips with the problem of the
rela.tionship between them and the f'undamental distinction of'understanding
and assessment. The attempt to do this will be the main theme of'the
next chapter.
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Ch~1)ter 6
FOR!;AF1) CONT5ITT(I)------- .----~.._\..: ...
It nay be Hell to begin \"li th a short account of the debate
over 'form' and 'content'. The literature on this topic has been surveyed
1
a nunbez- of tines arid all that is needed here is an e ssen t i a.Lmininurn
of background for the di ecuaed on, Such a sketch Hill not do justice to
tbe many distinctions that r.1ight be made Hithin the broad cateeories it
r-ec ognd sea , But scholarly conpr-ehens i.veneeo is not our main concern here,
and, besicles, the iM},>ortant orri r.ci.ons vdll be repaired later in the
discussion.
Let us ad cpt the sir.1~le~t nethod of drm-Ting up the battle
lines. On one side are those wh o hold that any practical principle Hhatever
may be a nor-a.I pr-Ln cLp'l e, One cannot lay d o-rn in advance any restrictions
in te!'ns of nature or content or the range of considerations that night
be appealed to in its suppor-t , Instead H]1at is r-erjud r-ed is, per-hans , a
readiness to 'Q"1iversalize' it; that is, rOUGhly, to regard it hs having
the sane validity for everyone.2 Alternn.tively it may be held thn.t Hhat
is essentially required is that the moral agent should reGn.rd the principle
as being suprene or overriding. It rnu~t, as a natter of fact, have a
dominant role in the guidance of his conduct.3 Sone critics, however-,
remain dissatisfied Hhatever requirements of this sort are su{!c:ested.
1. See, for instance, i·I.K.Frankena, _0J2. cit; and G.J. ~larnock, _o_.:2._q,i_1.
chs.5-1.
2. See, for instance, the liri tings of R.r .lhre, Tl:!..~@:!l..Jrl:l_~~ofLoral.~,
O.D.P. 1952, an d l<~~~donand Re_Cl:_s_Q.12,O.LT.P. 1963. .
3. Sea, for instance, D.II.l:unro, ~m_p.i_:r:~~isll_~d_}~t_l:!.i..9_~,.
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In :part at least this is due to the suspicion that raez-eLy :fornal conditions
may in the end connit one to accepting the moral status of trivial or
absurd rules auch as 'never wal.k on the lines of a pavenen t" or 'al1mys
have your bed faci!lf,' the north-east'. It is not LnconceLvab'le that
someone r.ight be prepared to reGard these rules as un.iversally valid and
to live consistently in accordance with then hinself. Yet, it nay be said,
surely the cLai.ra that these are nor-at rules woul d ncar-cel.y be intelligible:
'l"lhatcould be the si{~nifice.nce of 'noral' here? Eore Moderately it might
be ar,'med that whiLe in excepti ona.I cases one could make sense of the
sugeestion" this Hould never be due nerely to the satisfaction of such
condi t i ons as univer::::alizabili ty and overriding-ness. It liould be pocsible
:only wher-e the'rules' are eivcn a backs-r-ound trhdch brines out their links
with considerations of a quite different sort. These relate not just to
the form or structure of Morality but also to its content or subject-
matter:
'Given the backgz-ound of a r-el i.gdous comrrun i,ty, one can begin to see
how the rule, "Hever waIlc on tbe lines of a pavement ' could have
Moral significance •••• By linking disapproval of Ha1king on the lines
of a pavemerrt ~1ith lack of reverence and disres3)ect, even those not
far.1iliar Hith the relie-ious tradition in question nay see that a
.8£ra1. vi etr is being expr-ess ed, Such concepts as sincerity, honesty,
courage, loyalty, respect, and, of course, a bast of others, :provide
the kind of backf,TfUnd necce eary in order to make sense of rules as
Moral princi~les'.
This concern Hith the social setting' of practical rules and judgements
has sometimes been carried a eood deal further. It has been sUGr:,ested,
for instance, that :tID: social harmony or co-operation re:presents a goal
which is built into the very r1eanin{~of' Hords like 'Moral' and' morali ty'
.)
in their or-d.inar-y uses. 'Stephen Toulnin in A:!2._~~?:l'1inA.t_i_o_n__~f i})_~!:_l.?:c.E?-....Q.f
2
R~~on iJ1_~t_~~'£"1lhas :.orovided ,·,hn.t is still perha;::>sthe clearest
1. D.Z.Philli:.os and H.O.naunce, 'On rorality's HavinG a Point',
T'h~J.oso.!'.P..Y,1961). Reprinted in 'l.n.Hudson(ed), .T11_U~-Oup'ht
3.u.c_r:2_ti.o_llLlIacMi1lan,London, 1969, p.230.
2. Cambr-Ldg'oUni.ver-s i ty Pr eae , 1950.
-102-
expression of such Cl v.ievr, In one :place the 'f'unction of Ethics' is
•provisionally defined' e.s beine;' 'to correl2.te our feelings and behaviour
in such a Ttray as to rake the fulfilnent of everyone's aims and desires
as far as :possible conpatible,.1 I,ater the point is exyressed less tenta-
tively: 'the ftitncti on of' ethics is to reconcile the independent ains end
~Tishcs of' a connum ty of' people'. 2 For Toulnin, 'Hhat make s us call a
judgeMent "ethical" is the fact t"hat it is used to harnonise people's
actions' .3 It fall ows thC'.t there are definite restrictions on the ranee
of considerations that can be a.ppe a.Led to :in Cl Moral arg1L'1ent. One reaches
the boundary by invoking the har-mony of society 2.nd to refuse to accept
such an appeal as conclusive is to :put oneself outside the realM of
morali ty aL toe-ether. In a rather different spirit it may be sUG':'Tested
that Morality is inescapably bound up t-Tith what are vaguely termed' con aLd-,
erations of hunan good and harm'. Thus G.J.:larnock thinks it 'enormously
plausible' to SeW that 'one who professed to be making a nor-a l judeement
must at least profess tJ:at uhat is in. issue is the good or harm, Nell-
being' or other"Tise, of hunan beinr::s,.4 On this v iew, as on Toulnin's, the
decision CI.S to whe ther- a particular judc:enent is noral must take account
of 1·rhatit is about and cannot be deternined by its formal status alone.
:mauCh has nowbeen said to indicate the main possibilities
discussed in the recent literature and to establish a general f'r-amewcrk
~vithin wh i ch to proceed. Let us begin by applying the fundamental distinc-
tion between understanding' and assessment to the debate. The first :?oint
to force itself on ones attention is that nor-at understanding is. obviously
contentless. As a lens thr-ough vrh'i ch to vie'\oTthe wor-Ld of action everything
within that vTorId is erruaLl y eligible to cone Hithin its scope. The only
requirenent is tllat the concepts in terms of Hhich it is interpreted should
1. ibid. p.137.
3. _ip_i.<.!. p.145.
2. i1?_i_q. p.l70.
4. _~·9i!.p.57.
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be related to one another in tl:e '\"raydescribed above. I This places no
restrictions on the nature of the concepts theDsel ves and an at terrp't has
been made to show h owvaried are tbe alternatives available.2 The core
of the problem that renains Maybe stated quite simply: can Doral assess-
ment be characterised in purely formal terns or does it has an inescapable
material el~~:lent? The issues that this raises are of great conpl exf ty and
in view of it perhaps it may be best to state at once the conclusion we
shall be ''lorkinG tOirlard.s. It Ls that rnor-a.I aeae ssmen't is indeed necessarily
linked ~dth a certain range of nateri.:J.I considerations and that ~Iarnock
is essentially richt in identifyine these Hith the good or harn of hunan
beings. To say this however- is to do little mor-e than indicate very roughly
that part 01' the spectrUJ'l of possibilities whd ch we hone to occupy. A
great deal of work oust be done before we can know its exact bound.aries
and main internal features, or indeed before we can feel any c onf'Ld.ence
in tte claim to it.
All the attenpts to characterise Morality that have been
mentioned are subject to a peculiar sort of difficulty. Since this is
likely to be n 0 less true of ours it may be Hell to try to CODeto r;rips
with it at once. In general terns the difficulty is one of establishing
any conclusion about these matters 'vith the kind of finality and decisive-
ness tl:at one i"louldHish. To help us get down to details let us look at
Frankena's treatr1ent of an objection that is Dade to Ifoulnin.
, It is argued tbat tl1ere are or nieht be people wh o deny that we
oue:ht to be concerned about tbe har-mony of society, eG• Nietzsche;
that their opposing principles and the issue between then and Toulmin
are, or may properly be, or should be called "r:lOralll; and that tbere-
fore Toulnin is "Irong in thinking that a concern for the harmony of
society is or should be a necessary condition of morality. For on hid
view his opponents cannot be said to have a morality at all, and the
ir:lsue between himself and then is not an issue between hIO mor-al.
principles or moralities but be twecn morality and sOr.lething else.
Toulmin is concealine the existence of radical ethical disagreement,
it is said; he bees the question against opposing moralists, he takes
sides in a mor-aI issue ~·,hile clcdnine; to do "I ogiell. ,3
•• See dh.l.e:p.p.8-11. 2. See ch.2 above.
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Frankena r-emar-ks that this objection can be generalised arid indeed that
an 'exactly parallel' one 'can be nade to tYe v i etc that the uni versn.lization
requirer.:ent is a necessary condition of Morality'. 'Thus', he continues,
'r.IacIntyre contends that tho:c:e who define F.lorali ty in 't errns of uni versal-
izabili ty are not neutral either, as they cLairn to be, that they too are
begging questions, taking cides, for e.xanple, against the eXistentialists,.l
Frankena is pessinistic about tl:e chances of being able to escape the
charE;; of cruesti on-bec;~in{; entirely: one rrust it eeeme be prepared to
take a tough line. Thus, "any one who naintains that sone :particular
rec:uirenent is e~sential to mor-ali,ty "Till have his Nietzsche, as Toulr.'lin
has his, and he nust either give up his position or deny that his opponent's
2is a noral one, just as 'I'ouIru.n Dust'.
At firet si["ht it r.;ieht be temptine to disnias the objection
Hith which Frankena is concerned as havf.ng little t·mie:ht. I11 tak:inc this
line one could point to its very t:eneral nature. Since it is equally
available against all conclusions it miGht be held that it cannot tell
seriously againct any particular one. To make this point aer-ves at least
to get the difficulty into a less troublesone perspective. nevertheless
it retains enouGh nuisance value to nake it advisable to define an attitude
towarcls it explicitly. For unless one is careful it May lead to a rather
unprofitable kind of discus2ion. Thin nay ha:ppen if, for insta~ce, someone
is moved to protect t:h.2.t his understandin, ....of the terns t moral' and
'norali ty' has been outraced by a. particular acc ount of them. A dispute
may then arise ~lhich, in tl1c end, recto on nothing more substantial than
rival intuitions about ucac;e, and in trhd ch charr:es and counter-charGee of
r;uestion-beCG'inG' are exchanr:ed Nith the facility envisaged by Franlcena.
No one Hith experience of the path that discussion of the::Je issues tendS.
to take wi l I rc{','ard this as an enpty fear. Hence, Frankena's difficulty
1. i9_id. p.19.
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should be treated Hi th s ono seriouGness. NevertJleless one wouLd not vLeh
to be reduced by it to th2 k i.nd of poGi t i on he adoptee It is surely
invidious to have to choose b etwecn the sacrifice of one's otrn posi ticn
and bald dismissal8 of' one's oTl')onents. Beside::; the resources of reason
May not be exhausted so readily as this SU(,:"'csts. The pri!",2.ry requirer:1ent
here is to get a clear id.ea of Hhat one can ler;-i til:1ately hope to achd eve ,
In deference to Fra:nkena's vie~'1 it rrust be adnitted that z::::1: an eLernent
of' inconclusivel1ess Hill be ir.:possible to avoid, at least to the extent
that is constituted by failure to rule all the alternatives out of court
as being untenable in :principle. One uill have to a.lI ow that SOr.1enay be
held t",ithout incoherence or absurdity. lJevertheless this may not be an
unsatisfc.ctory dtate of affairs if one can ShOH that there is little or
nothing more posi ti ve to be said in their favour ~·jhile the Neir;ht of the
argument falls on our s ide , This need not be re{','arded as an ir:1:r)ossible
goal. Hence the aim llill be t 0 r-educo all rival vie"TS to bare pocct bili ties,
pos:::essed only of the nod eot advantace of c.elf-consistency. The adoption
of them Must then be seen 0.0 ,·lilful or arbitrary, a step tnat reason
cann ot war-r-ant , and :perba~s thia is e.G dar.acing a verdict as one needa
in philoso:;:Jhical diccuf'sion. A SOf.lel·,hat conplicated strategy is required
here: one rrust be content to wor-k touardc: a conclusion in a pieceneal and
roundabout U2,Y. :10 sh2:.11 beGin by askin::; Hhether the one result that h2-3
been firnly established, that Moral und.erstanding- is contentless, can.
shed e.ny light on the C'eneral situation. The next ete]) i",ill be to dispose
of the Dare inporto.nt cOTIf"'iderations that have been taken to su',:':_)ort the
view that noral ascescnent is not necessarily tied to a material element.
l'le shall then be in a pcs i ti on to tackle our positive thesis nore directly.
The first r~'ruestioJ1 is I-Thether our account of nor-al underst-
anding has any explanatory value for the controversy as a t-rhole. A fairly
obvious p0int may be made at once. It is simply that no serious attempt
has been made to apply the fundanental distinction of understanding and
assessment to the issues. This neGlect has surely been of SOMeSiGnificance
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for the prog-re:"'s of the dcba t e, 'I'huo it mirht be ae:reed that the tendency
to overlook the distinution, tOGether .vith the fact that moral unde-!'stand-
inc is contentlesc, {Soeo Gone :-Tayto account for the charn of fornalism.
!:uch of i t::- ctrcncth c t erio fron the conviction that none of' the available
r.n.terial acc ountn tell anythinG" like the cOr1:9lete story and that no
in jecti on of furtber content could rescue thon, There se "ns to be an
eLernen t in our !)re-~hil o8o:')hical intuitions ab out T:1oralitythat', is never
satisf'ied hOHever far one travels alone; this road. So a radically different
kind of aPIlroach COU'38 to be fc:woured. Tbe pernanently unsatisf'ied element,
it r.1aybe sW':'f'"e:"ted, is the r~enuine insight that noral understnJ1ding as
ouch has no naterial iw','redient. r_Llhus,there is em inportant sense in
i!bich norali ty r:v:wbe said to be a purely forr:al affair. At this point
if' one fails to n ate the cicnificMce of tJ1e dnderstandinr:-assessr.1ent
distinction one C'.nybe led to reject material concerns al toc:ether. Such
a nove wou'ld be unwar-ran+ed and ni,o,-ht ..,ell turn ant to be a mietake ,
Let us try to a--:-proach the problem f'r-on an o+her- direction
by asking th2 f'olloHinc~ (Tuestion. Given tbat noral understandinc has no
di8tinctive content or subject-n2.tter 1vhat must be true of nor-al assessment
±!t~ in order t:1 ;::o.1:eoence of' philocophical discuGsions of the undifferen-
tiated concept of norality? If, so to speak, one subtracts Hhat can be
attributed to understanding f'r-om t,""',lkabout r:1orCl.lity in general what sort
of' residue is left to aSf:'essr.1ent? Uhen one t~ the apparently conflictinc
assertions that are nade about the general concept and perforns this
operati on on tben, the essence of Hhat r-emains is an insistence 011 its
distinctive content. It b novr teM~tin:,,; to ackn01·11edge tbe core of truth
in this vi ew by assi,S'l1ing it, not to norality as a 1tlhole, but specif'ically
to assesc'L1ent. For it night be thoucht that if this ..lere not done it
vTould be ir:1~oG,cible to exnlain Hhy naterial def'ini tionc f'houlcl have any
plausibility at all, Much less the perennial ap~eal that they in fact
exert. Ho,.,.COtl_ldtbe debClte betHeen such perceptive <",nta{,:onists have been
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sustained unless this sugeestion were es~entially correct? Once again
one is led towards the conclusion that the fornal eleMent in norality is
supplied by dndersta...l'Jdingand the material element by aasessmerrt,
An obvious nerit of this viel'T is that it offers an attractive
perspective on the debate as a whoLe, For one thing it accords 'l-Tellwith
its peculiarly interminable character, the sense one tets that the ti'TO
sides operate in different d.iraenai ann and never really come to grips vTi th
each others concerns. At least it can be said that if the Buggestion
vTerecorrect this is just the state of affairs one woul d expect to find.
Besides it offers an agreeably civilized \-Tayof resolving the controversy
in that it acknow'ledgas and Makes use of elenents of value f'r-on both sides.
The truth in each is safeguarded by the recognition that it applies either
to uhderstanding or to assessment, though not in any straightforward way
to morality in general. One is tempted to sa.y that any proposed solution
of the problem Must be irenic and eclectic in the same sort of "Tayif it
is to have any plausibility or perrne..nence.:for we are faced ",ith a deep-
rooted and persistent conf'Ldce' in which each side can marshal. ",eighty
arguments e~d sincere and able supporters. rro wholehearted verdict for
one can avoid giving rise to an uneasy fealing that sonething of value
has been lost with the other. The view suggented here does have the
advantage of being able to acconmodate considerations of this sort.
It is now tine to approach the issues at a less abstract
level and to begin to consider the case for fornalisrn in detail. vie shall
concentrate on l'J'hat is probably the most formidable and "lidely-discussed
element in it, the ar'gunent s that centre round the feature knownas
''tiniversalizabili ty'. This is a difficult and elusive notion and tbe
extensi ve literature on it is far from achieving any uniformity of inter-
pretation. Hence the fDrst task is to form a clear impression of what is
involved. R.l1.llare' s treatMent of t:'e subject has been particularly
-108-
influential and is cti11 pcrh;:'.ps the beet place to turn initially for
enliehtennent. For Hare, nor-at judE':e"1ents are uni versalizable in v:i.rtue
of possessinc 'deccriptive r.le,3.ning'. 1 U:1iversalizabili ty is a feature
2oormon to all jUdgor::ents which carry this kind of neanin,"",. Indeed,
u.l'Jiversalizabili ty and the possession of descriptive neand ng are, in
sane cense, ideYltical: 'the feature of value jud{';cnents Hhich I call
universalizabili ty is simply that l'lhich they share Hi th descriptive
judcenents; nane l.y tI'e fact that they both carry descriptive nean i.ng", 3
Descriptive neaning is a kind of neanin,,,:, whLch is or involves the use
of an expression in acc or-dance hrith descriptive meaning-rules.4
Clearly tr.e key notion here is th,),t of :x:i:hxxrlx...t±:x:x
a 'descriptive neaninc-rule , and it is unfortunate that Hare's account
of it is not al to{;ether satisfactory. The main ueaknes8 is that it is ];I
open to a nunber of substantially di.fferent interpretations. In order
to arrive at the one Hhich accords best 1"Jith his general position and
is therefore rlost likely to represent his real intentions the chief
ca.ndidates Hill have to be deacr-d'bed, The discussion of tbese rla.tters
Nill have eone sir:nificance for our. general thesis for i t ~Till serve
to illustrate the difficulty of adherinc,- strictly to a forr.1aliot vie vt
of moral aae e: smcnt , A convenient \-Tay of bringing out the tension
be tween the var i oun conceptions o.f descriptive neaning-rules is by
askinG' uhat a breach of one is sup:posed to involve. Hare's answer- is
that a descriptive Meaning-rule is broken when t}:c descriptive tern
which it caverns is nisused. But whaf is it to misuse a descriptive
tern? At this :point t]~e incongruities that lurk beneath the surface of
his account begin to cause trouble.
i:
1. _22._ill.
3. ibid. 1'.15.
2. _i_£:j._q. 2.2.
4. il?_id. 2.1.
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In places it looks as if'a descriptive meaning-rule is a
codification of the practice of a particular group of language users.
Such rules license the application of descriptive terms to particular
kin.ds of object. Their function is to enable language to serve as a
social instrument by ensuring a degree of uniformity anong its users.
A rule of this kind serves to lay down the standard range of a:pplication
of wor-ds like 'red' and 'ultramarine'. A breach of one would occur if t
.for instance, the tern 'ultramarine' was applied to things which most
speakers of English "lould call 'red'. The textual evidence for this
interpretation connists in rtatenents like the fol101oJ'in15:
'In general a person is misusing a descriptive term if in using
it he breaks the descriptive rule attaching the term to a certain
kind of objects •••,l
'•••we can detect a misuse of a term by observing that the term
is used of an object of a certain kind, when the descriptive rule
which determins the meaning of the term excludes its use of objects
of that kind. lJornally, if a man said that an object was ultramarine
when it was not, and when the object was in plain vi ew , and he had
normal eyesight, and Has 2. straightfor1'lardperson, we should conclude
that he did not kn01<1 the mean i.ng of "ultranarine"' .2
A descriptive neaning-rule then, attaches a term to 'a certain kind of
objects'. The implication is that it is a rule with an objective inter-
personal validity based on itc general acceptance by users of the language.
This sUg'c'estioncones out more clearly .Ln the following passage:
One may conclude, it seems, that descriptive meanin[,:,-ruleserve to
fotr.mlate the principles Hhich underlie the accepted usage of '-lordslike
'red'and 'ultramarine'l If one takes into account the sig:t1ificancevrhich
.Hare attaches to such rules the implications of this for morality are
rather startling. To use ,",oraslike' good' .and 'right' in unconventional
Ttlays,to apply them outside the linits generally acce:pted in the conrrun.tty,
is to ini'ringe the corresponding neaning-rules. Legitinate uses of moral.
language, on the other hand, employ the terns in accordance with the
1. ibid. p.8.
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socially accepted rules by means of which they are attached to particular
kinds of objects. Clail':16of this sort might well form the basis of an
attempt to build material considerations of a fairly crude kind into one's
account' of Morality. If they BGre trucen seriously· one would have to
regard Hare as an.extreme example of the 'establishment moralist', someone
who sees in nonconfort:lisnnothin[; but intellectual failure expressed
throu[;h the systematic abuse of language. One hesitates to ascribe such
a viellTto him, and fortunately there is enough textual evidence to support
an alternative.
For, on other occasions, Hare seems to think of descriptive
meaning-rules ae rules laying down standards of internal consistency t-1hich
an individual's use of language must satisfy but l·rhichneed not in any
way resemble those used by other people. Thus, if a person describes an
object as 'red' the descriptive meaning-rule governing the use of the
word forbids him to deny its applicability to other objects which he
admits to be relevantly sil':1ilarto the first. The range of similarities
t-lhichcount as relevant is determined by the reasons l'IThichhe would involte
to justify the use of the descriptive tern in the first place;' If he
appeals to the fact that the object is scarlet he cannot refuse to allow
that other scarlet objects nay properly be called 'red'. His use of 'red'
May be highly idiosyncratic and thus run. contrary to descriptive neaning-
rules of the first kind Hithout involving cny breach of rules of this
second kind. He night for instance always refer to objects which most
English speakers wou ld call 'red' as 'ultramarine' and to things they
would agree to be 'ultramarine' as 'red'. The evidence for this Hay of
interpreting Hare is contained in a nUr.lberof pascaees of lIThicbthe
following is a sanple:
'If a person sals that a thinIS'is red, he is comm itted to tllevielvthat anything whd ch ..Tas like 1.t in the relevant respects would
likewise be red. The relevant respects are those which, hethoueht,
tilntitIed him to call the first thin,9,'red" in this particular casethey anmount to.one respect only: its red colour. This follows,
accordine to the defini tiona given above, from the fact that 'This is
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red' is a descriptive judgement. 'This is red' entails 'Everything
like this in the relevant respects is red' simply because to say
that something is red vhile denying that some other thing which
resembles it in the relevant respects is red is to misuse the word
'red'; and this is because 'red' is a descriptive term, and because
therefore to say that somethinc is red is to say that it is of a
certain find, and so to inply that anything which is of that same kind
is red'.
Clearly the consist4nt eccentric need never be involved in breaches of the
kind of rule with lvhichHare is concerned here. He can, it seens, call
anything he likes 'red' with impunity :provided he sticks by this usage
on all other occasions. He would in;t'ringethis second kind of clescriptive
l'!leanin,3'-ruleonly if having called something' red' he were to refuse to
apply the tern to another object, whdLe admfttint3' tbat there was no
relevant difference between then; that is no difference in respect of
the features which he thought entitled him to call the first one 'red'.
This is ()fcourse a quite different requirement from that which is appro-
:priate to descriptive neaning-rules of the first kind •
1. ibid. 1'.11.
3•.ibid. p.30.
2. ibid. ch.9.
4. ~. 1'.32.
•~ interesting feature of this discussion is the impression
it gives that Hare is unable to avoid hints of a material presence in
jrizxhis account of morality. The warrant he provides for interpretin[;
descriptive rules as rules of conventional usage may be taken to represent
the intrusion of such an element. But apart from being intrin.sically
implausible, this interpretation is difficult to reconcile with important
features of his general argument, in particular liithl-lhathe hac to say
about universalizabili ty. For one thing he is willing to a'l ow that 8).
'fanatic' may use moral terms in an idiosyncratic way without necessarily
2offendine against tr.eprinciple. Besides there is the insistence that
'the thesis of universalizability ••• is a logical thesis,3 and that
'of:fences against the thesis of limiversalizability are 10l3'icalnot noral,.4
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To describe as 'ultramarine' an object which most English s:peakerswould
call 'red' is surely not to conrad t a logical blunder. On the other hand
the offence involved in a~:plying the label'ultramarine' to some objects
and refusing it to others without being able to point to any relevant
differences might well be described as a 'logical' one. It see!'1Snecessary
to conclude that the second interpretation of descriptive rules is required
by Eare's general position.
A descriptive meanine-rule then is a rule whdch the individ-
ual commits hinself to whenever he uses a term with descriptive raeanIng,
The content of the rule is deterMined by the reasons he would give to
explain or justify his use of the term. They nay be thoroughly eccentric
reasons: all that the rule requires is that he should be prepared to accept
their validity in other cases. Thus, at the beginning he is free to choose
the content of the rule for himself. But, as the word rule implies, the
choice he makes will limit his freedom thereafter. vie can now begin to
appreciate the force of Hare~s insistence that 'the thesis that descriptive
judgements are universalizable isa quite trivial thesis,.l The case for
it consists essentially in drmiing out the implications of some banal,
yet fundamental facts about language. The oomplexdty and variety of the
tasks it has to perform impose economy on our treatment of it. To put
the point in the most obvious wa y, words are not disposable things to
be used only once: they must serve our purposes over and over again. Yet
if we are to succeed in cOM~unicating with one another there must be some
intelligible connection between the different cccaat cns of our use of
them. For sone, those which have what Hare calls descriptive meaning, the
link is constituted by Jlqsctjre features of the situations to which they
apply. Hence it should always be possible in principle to justify a use
of such a term by appealing' to the appropriate feature. If this is to E
count as a genuine justification rather than a piece of ad hoc rationalising,
1. ibid. p.12.
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one must accept that it has ~~ inescapable reference beyond the particular
occasion. A reason in one case will be a reason in all others unless
there are differences that make it inapplicable. The opponent of universal-
izability is connitted to denying all of this. His position in effect is
that descriptive terns may be applied to or \-Iithheld from objects in
capricious and arbitrary rTays. This is to say that one's procedure need
have no intelligible basis whatever. To attempt tb take this vie1'lseriously
in practice would defeat the purposes of language as an instr~~ent of
comnunication. Someone who rejects TIare's thesis Nill have to be prepared
to accept such a result: in this liea the point of his insistence on its
triviality.
So far the arG"UJ1enthas noved at a rather obstract level
and one might begin to worry about the dangers of lo.sing sight of the
particular case. Besides there is a need to tie this general discussion
of universalizability nore closely to the specific problem of moral
jUdgements. If the interpretation of it aa a logical thesis is correct
it follo'\'1sthat there can be no genuine counter-examples. That is, there
can be no judgements whd ch are both moral and non-uni versalizable. Never-
theless various candidates have been suggested from time to time and
instead of rejecting all of then in advance it may be useful to look at
the process of acco=mode't.Lng them in some detail. One might 'I-1ellbe susp-
icious of a purely ~ ~~~9ri style of proceeding here. Discussion of these
issues has often foundered in the past because of insufficient attention
to the data. Besides a study of how the awkwar-d cases are dealt TrTlth in
practice should sharpen our apprehension of \vhat the thesis involves and,
more particularly, reveal the cash-calue of the concessions about its
triviality. Let us therefore turn to consider some of these alleged hard
cases. r:any of the most pr orrisi.ng ones have been brought together by
Alisdair MacIntyre in his paper 'rlhat I:orality is Not,l and it vTill be
convenient to use his examples.
1. PhilosonhI, 1957.
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The first case is the well known one of Sartre's pupil
who had to choose between staying with his nother and joining the Free
French.l Hare's discussion of this situation seems to dispose of Most of
the grounds for its claim to constitute a difficulty for the universalist.
One of these is the assunption that universalism 'implies that there are
certain rather sinple general moral principles Hhich, in some unexplained
sense, exist antecedently to the making of any moral judgement, and that
all we have to do whenever He make such a judgement is to consult the
relevant principle and, without more ado, the judgement is made. 2 Sartre's
example does indeed show that in some cases 'no antecedently existing
principle can be appealed to,.3 But of course Hare is in no way committed
to denying this possibility. He merely insists that however- the decision
is arrived at the young man cannot deny that if there is another case
relevantly similar the name choice ought to be made. To undver-aalLae
characteristically involves creatine rules rather than subElcribing to
them. There is another elenent in the case of Sartre's pupil which perhaps
accounts for sone of the plausibility of its claim to raise difficulties
~~universalizability. Sartre's account of the natter is brief and imprecise
and it is difficult to be sure that one has not misdescribed the situation.
lTevertheless a significant factor in the case seemo to be the suspicion
that the pupil, being a.ra.ther inarticulate young man, may be unable to
sa.yin Hhat respect. the decision he eventually na.kes is morally preferable
to the alternatives. He may be unable to point to any feature of the
situation as the reason for his choice. Even if this is the case the
universalizability thesis seens able to accot:1nodateit. Indeed Hare has
explici tly allowed for this possibility: '••universalism is not the
doctrine that behind every moral judgement there has to be a principle
expressible in a fevlgeneral terns; the principle, though universal, Tolay
be so complex that it defies formulation in words at all,.4 So the
1. ~is!~tia!.!..£?!Lan<!.1Iur:l~' ITethuen, London, 1948. pp.35-38.
2. ibid. p.37. 3. ~. p.38. 4. ibid. p.39.
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universalist need not be worried by the fact that Sartre's pu:pil might
claim his decision to be a noral one D~dyet be unable to give any reasons
for it. ~hat he insists is that, if the decision is a moral one, the
yoUIlG'manmust agree that the course of action he chooses has some feature
or set of features whdch make it morally :preferable. It maybe impossible
for him to describe then in words. Nevertheless, he must, logically,
admit that whatever they are, they will constitute a reason for any
similar person in similar circumstances. If he refuses to al.Low this
he makes nonsense of the original acceptance of the vie~v that the course
of action he chooses has sane features which make it morally preferable.
This is to admit that no reason can be given for his choice. This in
turn, as we smTearlier, implies that for him moral terns do not carry
any descriptive Meaning, and hence, that he is not using words 'morally'
at all and that his decision cannot properly be described as a 'moral'
one. Like everyone else Sartre'e pupil Must choose between accepting
universalizability and admitting that his use of moral language is
entirely capricious. Of course, if the principle behind his judgement is
so complex that it defies formulation in words the young man'sacceptance
of its existence will be no help to other people '-1ith moral problems.
But uni versalizabili ty is a logical thesis, not a t.echn.Lque for making
decisions.
The next example is that of moral heroes Hho do 'nore
than duty demands'. l:aclntyre argues:
' •• 0. man nay set himself the task of perforning a wor-kof superer-
ogation and conni,t hinself to it so that he will blaim himself if
he fails .'Iithout finding such failure in the case of others blame-
worthy;,-Such a manmight leei tiI'1ately say "I have taken so-and-so
as 1-ThatI ought to do". A..?"Jdhere his valuation cannot, logically
cannot, be universa1ized,.1
1. 1. op.cit. 1'.328.
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The plausibility of this case see~s to rest, not on any new principle it
embodies, but on the f<1ct that the conditions for rele\(a.ntsimilarity are
unusual. They are not exhaustively specified by listing the observable
'objective' features of the situation. The moral hero would refuse to
a.low that anyone else, however- a imd Lar-the external aspects of his
posi tion, oueht t9 atter.lptthe work of supererogation. There is an addit-
ional 'subjective' require~ent before relevant similarity is attained.
The other person must, in the sane lmy as the moral hero, regard the
work of supererogation as w'hat he ought to do. If he does, the hero Dust
surely aeree that he really ought to do it. If he refuses we ~ust invoke
the familiar penalty - that his use of moral words is merely capricious
and there can be no rational backing for his jUdgements. It is,worth
noting that the hero is not cOr.!r.littedto agreeing that the other person
ought to perform the work of supererogation merely because he regards it
as what h~ oueht to do. That is, he is not merely subscribing to a general
principle of toler~nce 'everyone ought to do what he thinks he ought to
do'. He might quite consistently reject such a principle. Thus he ~ight
refuse to accept that someone who thought tbat he ought to torture others
really ought to do so. That the man takes the work of supererogation as
what he ought to do is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the
moral heroe's agreement that he ought to do it. The other necessary condi-
tions are given by specifying the observable features which the two situa-
tions have in corrm on, It is necessary to make this point in order to
establish that we have here a genuine case in which a man universalises
the judgement he PAsses on himself, and not merely one in which he passes
a similar but independent judgement on someone else. But nO\'1the universa-
lizability thesis seems perfectly able to accommodate works of supereroga-
-tion. The only novel feature they introduce is that in certain cases, the
existence of a particular feature or attitude - a 'subjective' not an
'objective' element - may be an essential constituent of relevant similar-
ity. But such a qualification does not affect the logical thesis of univer-
salizability.
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Finally let us look at another case mentioned by Haclntyre.
He writes:
'The fact that a man might on moral grounds refuse to legislate
for anyone other than himself (perhaps on the grounds that to do
so would be moral arrogance) would by itself be enough to show that
not all valuation is universalizable'.
Now the interesting point here is that Buch a man, so far from constituting
as it l'lerea living disproof of universalizabili ty would find it hard to
Off And against the thesis. He !!lightsucceed in doing so through his self-
legislation but never merely by virtue of refusal to legislate for others.
A breach of the universalizability principle characteristically occurs
when a person asserts that he ought to do a certain act but denies that
someone else ought to do it, whd Le admi, tting that there are no relevant
differences bet,'Tecnthe hlO cases. But to deny that the other :person
ought to do it is to legislate for hin. Hence in so far as ones relations
wi th others are concerned one can only offend against the universalizabili ty
thesis if one is prepared to legislate for them. Refusal to legislate is
nerely a refu.sal to dr-aw the consequences Nhich the :princi:ple licenses.
It may t'lellinvolve unwilling-less to universalize the jude-ements one
passes in one's own case, as t'lellas unwillingness to pass any independent
moral judgements on others. But all this is perfectly compatible with
acceptance of the und.ve i-ee.Ld aabd Ldty thesis. Oddly enough it suggests
that the person concerned regards the 1)rinciple so highly that he prefers
to say nothing rather than risk a breach of it.
This detailed look at the WCl.yin which J.Iaclntyre's examples
are accommodated by the universalizability thesis has served to confirm
and, give substance to our interpretation of it. The position that has now
been reached has, however, sane intriguing features. Our main interest
in Hare's ylritings has been to see if they can lielp in chartine the
distinctive features of judgements of moral aaee asnerrt, The answer- that
1. i1?id. p. 328.
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energes is that they are 'universalizable' and 'prescriptive'. The trivial
nature of the first is insisted on by Hare and the justice of his clair.t
has been explored in some detail. Let us now look more closely at the
notion of 'prescriptive meaning' or 'prescriptivity'. Hare describes his
moral theory as 'a type of prescri:ptivism, in t};at it maintains that it
is one of the cbaracteristics of moral terms, and one 1-1hichis a suffic-
iently essential characteristic for us to call it part of the meaning of
these terms, that judgeMents containing them are,as typically used,
intended as guides to conduct,.1 Elsewhere he remarks about certain
'weakened' uses of 'ought' that 'in these cases "ought" fails to imply
"can" because it is not prescriptive in meaning at all; that is to say,
it is consistent ..ri th its meaning as used in this context,not to be
intended to serve as a guide to anybody's actions,.2 It appears then that
1-lhatHare beans when he says that noral judgements are typically prescrip-
tive is that they are, as typically used, intended as guides to conduct.
But in present circumstances the effect of this is to ma.ke the second
part of his answer the equal of the first in triviality. l:oral assessment
is that part of morality which is concerned with the problems of practical
x~i.~ reason. It is a defining characteristic of the judgements
,
belonging to this sphere that their typical use is to guide conduct,
that is, ~n Irare's terninology, they are prescriptive. To say that
judgements are prescriptive is just to say that they are judgements of
practical assessnent. Eut it is now very difficult to derive from Hare
anything like a satisfactory account of the nature of moral assessment.
Universalizability is a perfectly general featUre possessed by anything
one could call a' judgement' lihile prescrip'tivity belongs to the class
of judgements we are concerned with as an elementary matter of initial
defini tion. To be told that judgements of moral aase samen't possess these
characteristics is to be given no new ini'ormation. It merely restates
wi th a. positive air what was already implicit in the question. \ihat is
1.01'. cit. 'D 67- . . 2. ibid. pp.52-53.
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missing may perhaps be brought out in the following way. Our aim is to
underntand that category of practical judgement we have called 'moral
assessment'. In this context Hare's work nay be seen as a useful exegesis
of the notions of 'judgenent' and of 'practical aasesanan't", It fails
however to contribute anything substantial on a crucial :point, the sign.i-
f'Lcahca to be attached to the term 'moral'. Hence t"leare forced to look
beymnd universal prescri:ptivism for a solution to our problems.
This conclusion, however, still leaves a number of points
to be explained. For one thing it is disturbing that 1..e have so far found
nothing like a plausible reason for believing that moral assessment may
be adequately characterised in formal terms. Yet such views have been
widely held and the euapdcdon may nON arise that somewher-ea crucial
point has been overlooked. To help in allaying ±Y.i::r-..:f this fear we shall
come durectly to grips with what is perhaps the best argument for a
formalist position. It is that it is presupposed by a stronger thesis
whose correctness may be demonstrated. The stronger claim is that substan-
tive principles of moral assessment may be derived from its formal proper-
ties alone. lIence, an understanding oftthe form of morality is all the
raw material that practical reason requires. If this claim can be establ-
ished it vdll be impossible to reject the weaker- one that formal conditiona
alone may be a sufficient guarantee of the moral status of judgements and
principles. One way in which the link may be made explicit is this. It
might be asked how one can be sure that the practical conclusions which,
it is claioed, are derivable from formal resources are genuinely 'moral'
conclusions. Suppose that the presence of a certain t1aterial elenent is
necessary to provide a guarantee of this. Since He are supposed to be
dealing ~dth deductive ar[':'LlDentsthat element must have been :present also
in the premises. But in that case ue have not succeeded in drawing substan-
tive conclusions from formal sources alone. If, on the other hand, the
introduction of a naterial element is not essential to ensure the moral
status of the conclusions tllenit is not the case that moral judgements
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are neces~arily tied to a certain content or subject-natter. Hence our
proposed resolution o~ the '~ornal-material' controversy falls to the
ground. It folI01-1Sthat He nus t eitber abandon our tbesis or ahou that
the attempt to derive subst~ltive conclusions fron purely formal features
of nor-a.L judgencnts is a failure. This enterprise i·Tillthere~ore have to
be examined in some detail. It is l'rorthnoting that while the stronger
thesis entails the weake r the converse does not hold. It is possible to
hold the latter in isolation and, indeed, this seems to be Hare's position.
For it is not his contention that the formal properties o~ morality serve
by themselves to lead us in any particular practical direuiion. He is
prepared, for instance, to grant the nor-al. status of viet·rsHhich he finds
repugnant, such as those of the fanatical nazi, and to admit that, in the
end, universal prescriptivisn may be unable to furnish any decisive
ar-gumen.t s against them. I An indispensable role in Hare's theory is played
by 'decisions of princiPle',2 that is decisions on.a particular filling
for the fornal shell of morality. 'tlithout such a corani,tment to content
no practical guidance can logically be derived from universalizability
and prescriptivity alone, though Hare believes that a sincere concern
with then will for most people set limits to the moral beliefs they fin.d
psychologically possible. For a defence of the stronger version of forma-
lism one mus t look elsewhere. It will be convenient to consider a moral
philosopher whose vror-k is sinilar in spirit to Hare's and night in some
respects be seen as a natural extension of it. l:.G.Singer in Generalization
in Ethics3 has made a detailed x±:b:x~ and ambdt i oua attenpt to show how
the substance of a moral theory may be derived f'r-on the form of moz-a'l i,ty.
As it is now clear that the feasibility of this project is crucial for
our general thesis we shall have to look at Singer's arguments with sone
care.
1•.See.~do~ and Reason, en. 9.
2. See The I.i"'D[?1j'>.;:e of r oral f': , Ch. 4.
3. Byre and Spottiswoode, London, 1963.
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Chapter 1.
FORM A.t~ CONTENT (2)•
A crucial role in Singer's case is played by what he calls
'the generalization principle'. The principle states that 'what is right
(or wrong)for one person must be right (or wrong) for any similar person
in similar circumstances,.l The importance of the principle consists in
the gact that it i8 'involved in or presupposed by every genuine moral
judgement, for it is an essential part of the meaning of such distinctively
moral terms as "right", "wrongtl and "ought" in their distinctively moral
senses,.2 It follows that 'one who says that a certain act is right for
some given person and not right for any similar per!!on in similar circum-
stance. w~ld be involved in a contradiction.,3 So far, although the
terminology i. rather different, the general line of argument is familiar
enough from Hare. Where Singer toes beyong Hare is in hi!! in~istence that
the feature of Iloral language he i. concerned with i. not 'trivial' nor
i. it 'morally neutral,.4 On the contrary:
'•••the generalization principle ••• does have moral consequences,
Moral judgem~ntscan be based on this characteristic of moral
judgements'. .
As Singer noten 'the best way to show that the generalization principle
has moral consequences is actually to traoe out these cansequenc8s,.6
The way in which he sets about this task will have to be examined in some
detail.
1. ibid. 1'.5.
3. ~. 1'.46.
5. ~. 1'.50.
2. ibid. 1'.34.
4. ~. 1'.46.
6. ~. 1'1'.46-41.
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There i. however,a preliminary matter to be dealt with. It
ooncerna an apparent ditference of aubstance between Hare'a 'univeraaliza-
bility theais' and Singer's 'generalization principle'. Hare'B thesis, as
we have seen, is concerned with what one is committed to in making a moral
judgiment. It states that it one judges action Y to be right one BUst
judge any action relevAntly aimilat to Y to be right also. In many formula-
tions of the generalization principle on the other hand it appears as a
thesis about actions rather than judgementsl what is right for x is right
tor anyone else in similar circumstances. It might be thought that the
ditferences between the two formulations are significant,and hence that
one should be cautious about any easy identification of the generalization
principle and the universalizability thesis. Before turning to Singer's
text tor guidance there is a general point to be made here. It is that
while there may be a priMa tacie distinction between the two verBions it
.is not easy to see what the substance ot it could amount to. What precisely
doe. the principle that 'what i. right tor x is right for any similar ~
person in .i.ilar circumstanoe.' add to the prinoiple that 'what x judges
to be right for himself he thereby judges to be right for any si.ilar
per.on in similar circumstances'? Perhaps one might have something like
the following in Ilind. The point of the first formula is that it offers
a kind of metaphysical guarantee. It assuees us that the objective world
of morality is isomorphic with the logic of the moral judgements we .ake.
That iB, values do not attach to things in random and arbitrary ways, but
conform to intelligible patterns of order. This, it might be said, is
important for it represents a necessary precondition if morality is to
be a subject for rational investigation. This sounds impressive enough:
the real difficulty is to lee what, in the present context, could be the
point of denying it. Of course, one might have misgivings about talk of
a realm of objeotive moral reality independent of our conceptual scheme ••
But even if one is willing for the sake of the discussion to grant the
propriety of this language it is hard to see what could be made to hang
on the distinction here. Our aim is to reach a philosophical understanding
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of that sjpere of reasoning which is concerned with telling us how we
should act. The practical problem of deciding what to do will continue
to face us whatever view is taken of the relation between our judgements
and 'moral reality'. Thus, reasoning about conduct is unaffected by the
kind of speculation we are having to engage in to attach some weight to
the differences between the formulas quoted above. To note this is surely
to call the point of the attempt into question. It is significant that
this line of argument is very close to one used by Singer against the
.oral sceptic. He remarks that,
'••even though such skeptical theories have had some value as a
stimulus to more accurate thought about the matter, there is an
important sense in which all such theories are morally irrelevant.
They have no relevance to the problems of morality (and at the salle
time they are productive of moral confusio~Hence they can be no
substitute for a theory that does. To one who is trying to decide
whether something ought or ought not to be done, it is no help to
be told that moral judgements are all subjective, or merely expres-
sive of attitudes. And to claim that therefore one ought not to
have some moral problem, because moral ideas have no objective orrational basis, is to depart from the moral neutrality thrt is now
so widely regarded as the paragon of philosophic virtue'.
This passage is highly relevant to our discussion. The suggestion we have
been considering may easily be reformulated BO as to bring this out. It
amounts to the clai. that the point of stating the generalization principle
in terms of 'what is right for x' rather than of 'what x judges to be
right' is to provide a guarantee against absolute moral scepticism.
Clearly this line of argument is not available to Singer for he regards
the danger that it is supposed to avert as quite unreal in that it haa
no relevance to the concern of the philosopher with practical reasoning.
It is now hard to see what significance he could possibly attach to the
distinction.
When one turns to consider the details of Singer's discussion
the overwhelming impression is that he would not in practice wish to let
1. illi. p.1.
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anything whatever depend on it. Thus he seems to regard the generalization
principle as applying indifferently to actions and to judgements:
'The generalization principle has so tar been stated in such a way
as to refer more explicitly to actions than to moral jUdgements.
]ut it can easily be restated so as to make its application to moral
judgements more eXPlicit,.1
Besides he tends to switch tram one kind of interpretation to the other
. th t t h . ·f· difference th Th1n a way a sugges s e sees no S1gn1 1cantAbetween em. e process
is illustrated in the following passage:
'Anyone who judges an action to be right for himself implicitly
judges it to be right for anyone else whose nature and cirCUMstances
do not differ from his own in certain important respects (that is
for any similar person in similar circumstances). If a kind of
conduct that is right (or wrong) for one person is not right (or
wrong) for sOl1eone else, it must be on the ground of some difference
between the two cases, other than the (tautolOg~cal) fact that the
individuals involved are distinct individuals'.
Perhaps the best evidence of all is provided by the way in which he applies
the principle to particular practical issues: at this point the thesis
about actions dissolves entirely into one about jUdgements. Throughout
the discussion Singer tends to take fDr granted that the generalization
princ"iple is immune from serious doubt. Thus he remarks that 'it is not
likely bo be regarded as fallacious though it has frequently been regarded
as vacuous and hence devvid of significant application,.3 As this statement
8uggests,he believes that the real difficulties arise not in connection
with its correctness or justification but with its application in practice.
More speCifically, he recognises that the 'basic question' about the
principle 'concerns the import' of the qualification 'similar per-aons in
similar circumstances,.4 The first step he takes in dealing with this
question is to switch the focus of attention to reasons for jUdgements.
Relevance is determined by reasons:
'The criteria for "all si.ilar cases" are contained in the "general
grounds II or reasons on the basis of which an act is, or is said to
1. ibid. p.36.
3. ibid. p.5. 2. ibid. pp.17-l8.4. ~. p.17.
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be, right or wrong. These reasons determine who are similar and
who are not in a certain context. All those to whom the reasons
apply are similar toeach other and relevantly different from those
to whom the reasons do not apply,.l
Elsewhere he writes:
'•••it is the reasons that are given in any particular case that
determine the application of the principle, for they determine thescope of the qualification "simi1ar persons in similar circumstances'''.2
As was stated earlier our interest in Singer's discussion of the generaliza-
tion principle arises mainly from his claim to derive substantive moral
conclusions from it. It is now clear that in this context the differences
between its implications for actions and for judgements are unimportant.
It is the possibility of giving reasons for judgements that gives the
principle its practical significance, and it is the Dature of the reasons
that determines its scope in particular cases. Thus, before ODe can apply
the generalization principle it must be transformed explicitly into a
thesis about jUdgements. In this form it becomes indistinguishable from
Hare's principle. The cash value,· one might say, of the generalization
principle is the unive~Balizability thesis. Our initial view of Singer's
case as an attempt to take over Hare's thesis while discarding the insist-
ence on its triviality will therefore stamd.
We now come to consider in detail the ways in which Singer
'traces out' the practical consequenses of the generalization principle.
He offers two '.odel cases' which are intended to serve as 'paradigms' of
its apP1ication.3 Both models are of great interest, though for con.trasting
reasons. In one case the attempt to show that the generaliza.tion principle
is not trivial or morally neutral founders through difficulties of detail.
What happens i8 that at crucial points SUbstantive aoral assumptions have
to be smuggled in to help the argument along. This,of course, is what our
thesis would lead one to expect, but it is difficult to derive any general
1. ibid. 1'1'.21-22. 2. ibid. P.34. 3. ibid. p.20.
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arguments against Singer's position.from th4 fact that he has to resort
to it in a particular ca~e. For this purpose his treatment of the other
model is more useful. Here hi. problem is to cope with a maneouvre which
would Beem to be quite generally available to the hostile critic. Hence
if it can be shown that he has failed to deal with it we have been give~
reasons for rejecting his entire programme.
It may be useful to begin with an outline of Singer's
general strategy. As we have seen, he recognises that the basic problem
is to determine which differenoes and similarities are relevant and which
are not. Sinoe he olai•• that the generalization prinoiple will yield
SUbstantive oonclusions by itself he is committed to trying to overoo.e
the diffioulties by the use of formal or oonoeptual devices alone. Hi.
first step, as was noted above, is the plausible one of switohing the
weight of the argument on to reasons for jUdgements. What he has to do
now i. to show that on purely tormal grounds certain kinds of alleged
reasons for judgements may be shown not to be reasons at all. The praotioal
judgements based on them will then be deprived of all rational support.
Singer take. a strong line on the role of rea.ons in morality. He hold.
that 'there oan be DO genuine moral judgements apart from reasons,.l
Hence an 'alleged moral judgement that one is unable to support by reason.
i. Dot a genuine moral judgement at al1••••2 The argument is that the
generalization p~inoiple enable. one to reject oertain kinds of alleged
reasons, and this is to eli.~ate the praotical judgements based on the.
in so far as one is considerin# what one morally ought to do. Clearly the
substantive conclusi~. derived by Singer from the generalization principle
will typically be of'a negative oh~aoter. The usual effeot of the principle
will be to exolude oertain possibilities rather than to guide one unambig-
uously in a particular direotion. It would be unfair however to use this
1. ibid. p.34.
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as a criticism of his case. Negative conclusions will be substantialare ruledenough in most circumstances: to be told that certa.in c.uries of act on"
out is to be given practical guidance. Neither is there any need to cavil at
the lofty view he takes of the status of reasons. Even, if one does not
wish to be committed to the view that without the ability to give genuine
reasons there can be no moral judgements, it .ight still be possible to
agree that Singer has shown that certain alleged reasons for judgements
are not reasons at all. HencQ~ one might concede that the moral judgements
based on them could have no appeal for someone who wished to decide ration-
ally what he should do.~ga.in this conolusion will appear substantial
enough to anyone seriously interested in moral assessment, a sphere of
judgement concerned with reasoning about conduct. Hence it is essential
for us to show that even results as modest as this cannot be established
by Singer's procedure.
One of the questions which he considers is this:,~-1hatwould justify excluding Bome class of persons from public
employment, or more generally, from appointment £%mm to any sort
of position,.l -,
He goes on to .ake clear the kind of 'reason' he wiahea to exclude:
'The fact that someone does not like people of a certain type would
not, by itself, justify him in claiming that they ought to be excluded
from some position. The fact that he does n~t like them would not be
a reason though he might think that it is'.
The argument now proceeds as follows,
'For suppose that it were. Then the argument would be that people
01" type T ought not to be allowed to hold a certain type of position
because A does not like people 01" type T. Rut this presupposes that
anyone A does not like ought not to be allowed to obtain that sort
of position •••.Anyone can argue in the same way. If there 1s anyone
who does not like the people A does like (himself included), then
theBe people ought to be excluded also. It is possible to maintain
on these ~ound. that no one ought to hold any position, and this
18 absurd. ,
1. ibid. p.25.
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Singer does not go on to say what is absurd about such a claim, and in
the abstract it is difficult to see what he might have in mind. It Beems
reasonable to suppose that there is nothing conceptually odd about it.
ThuB, an anarchist might believe that no one ought to hold anYPoBition,
for there ought not to be positions to be held. It might be said that such
a view would be contrary to common sense or that it would be unlikely to
appeal to anyone with much insight into the nature of human society.
Perhaps this is all that Singer wishes to suggest in speaking of its
absurdity. But even if this point were granted it would not be enough to
establish the conclusion as decisively as he requires. Besides to rely
on this interpretation would be to invoke a particular normative assumption;
the view that society should be structured in a way that allows for the
existence of positions of authority. This may strike one as a modest
enough claim but it can hardly be regarded as conceptually necessary.
We surely cannot rule out the possibility of a viable community of anarch-
ist. on ~ priori grounds. Here then we have the first introduction of a
substantive value-judgement. It plays a vital role in Singer!s argument
for without the results that are based on it he can.proceed no further.
Let us however waive this point for the present and l~ok at how he continues.
.. Having eliminated appeal.s to personal likes and dislikes
he goes on.:
'Now what would count as a reason for excluding a class of people
from a certain type of employment? In order to justify the claim that
a certain class or group of people ought to be excluded from a certain
type of position, it would have to be shown that the members of that
class have cer*ain characteristics, in virtue of their membership in
that class, which are such as to unfit them or make them incompetent
to perform the duties of that postition. But then this class of
people must be defined by these characteristics. Identification of
thea in terms of some popular category, as say Negroes, or Poles,
or Jews, will not be sufficient. It would have to be shown that
because someone is a Negro, or has certain characte~istics commonly
associated with Negroes, he is incapable of carrying out the require-
ments of the position in question:l
1. ~. p.27.
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The primary difficulty is to see how any of this is warranted by the
generalization principle. The central claic is that to qualify as a
moral reason one's reason for excluding people from employment must make
reference to their capacities. But a nepotist mig~t refuse to appoint
anyone except his own relations on the grounds that one has special oblig-
ations to members of one's family. In some societies this stand might be
applauded as showing a commendable loyalty to traditional ways. It is
surely not inconceivable that such a person might be able to invoke the
backing of aoral reasons. Would it not be un.reasonable to refuse to allow
that there might be a ease to answer here? It may well be that the nepoti-
st~ arguments could be refuted. At any rate, the assumptions which Singer
tacitly relies on would have fairly general support. For what he does in
effect is to appeal to widely-held viewB of what constitutes justice in
the making of appointments. In the circumstances this move has a certain
insidious charm. In part this is due simply to the fact that Singer some-
times refers to the generalization principle as itself' a 'principle of
justice·.l But a more ominous factor in the case is the close link between
the notions of 'being just' and 'being rational'. A central element in
each is the refusal to make arbitrary discriminations. Because of this
affinity it might be thought that Singer is merely appealing to conceptual
considerations which are inescapabl" bound up with our idea of what const-
itutes rational procedure in such a situation. This would, of course, fit
in perfectly with his general programme. To get to the heart of the issues
involved here we shall have to look aore closely at the notion of justice
in general and its relationship with the generalization principle in
particular.
One can hardly do better at this stage than refer to the
discussion of'justice' in H.L.A.Hart's The Concept of Law. There is, as
Hart makes clear, a sense in which justice is a purely formal or procedural
prin.ciple which enjoins that we should 'treat like cases alike and differen.t
1. See, for in.stance, p.5.
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cases differently,.l When interpreted in this way the analogy with the
generalization principle is obvious. Central to each is the claim that
distinctions should not be made without a reason and that the genuineness
of alleged reasons is tested by willingness to accept their authority in
other cases. Indeed it might be said that the generalization principle
and this formal principle of justice are, in a sense, identical: the
verbal differences are accounted for by the fact that they are concerned
to work out the implications of the sovereignty of reason for different
practical contexts. But if this is so then one must take seriously Hart's
warning that although the formula given above is a 'central element in
the idea of justive' it 'is by itself' incomplete, and, until supplemented,
cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct,.2 For,he explains:
••••until it is established what resemblances and differences are
relevant, "Treat like cases alike" IftUstremain an empty for••••
Without this further supplement we cannot proceed to criticize laws
or other social arrangements as unjust,.3
H~~ sums up the position by remarking that the idea of justice 'consists
of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, summarized in the precept
-Treat like cases alike" and a shifting or varying criterion used in
determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different,.4
Let us try to apply the lessons of'this analysis to Singer's discussion.
He wishes to show that the generalization principle has practical conseq-
uences for the making of appointments. In the process he becomes involved
with considerations of what constitutes justioe here. This may be legitim-
ate in so far as he is merely invoking what Hart calls the 'central precept'
of'justice: 'Treat like cases alike and different cases differently'. Fo~
this formula might plausibly be seen as a restatement of the generalization
principle in a way appropriate to the 'particular context. But there is a
difficulty here which was predictable from Hart's analysis. It is that
an appeal to the formal element in the idea of justice leaves one still
at the level of procedural rules which point in no particular practical
1. ~.cit. p.155.
3. loc.ill.
2. loc.cit.
4. ibid. p.156.
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direction. Hence to save his conclusion Singer is forced to supplement
the 'central precept' with a criterion of relevance, the capacities of
condidates. By doing so he is able to generate practical conclusions but
such a move is impossible to reconcile with an official policy of relying
on the generalization principle alone. Besides, although the criterion
of relevance that is used is quite plausible it can hardly be said to
be necessarily demanded by our idea of what constitutes justice in these
matters. Capacity is not the only criterion that might reasonable be
thought appropriate. Considerations of'need' may be involved in some
cases. For instance, it might be thought desirable to take accoun.t of
the number of dependants each candidate has to support. Or perhaps notions
of 'de8i.~t' in a sense which involves more than capacity might be
introduced. It might be thought that war-veterans and other public
benefactors should in justive be given precedence over other candidates.
Thus it might be argued that iven if the unwarranted assumption which
Singer makes is granted. one is still in no way obliged to accept his
conclusion.
In view of these difficulties it is tempting to suggest
that Singer's references to the generalization principle as a principle
of justice should be interpreted in a different way. One might see them
aw identifying it not merely with formal elements, but with the idea of
justice mn its entirety; that is with justice as a substantive principle
which incorporates criteria for determining what considerations are
relevant in practice. It might then be claimed that among these in-built
criteria notions of capacity have a special importance when considering
candidates for ~mployment. To take this line would leave no room for
doubt as to the practical significance of the generalization principle.
The difficulty would be to reconcile it with other elements in Singer's
case, in particular with the claim that the generalization principle is
'involved in or presupposed by every genuine meDal judgement' and that
it is 'presupposed in every attempt to give a reason tor a moral judgement':
1. ~. 1'.34.
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No doubt the ooncept of justice is of great importance in morality but
it is hardly as fundame~ta1 or ubiquitous ZXE as this implies. It has
been suggested that in some areas of the moral life, such as personal
relations, notions of justice have little relevance. Or it may be said
such notions are really appropriate on1e where questions arisa as to how
conflicting claims are to be settled and not all moral problems take this
form. Even in situations where the principle of justioe is obviously
relevant, for instance where appointments are being made, it may be thought
that there are other kinds mf moral consideration with which it conflicts.
This point has important implications for Singer's attempt to provide
unequivooa1 moral guidance on the issue. Thus, for instanoe, it might be
argued that the head of the government, on whom national survival is
thought to depend, should in a time of grave crisis be free to appoint
whomever he likes to serve under him, even when his only criterion is m
that he finds their faces congenial. In such a case considerations of
'national well-being' or 'the public interest' take preoedence over
justice in the making of appointments. An egalitarian will believe that
there are important moral issues involved apart from justice in the sense
that Singer has in mind. If he takes an extreme view of these matters he
may insist that everyone .hou1d be considered equally el'gib1e for every
position and that aay reckoning of oapacities is an affront to human
dignity. More moderately, he may believe that equality is at least a
relevant consideration which would often tend to work against the notion
of justice as a matter of abilities. A liberal may feel that the emphasis
on oompetence is unfortunate in other ways. He may think that in a demo-
oratic society there are positions such as that of the secret policeman
which are best held by people who will not function too efficiently. More
generally it may be argued that, at least in peace-time, it is best if
the civil service contains a high proportion of incompetents, in that an
efficient and self-confident bureauoracy may pose a threat to individual
freedom. Thus it appears that considerations of justice in the making of
appointments may come into conflict with considerations of freedom or
equality or the public interest. It would surely be unreasonable to insist
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that anyone of these principles must always outweigh the others. Sin8er's
assumption that we can be guided by justice alone is, however, perfectly
intelligible in the light of his general position. In order to derive
practical conclusions from the generalization principle what he does is
to identify it with the principle of justice and then, interpreting the
notion of justice substantively rather than formally and taking for
granted a particular crit4rion of relevance,to expand it to fill all the
conceptual space available. But however insidious the charm of this
sequence may be it contains too many discontinuities and begs too many
questions to exert a grip on the uncommitted observer.
It may be useful at this point to list the more important
assumptions which Singer relies on to supplement the generalization
principle in this first 'model case'. One is the view that there ought
to be positions of authority in society and that people ought to be
appointed to fill them. Another is the assumption that in applying the
principle of justice to the practical problem of choosing candidates the
only relevant criteria are ones which relate to capacities. A third is
the belief that justice overrides all other moral considerations here.
If one brings these assumptions together one finds that they amount to
something like a coherent ideal of social organization. It is one which
is incompatible with anarchism, fascism and the acceptance of inherited
or customary authority. Instead it pins its faith to efficient administr-
ation by a meritocracy. No doubt this position has its merits but it is
surely not one which all rational men must feel bound to accept. If the
body of extra assumptions is set aside and one asks what the generalization
principle by itself will achieve here, the answer is likely to be disapp-
ointing. The situation is precisely analogous to that noted by Hart in
the case of his formal principle of justice. That is we are offered no
'determinate guide to conduct'at all. Even where someone's reason for
excluding a candidate is that he does not like him,the generalization
principle will not entitle us to reject it provided that the feeling of
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dislike is taken as relevant in all other cases. Indeed it is not even
obvious that this must be a foolish way to ~oceed: the man may have
/
found his feelings to be a reliable guide in the past. The general point
may perhaps be put in this way. The generalization principle ordaine that
what one judges to be right in case x one must judge to be right in all
relevantly similar cases, but it gives no guidance as to how one should
judge in case x. Of dOurS8 it follows from the thesis we wish to establish
that Singer is perfectly right in maintaining that not every practical
judgement in the employment case will be a moral judgement. This element
of selectivity is the core of truth in his position and accounts for much
of its appeal. But the conditions which must be satisfied cannot be
derived from the logical thesis of generalization. They are dependent on
the material considerations inherent in the nature of moral assess~ent.
The issues raised by Singer's second 'model casel, are of
still more general significance. His problem is the familiar one of
showing that certain sorts of considerations c~uld not possibly qualify
as moral reasons. On this occasion the considerations being advanced are
particularly troublesome for they are always available to the critic.
Hence if his objections are sustained once they dan never be resisted.
Essentially the argument relies on an appeal to trivial, though admittedly
distinctive, features of the particular situation such as the fact that
some person is a unique individual, that he has a certain name or that
the geographical location of his house may be precisely specified. In
trying to dispose of such claims Sin,ger makes use of an interesting maneo-
uvre. He points out that anyone can invoke similar considerations and
hence if they are admitted in one case they must be admitted in all. He
the argues that this result can be shown to be unacceptable on conceptual
grounds. The core of the argument is contained in the :following passages
'The fact that I am I, or the person I am, cannot justify my claim %
that my case is exceptional, that I have the right to do something
others do not have the right to do. But this is not because this
purported reason is not a general one, or does not have a general
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application. It actually has too general an application. If I can
say"I am I,and you are someone else", everyone can say "I am I andyou are someone else". Thus this cannot shOw that one case is differ-
ent from another. The attempt to use the fact that I am I to justify
the claim that my case is exceptional actually involves a contradict-
ion. For since it is true of everyone that he is he, sin.ce everyone
can say "I am I", it would ffllow that every case is exceptional, and
this is self-contradictory'. .
The main objection to this conclusion is that it begs the question in a
subtle way. Given that an objector is willing to accept the procedure by
which his argument is generalized so as to be available to everyone, he
might well refuse to accept Singer's description of the state of affairs
that results. That is, he might deny that it is a situation in which every
case has turned out to be exceptional. This would indeed be conceptually
odd, but talk of exceptions only has point against a background of accepted
rules or ways of proceeding. The existence of such a background cannot
be assumed in advance. of applying the gene~alization principle if one is
claiming to derive practical conclusions from that principle alone. Besides
it may we~l happen that the effect of the piecemeal examination of each
individual case in the light of the generalization principle is to show
that the assumption of a settled background would be unwarrAnted. For
everyone invo~ved may be able to cite distinctive features of his own
case which we may think to be trivial but which the generaliz~ion princ-
iple by itself does not entitle us to ignore. There is no need to resort
to absurd descriptions of this situation in terms of rules to which every
case is an exception. It is simply one in which there are no reasons for
believing in the existence of the alleged rule.
Let us take the discussion of this second 'model case' to
a more detailed level by considering an issue which Singer raises later
on. It concerns the grounds on which one might legitimately refuse to pay
income tax. As before Singer argues that one cauld not legitimately appeal
to the fact that one has a certain name or"lives in a certain house, forI
1. ~. p.22.
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••••exactly the same sort of consideration would apply to everyone.
Thus this sort of consideration could not show anyoneto be an
exception to the rule, simply because it would a~ply to everyoneand hence would impl! that everyone is an except10n, which is•••
selt-contradictory'.
Now it would indeed be odd to claim that one is an exception to a rule on
grounds that are equally available to everyone else. Someone who wished
to defend his refusal to pay income tax would be foolish to attempt such
a line. He would do better to begin by challenging the presupposition that
there is a general obligation to pay the tax, and, given a gertain backg-
round ot tactual and normative assumptions, this need not be an indefens-
ible position. He may go on to argue that if one considers each individual
case on it. merits without any predilections one may find that everyone
who might conceivably be thought liable for the tax can appeal to consider-
ations aach as the location of his house which show that he has no such
obligation. In this way it might emerge that no one has an obligation to
pay income tax. But this is not a matter of finding that everyone is an
exception to a rule: it is the discovery that there is no rule. This way
of stating the result is not open to Singer~s attempt at a reduction to
absurdity, and the generalization principle together with the sorts of
conceptual device he is restricted to offer no other way of dealing with
it. The significance of the income tax case is perfectly general. Singer
is anxious to rule out the trivial considerations that are appealed to
precisely because thay are available on every conceivable occasion. The
f~ilure to do so undermines his whole position.
The vital point that has emerged is that to apply the
generalisation principte so as to yield practical consequences it is
necessary to presuppose the existence of moral rules. It may prove ilIum-
inatinB to ask what is the basis of Singer's confidence in the existence
of the rule in the income tax case, or indeed in any other. The answer
yielded by the text is plain enough: to see what moral rules there are
one must refer to the 'generalization argument'. This is formulated in
1. ~. p.87.
-131-
a number of verbally different ways but a standard ~ersion runs as follows:
'If everyone were to do that, the consequences would be disastrous (or
undesirable), therefore, no one ought to do that ,.1 Singer is quite
explicit about the nature of the connection b4tween moral rules and the
generalization argument:
'Moral rules are established by means of the generalization argument.
A rule that cannot be derived from an application of the generalization
argument cannot be justified'.
ine might now ask what the generalization argument is itself derived from
and how it is to be justified. The answer is that it 'presupposes and
consequently depends upon the generalization principle,3: it is a 'deduct-
ion' from the principle and certain other premises.4 Clearly at this
point we are beginning to turn in a circle. To apply the generalization
principle it is necessary to presuppose some moral rules and all such
rules are established by the generalization argument. It one asks what
justifies that argyment the answer is that it is a deduction from premises
which include the generalization principle. The circularity involved here,
though not formally vicious, must be disturbing to anyone concerned with
the rationale of Singer's position. The key concepts fit together so
tightly that once one enters the chain one is carried s@oothly all the
way round. It is difficult, however~ to see what reasons have been given
for taking the first vital step. Singer's procedure does succeed in
creating an impression of rigour and economy. Eut this is bought at a
heavy price, that of detaching the system from the sorts of objective
consideration that could exert rational pressure on one who stands initia-
lly outside.
To pursue these general comments, however',.would take us
outside the scope of the present inquiry. For its purposes the essential
point is that it is now clear that the generalization principle can only
be usefully applied if one accepts the generalization argument. The
1. ibid. p.4.
3. ibid. pp.5-6.
2. ibid. p.ll9.4. ibid. p.66.
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'argument' raises a number of doubts and difficulties peculiar to itself,
but perhaps the crucial feature may be picked out without entering the
disputed area at all. It is that it embodies assumption.s which are far
from being self-evidently correct and which, as a matter of fact, not
all moralists and philosophers would accept. Thus, for instance, the
'deontologists' among them would regard the reference to consequences
as irrelevant or, at best, necessarily inconclusive. According to Miss
Anscombe the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition would forbid all appeals
to consequences in certain cases and she herself is prepared to say that
sometimes even a willingness to raise such issues for discussion would
show a 'corrupt mind,.l However eccentric or undesirable Sin.ger might
find such views they can hardly be treated as conceptually absurd. That
is he cannot refute them with the range of weapons he is restricted to
in the attempt to show that the generalization principle is not 'trivial'
or 'morally neutral'. tihat he does in effect is to bypass the issue by
taking for granted the background of a quite different sort of moral
theory, a version of what is sometimes called 'rule-utilitarianisM'.
To note this is to be given a vivid reminder of how complete has been
the failure to derive substantive conclusions from formal characteristics
of the moral judgement.
The contents of the last two chapters may be summarised
as follows. After a brief survey of the literature on the form versus
content dispute a particular way of resolving it was proposed. It is that,
wAile moral understanding is contentlesB,assessment is necessarily bound
up with certain material considerations. It was suggested that serious
doubts about this th.sis are likely to arise only in connection with the
second half of it. We then discussed the difficulty of providing a
straightforward demonstration of any conclusion here and decided on an
indirect strategy. In the first place it was suggested that the view
1. 'Modern Moral PhilOSOPhy'! Philosophy 1958, Reprinted in W.D.Hudson, ~.£!!. See.p.~ 92. '
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being proposed has the merit ot "being able to account satisfactorily for
all the phenomena. Then an attempt was made to reveal the weaknesses in
the f.ormalist position as it applies to assessment. Attention was concen-
trated on what is probabl, the most formidable and thoroughly discussed
aspect ot the case, the feature generally known as 'universalizability'.
It was found that the influential acccune, given by R.M~Hare yields only
a vacuous thesis in the present context. An attempt was then made to
demolish the chief remaining support of a formalist view of moral assess-
ment based on universa1izability. The claim is that this teature serves
not merely to distinguish those practioal judgements that may be accounted
'moral' but can also provide guidance %m a8 to whioh moral judgements are
correct. This view was examined in the elaborate and alibitious version
presented by M.G. Singer. His attempts to draw practical cono1usions from
the 'generalization principle' were found to involve either unacknowledged
normative assumptions or unsuccessful formal maneQuvres. llhenhis conclu-
sions are rejected one is left with some version of Hare's thesis and this
provides not so much a characterization of moral assessment as a restatement
of the pr.blem. The situation at present is that serious weaknesses in
the fDrmalist case have been revealed and we have outlined some of the
advantages of an alternative view. But, however persuasive, the effect
ot the discussion so far must be 1arge~y negative and indireot. At this
point we must go on to ask what independent arguments may be advanoed in
t~vour of our positive thesis.
-140-
Chapter 8.
Fomi AnD CONTEliT (3).
The hypothesis we are seeking to establish is that moral
....,,..,C "'\assessment is necessarily tied to considerations of human good and harm.
A rather banal but useful general point should be made before considering
it in detail. It is that to set out the contention clearly with all its
ramifications is to perform an important service for it. At present the
chief obstacle it has to face is misunderstanding, and this is as easy
to illustrate from the work of supporters as from that of opponents. The
pictUre that will emerge from the discussion should strike one with a
sense of familiarity. For the aim is not to promote any radical conceptual
revision in this area, but to reach a philosophical understanding of the
concepts we already have. Hence it would be disturbing if our characteri-
sation of moral assessmant was in any significant degree paradoxical or
oounter-intuitive. The primary requirement here is a strategy that will
allow the truth to emerge and establish its olaim on us. It may be well
to start with the sort of case that seems to represent the greatest diffi-
culty for the hypothesis. It concerns the person whose practical assessm-
en.tsseem to be tata.lly uninfluenced by considerations of human well-being
but have a claim to be called 'moral' that would Qn general grounds be
thought overwhelming.
Discussion of this topic is often carried on in terms of
a stock figure labelled 'the Fascist' or 'the Nazi' or 'the follower of
Nietzsche'. In spite of the perjorative associations of these terms it
will be conve~ient to use them here in a more or less technical sense
whose precise signifioance will gradually become olear. One might convey
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a rough idea of what is involved by saying that the Fascist has ideals
which emphasise certain kinds of excellence, and in pursuit oftthem he
makes assessments which are unaffected by considerations of human welfare
in any ordinary sense. It would seem that if our hypothesis is to have
any substance we must allow for the possibility that at least some Fascists
operate a system of practical assessment which is distinct from morality.
Yet it may well be that from an external, structural point of view their
judgements are identical with ones we unhesitatingly accept as moral.
Thus they are willing to prescribe them universally, to allow them a
dominant influence on the conduct of their own lives, an,d so on. It might
now be asked, how can the exclusion of such people from the realm of
morality be anything but arbitrary and question-begging? We may be in
danger of separating the sheep from the goats without being able to point
to any difference that might constitute a justification. Many writers have
been sensitive to this line of criticism and it may be one of the factors
that leads to the rejection of material concerns altogether. The situation
is particularly delicate if one is personally inclined to favouD the
'liberal' view. For one might be worried by the thought that the refusal
to credit the Fascist with a moral position is due to dislike of his
viewB and the wish to Bee them excluded from the realm of respectable
debate. Thus, one seems to be faced with a choice between dismissing the
opponentB case by linguietic fiat and abandoning one's own. The best hope
of escaping from this situation is to find some rational basie for one's
treatment of the Fascist. Perhaps it might be shown that there are differ-
ences between his position and that of the 'liberal' which deserve to be
marked in some manner, and that the most reasonable way to do this is
in terms of the distinction between morality and all that lies outside?
Let us explore this possibility by considering in more detai•.what a
Fascist position might involve.
There are a number of possibilities here which should be
clearly distinguished. The first might be sketched in this way. The
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Fascist is a person who sets great store by such virtues as pride, loyalty,
ruthlessness and courage. He in inclined to contrast these with the
'Christian' emphasis on love, compassion and humility. It maybe part of
his creed that his ideals stand the best chance of being realis4d in
times of war and violence and that prolonged peace leads to decadence.
He may believe that these virtues are unlikely to be displayed by the
'masses' in any period and that in their purest form they must be the
monopoly of an elite. If he inclines to an optimistic view of the human
situation he may believe that these 'supermen' will one day become the
dominant force on earth. 6r,pessimistically, he may think that those who
exemplify his chosen forms of excellence will always be at the mercy of
the envious majority. At any rate the general nature of the position is
reasonably familiar. The first question one might ask is whether some,
perhaps eccentric, conception of human well-being does not underlie it.
The suggestion that it might is easy enough to develop. Perhaps our
Fascist believes that what is most valuable in human life, indeed the
only thing that is intrinsically valuable, is the development of certain
qualities to the greatest possible extent. If this can only be achieved
by a few at the cost of the degradation of others the man of genuine
insight will consider the price worth paying. A situation in which some
people display the qualities of supermen is, whatever other features it.may have, preferable to one in which everone lives .n comfortable medioc-
rity. It may even be maintained that the underdogs in such a system should
be prepared to agree with this assessment in so far as they are capable
of objective judgement. For, objectively, there has been a net gain in
human. terms: the highest forms of excellence have been realized an.dthis
outweighs all else. Considerations of honour and dignity must take prece-
dence over vulgar utilitarian ones of material comfort and peace of mind.
Now it does not seem at all implausible to suggest that there is some
general conception of human good and harm at work here. Indeed one may
suspect that if this were not so Fascist ideas could never exert the
influence that in fact they do. Perhaps only a ti~ minority are ever
likely to be attracted by ideas which fail even to pay lip-service to
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a vision of the good life for man. It is worth noting the oblique tribute
paid to the strength of this tendency by even the most debased versions
of the position. It is conventianally, and no doubt rightly, said that
it wa.s an iIjportant aim of Nazi propaganda to gain acceptance for the
view that Jews, Slavs and gtpsies were not quite fully human. They there-
fora fall outside the range of those who must be considered in making
assessments of purely human good and harm. This is,of course, to narrow
the denotation of'human' in vicious and unjustifiable ways. And, no doubt,
the Nazi view of wha.t constituted the well-being of those who came within
the scope of the term was somewhat bizarre. Nevertheless it may still be
argued that these views retain some link with a general conception of what
is valuable in human life. In this respect there is an important distinction
to be made between even the most extreme exponents of this first kind of
Fascist position and those who fall wttWi-g within the category we now
come to consider.
Sometimes the virtues with which the Fascist is supposed
to be concerned differ significantly from those mentioned above. What he
values, it is said, are states of affairs which exhibit in a high degree
such qualities as order, uniformity, symmetry and discipline. Correspond-
ingly his opposition tends to focus on a different sat of enemies; variety,
disorder, nonconformity, individualism in all its forms, whatever is
amorphous and resistant to central control and so on. In practice it
would of course ba impossible to divide people neatly between the two
oategories. Some pure representatives of eaoh may perhaps be found but
in most oases one may expect to find their elements combined in varied
proportions. Conoeptually,howeve~ the distinction is reasonable sharp.
Putting the point in terms of a rather orude dichotomy one might say that.
while the first kind of Fascist wishes to see Jews eliminated because in
their absence various kinds of human excellenoe will flourish,the second
wishes it beoause the world would ba left a tidier plaoe. What is happening
in the latter oase is that human affairs are being assessed in terms of
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standards normally reserved for inanimate things. Hare's discussion of
'the Nazi,l contains a shrewd appraisal of this tendency though it is not
clearly distinguished from other possibilities in the case.
'The enormity of Nazism is that it extends an aesthetic style of
evaluation into a field where the bulk of mankind think that such
evaluations should be subordinated to the interests of other people •.
The Nazis were like the emperor Heliogabalus, who, I have been told,
had people slaughtered b~cause he thought that red blood on green
grass looked beautiful'.
No doubt many would agree that the application of an aesthetic style of
evaluation to human affairs is liable to prove disastrous. It is not
difficult to see why this should be so. To make such evaluations is to
look at human life from the outside. It abstracts from the individuals
own view of his situation and treats his conception of where his interests
lie as irrele~ant. Instead his case is judged in terms of its contribution
to a larger pattern which in its turn is controlled by notions of order
and design. Within such a perspective its role is analogous to that of
the notes in music or the pieces in a game of chess. Obviously the practical
consequences of judgements made in this spirit may easily turn out to be
repugnant to our ordinary sense of what is permissible or appropriate.
It will be an accident if in particular cases the craving for order produces
the same ~esult8 as would a concern for human welfare. Our purpose is not
to adjudicate this issue but simply to note that two quite different sorts
of consideration are involved. Besides we wish to suggest that what is
excluded by this second variety of Fascism are precisely those considerat-
ions that are constitutive of moral assessment.
1. Freedom and Reason, ch.9. 2. ~. p.16l.
It may offer a fresh viewpoint if one considers the sort
of case which this suggestion would lead one to exclude from morality.
An example is provided by the man who desires the destruction of certain
human groups in the interests of a more economical universe and another
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by the emperor Heliogabalus who had people killed because he liked the
effect of their blood on the grass. There is surely a prima facie difficulty
a.bout grasping the significance of calling these judgemen.ts 'mora.l'. If .
such cases are not to be excluded one might begin to wonder how any limits
at all could be placed on the concept. Besides a description of a quite
different Bort lies read; to hand. We can say with complete appropriateness
that these are aesthetic judgements, unusual mainly by virtue of their
objects. Even the appeal to what we find it natural to say, usually quite
inconclusive in this area, offers some support. In describing some situat-
ions in which consideraiions of human well-being are disregarded in a
spectacular way we do seem to step naturally from the vocabulary of morals
to that of aesthetics. Thus, writers on the Marquis de Sade sometimes
urge that he be seen aa an 'artist' in an unusual sphere. It would be a
commonplace to remark that those Indian tribes who strove to keep their
prisone~s alive in great pain for as long as possible had made torture
into an 'art'. Or we may recognise that Machiavelli in developing hiB
'art' of politics was proposing to set moral considerations aside as irrel-
evant. All this suggests, with whatever force is to be attached to such
considerations, that we are on the right linea in holding that,while the
first kind ot Fascist has a moral code of a sort,the second has left the
realm of morality altogether. Perhaps it does not matter greatly in the
end whether one agrees to use the terms 'moral' and 'aesthetic' to mark
this conceptual gulf. The essential point is to grasp the nature of the
distinction and to insist on its significance. On the one side is a
system of practical assessment controlled by some general conception of
the good life for man. On the other is a system to which such considerat-
ions are wholly extraneous and irrelevant. If someone refused to acknowl-
edge that this difference i.~ important one would be at a loss to know
what his conception of 'importance' could amnunt to. If the distinction
between exclusive concern for and total neglect of human interests is not
regarded as eignifica.n.tthen where is significance to be found? Of' course
when one accepts that the difference is philosophically important and
deserves formal recognition the question arises as to how it should be
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done. In support of the terminology proposed above one can at least say
that it manages this in a perfectly satisfactory way and moreover puts
minimum strain on our ordinary use of language.
There is a third variation on the Fascist position to be
considered. Where practical judgements fail to connect with any conception
of human wall-being it will not follow automatically that they must be of
an aesthetic dharacter. There is another possibility which may often,
though not always, be understood as a development from the one we consid-
ered first. It may happen that a man~s ideals gradually become detached
from their original background of a general picture of the good life. They
come to be held with a degree of purity and abstraction that makes all
reference to the ordinary circumstances of human existence seem vulgar
and inconsequential. The existence of such a situation is most likely to
reveal itself through a rigid insistence on the practical implications of
the ideals regardless of their cost in human terWs. The Fascist might
constitute an example if his concern for racial purity led him to believe
that the extinction of all life on earth should be preferred to miscegena-
tion. It might be thou~t that this view has a pathological aspact which
makes it unsuitable as an example. But the presence of this element is
not entirely accidentals it represents a danger to which the position is
inherently liable. To insist on one's ideals regardless of their human
cost is an important part of what is usually meant by 'fanaticism'. Never-
theless not all manifestations of the tendency will be as difficult to
defend as the one that has been cited. One can find more plausible, and
perhaps more characteristic, examples among what are conventionally regarded
as the less extreme forms of nationalism. This may be explained by looking
at the intellectual backgroun.d of the position. The characteristic line
of development is as follows. A partiCUlar concept comes in the course of
time to be hypostatized and endowed with exalted significance. It is thought
of as an entity having many of the attributes of human persons and with
interests and needs peculiar to itself. In favourable circumstances it
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may become widely accepted that these outweigh merely human interests
and needs and should always take precedence in the event of a conflict.
The history of the concept of 'the nation' is a classic illustration of
this·process. In the end people may come to think of 'France' or 'Italy'
as a sort of eternal metaphysical entity whose welfare is quite independent
of that of Xxi-pe's .. individual Frenchmen and Italians. Thus a nationalist
might wish to claim that the nation is in a disastrous state when all its
citizens are living peacefully and prosperously under a non-national
government. Not only are the interests of the nation autonomous, they are
also overriding. On occasion it may even be held, as Hitler seems to have
done in his last days, that the honour of the nation requires that all
its members should commit suicide. It is difficult to see how this sort
of judgement can have any connection with considerations of human welfare.
Some at least of those who favour the general line of
thought would not wish to pretend otherwise. A characteristic element ih
their creed is that there are types of consideration that transcend mere
human interests, and in the context of these larger notions a concern with
such interests is felt to be stifling and ignoble. Men ought to sacrifice
their welfare to that of the nation for it incorporates the highest ideals
they can formulate. Religion is perhaps the natural home of views of this
kind. It has not been unusual for believers to think of God as having an
interest in seeing one kind of development rather than another take place
on earth. Interference with the desired course of events may be seen as
an affront to His dignity which should be avoadad at whatever cost. Such
views have sometimes been attributed to the Roman Catholic Church, as in
the following passage from John Henry Newman:
'The Church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from
heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are
upon it to die of starvation in extremest agony, so far as temporal
affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost,
but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one ~
wilful unt~h, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing
-148-
without excuse,.l
According to Newman, the Church would prefer the extinction of all human
life to the theft of a farthing. Such an assessment must be understood as
based on what can only be called a calculation of divine, as opposed to
human, interests. Indeed, if one sought a paradigm example of the semewhat
elusive aategory of purely religious practical assessments one could
hardly do better than refer to this case. If any sense can be made of
the distinction between th4 moral and the religious in this area such a
judgement must surely fall outside the moral half of it. Significantly,
many religious believers would have no difficulty in accepting this
verdict. It is not unusual in such circumstances to encounter the claim
that at a certain point the realm of secular morality has been abandoned
for the higher one of religious truth. Hence, our thesis is perfectly
able to accommodate the situation. Moreover it has little difficulty with
thv nationalist case discussed earlier. If a man were to prefer his own
death and the deaths of all his fellow countrymen to a loss of dignity by
the nation one might well be struck by the contrast between the sort of
oonsideration he is concerned with and those usually associated with
moral jUdgements. It seems reasonable to hold that the most appDopriate
way to aoknowledge these conceptual gaps is in terms of the distinction
between moral and non-moral forms of practical assessment. One is greatly
encouraged here by the fact that such a conclusion fits in well with the
descriptions that many nationalists and religious believers would give of
their position.
This examination of the case of the Fascist has revealed
it to be a good deal more complex than it may appear at first. A number
of substantially different positions have had to be distinguished under
1. b.lIdi,n'~Rrlll'jT Quoted in John Hospers, Human Conduct, An Introduction
to the Problems of Ethics, Harcourt, Brace and World Jno , , New York,
1961, p.260.
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the general heading. The basic distinction is between the cases where
assessment is based on some general notion of the good life and those
where it is not. Attempts to put representatives of the first category
outside morality may generally be explained in terms of a tenden.cy to
take for granted some particular, limited conception of what human welfare
must consist in. There is on the other hand no temptation to include any
members of the second once its true nature has been understood. In this
latter case there are alternative descriptions ready to hand in the shape
of various well-established categories of judgement; religious, aesthetic
and ideological. The general conclusion that emerges is that the case of
the Fascist presents no serious difficulty for our thesis. On the contrary
it offers a chance to show its explanatory power in reducing a welter of
phenomena to order. There is a further point to be made before leaving
this topic. We kave been arguing for a liberal interpretation of the notion.of human good and harm. The characteristic risk of such a proceeding is
that one's thesis may become vacuous and serve to exclude little or nothing
within the field of its operation. The discussion of the Fascist has given
some guarantees against this in that it has shown that various familiar
styles of evaluation fall outside the limits of the moral as they have
been drawn here. It may be useful, however, to reinforce this point in
a way that enables one to make a final comment on a question raised earlier;
whether every community must be ~edited with a morality.
Part of the answer has alreadY been given. It is that when
a dharacterisation of moral understanding is achieved the problem takes
on a substantial empirical aspect. The picture may now be completed by
remarking that our account of moral assessment serves to take the remaining
issues out of the philosopher's hands. Whether or not a community's code
of assessment is a moral code depends on its relationship with general
conceptions of human good and harm. If this issue can be settled at all
it will only be achieved by anthropological evidence. It does however seem
.reasonable to suppose that the verdict will sometimes go one way and some-
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times the other. The standard accounts of Homer's heroes, for instance,
tend to assimilate their views to the first kind of Fascism. Thus they
are conventionally said to attach great i~portance to qualities of guile,
ferocity and ruthlessness. These might well form the core of a more or
less coherent ideal of human existence, however mistaken or objectionable
it may appear. en the other hand, some descriptions of their position
would serve tb brin.g them closer to the second kind of Fascist. For some-
times the emphasis is on their regard for the manner or style in which
human faculties are exercised rather than the substantive virtues which
the exercise reveals. Again it would not be difficult to conceive ot
situations analogous to the third category. These might arise where for
instance the assessments of a primitive community are dominated by the
supposed wishes of a bloodthirsty deity who demands sacrificial victims
without the assurance of any ~ pro ~ whatever. But there is little
point in trying any further to anticipate the results of empirical inquiry.
Enough has been said to indicate in a general way the implications of our
thesis for this area. We must now return to the task of making its founda-
tions secure.
It may help to carry the argument a stage further if one
notes an important feature of the way these issues have been treated in
recent moral philosophy. It is that disagreement between those who accept
and those who reject a general link between the concepts of morality aad
of human welfare is bas4d on a measure of agreement at a more fundamental
level. The common element is the assumption that in many cases what const-
itutes human good and harm is a quite straightforward and uncontroversial
matter. It can be read off from the situation with the same ease as its
ordinary empirical properties. Underlying this assumption in its turn is
a general yendency for the notion of human welfare to be cashed in terms
at an unsophisticated kind of utilitarianism. The results are unfortunate
in a number of ways. A thin and partial view of morality has been bequeathed
to those who continue to insist on the conceptual link. The implausibility
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of this has led others, taking for granted the same narrow view of human
good and harm, to deny that there is any necessary connection here at all.
Their search for an underetanding of morality has then led down various
paths with nothing in common except that all lead away from the truth.
One source of the trouble is that discussion has centred on how to operate
with the concept of human welfare without any adequate sense of how obscure
and problematic a concept it is. The recovery of this aw~eness as a first
step towards the resolution of the problems to which it is at present the
appropriate response is therefore highly desirable. At:,this point we shall
turn to consider some particular cases in order to substantiate these
claims.
Mrs. Philippa Foot has been one of the ~ost influential
advocates of the view that considerations of human good and harm are in
some way constitutive ot moral reasoning. The paper entitled 'Moral lZ%iEtxx
Beliefs,l is a convenient text for examination in detail. The starting
point of the discussion is the claim that moral evaluation is internally
related to its objects.2 When this view is looked at closely it becomes
apparent that two rather different conclusions might be thought to be
implicit in it. They are not mutually exclusive but there is no difficulty
in holding one without the other. The first is that there are conceptual
limits on the kind of action or situation towards which one may properly
be said to have an attitude of moral approval and, likewise, of moral
disa~proval. For convenience let us call this 'position A'. The second
is that there are conceptual limits on the kind of feature that can const-
itute %j evidence or reasons for a moral evaluation: this is 'position B'.
The sense of the distinction may be conveyed by means of a question that
poses what is for present purposes the crucial issue. Are there any rest-
ric.ions on one's ability to entertain attitudes of moral approval and
1. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sofietl, Vol.59, 1958-9, pp.83-l04.
Reprinted in Theories of Ethics,ed.Philippa Foot, O.U.P.1967.pp.83-l00.
2. Theories of Ethics, p.85.
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disapproval which are entirely independent of ones conception of the
situation or any beliefs one may have about it? In particular, do its
'objective' features, those which are external to the observer and may
be specified independently of him, constitute such a restriction? Anyone
who holds position A is committed to answering 'yes' to these questions
while if he stops short at B ae is not. As we shall see Mrs. Foot's
discussion tends to equivocate between the two and this point is crucially
important for one's view of her case.
Belore dealing with moral evaluation Mrs. Foot declares
that she will discuss, 'some other mental attituaes and beliefs' which
have the same internal relation to their object.l The first example she
considers is 'pride'. In the course of the discussion the position we
have labelled 'A' comes to be rejected in favour of position B. Thus she
writes:
'Given any description of an abject, action, personal characteristic,
etc., it is not possible to rule it out as an object of pride. Before
we can do so we need to know what would be said about it by the man
who is to be proud of it, or feels proud of it; but if he does not
hold the right beliefs about it then whatever his attitude it is notpride,.2
Here is an explicit admission that one cannot rule out anything in advance
as a possible object of pride. However unlikely a candidate may appear it
is always conceiva.ble that it will qualify if someon.e holds a sufficiently
odd set of beliefs about it. Later in the paper however it becomes apparent
that Mrs Foot has moved over to an acceptance of position A. Indeed this
is essential for her general argument. She wishes to maintain that moral
evaluation is grounded on the facts of human good and harm, and that these
are quite independent of what anyone may think or believe. Thus, f9r
instance, she argues that 'an injury is necessarily something bad and
therefore something which as such anyone always has a reason to avoid,.3
Now whether or not someune has incurred injury is, for Mrs. Foot, a strai-
ghtforward empirical matter. The typical cases arise when some partEt of
1. op.dit. p.85. 2. ibid. p.86.- 3. ibid. p.93.-
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the body is a.f-:'ectedin a way that impairs the performance of its charae-
teristic function. Thus for example: 'An injury to an eye is one that
affects, or is likely to affect its sight; an injury to a hand is one
which makes it less well able to reach and grasp, and perform other ~
operations of this kind.,l The contention therefore is that certain kinds
of bodily change always constitute a reason, though perhaps not a conclusive:
one, for a certain kind of moral evaluation. Some things are appropriate
objects of mora.l disapproval quite independently of any beliefs at human
beings. Their moral import is simply part of the natural order in the
same way as more ordinary empirical facts. To hold such views is, of course,
to subscribe to position A. Yet while Mrs. Foot presents a solid and
convincing case for position B, at the end of her discussion position A
is still largely without any rational backing. Thus she makes it very
difficul t for anyone to deny that only against a certain kind of conceptual
background does it make sense to speak of a practical assessment as 'moral'.
The analogy with pride is a persuasive one here. The point is driven home
by asking whether it would make sense to say, without assuming any special
background, that a man who clasped his hands three times in an hour had
performed a good action. Mrs. Foot suggests, very plausigly, that it would
not, and that attempts to make it acceptable only appear to work by slipping
in the ba.ckground element surrept~ously. In principle it might be achieved
by showing that the action was an exemplification of some virtue and this
in its turn must be connected with human good and harm.2 Significan~ly,
she does not wish to deny that some story of this kind might conceivably
be told. She is not willing to make a similar concession in the case of
injury. That is, she is not willing to allow that there may be people for
whom the fact that something leads to injury doe. not constitute an~ kind
of moral reason for avoiding it. Thus the discussion of pride and of the
hand clasping case makes use of position B while the discussion of injury
and the general thesis require the stronger, but more dubious, position A.
1. ~. p.89. 2. ~. p.92.
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It is interesting that the point at which the transition
is made can be fixed precisely. Even more significant is the fact that
the argument relied on to effect it is quite inadequate. At one stage
1.1rs.Foot considers the :possibility that someone might concede the case
for what we have called position B and yet refuse to accept position A.
The discussion makes clear that she sees herself as committed to position
A as well. This stage is represented by the following passage'
'It will be said that indeed a man can be proud on.lyof something
he thinks a good action, or an achievement, or a sign of noble
birth; as he can feel dismay only about something which he sees as m
bad, frightened at Bome threatened evil; similarly he can warn only
if he is also prepar4d to speak, for instance, of injury. But this
will limit the range of possible objects of those attitudes and
beliefs only if the range of these terms is limited in its turn. To
meet this objection I shall discuss the meaning of 'injury' because
this is the simplest case. Anyone who feels inclined to say that
anything could be counted as an achievement, or as the evil of which
people were afraid, or about which they felt dismayed, should just
try this out. I wish to consider the proposition that anything could
be thought of as dangerous, because if it causeslinjury it is danger-
au.,and anything could be counted as an injury. '
She has little difficulty in showing that not anything can be counted as
an injury. All that is needed is to invoke the very reasonable account of
what an injury is, that was referred to above. She then concludes&
'It seems therefore that since the range of things which can be
called injuries is quite narrowly r4stricted, the word 'dangerous'
is restricted in 80 far as it is connected with injury. We have
the right to say that a man cannot decide to call just anything
dangerous, however much he :puts up fences and shakes his head,.2
But this argwn~nt is simply not good enough for her purposes. lira. Foot
does not limit the concept of danger by displaying the specialised nature
of one of the occasions of its use if all the others are allowed to prolif-
erate unchecked. The qualification 'in so far as it is connected with
injury' concedes all that a critic could want. All that has been shown,
he may say, is that someone who wished to argue that anything whatever
might conceivably be regarded as dangerous would be unwise to confine
1. ~. :p.88. 2. ibid. 1'.90.
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himself to the kind of danger that arises from threat!!!of injury. Indeed
he may claim that everything rejected under this heading may be resurrected
and must be accepted tmder another. According to J·!rs.Foot when a part of
the body is injured it is changed tor the worse in a specific sort, of way.
it cannot perform its characteristic function as before. Yet she explicitly
recognises that 'other threats besides that of injury can constitute
danger' and gives as examples death and mental derangement.l But now the
critic may take the offensive. Anything whatever may be thought of as
"dangerous, he may claim, for if it threatens a change for the worse it is
dangerous, and anything whatever can be thought of as threatening a change
for the worse. In support of this claim he may go on to cite anthropological
evidence about -the views of primitive peoples or what is known about those
who are conventionally said to be 'neurotic' in our society. But there is
DO need for colourful detail of this sort here since the main point of
philosophical interest has by now emerged. clearly. Perhaps it may be well
to restate it in terms which will bring out its relevance for our general
argument. Anything that can be thought of as a threat to one's physical
or mental well-being may be said to be dangerous. There are no limits to
what may be regarded in this way since, for all that has been shown to
the contrary, there are no limits to what one may Bee as constitutive ot
one's well-being.
The chiet consequence of the gap in Mrs. Foot's argument
1s that her version of position A is left without any rational support.
So far as the intrinsic merits of this view are concerned the essential
points have been made by D.Z.Phillips and H.O.Mounce in a paper 'On
Morality's having a pOint,2 which later formed the basis of a chapter
in their book )!oral Practices.3 The case th~y make against the insisten,ce
that injury is n,ecessarily bad is of a very simple kind. It consists
esse.tially of a list of what might be called counter-examples. By drawing
1. ibid. p.90. 2. Philosophy, 1965.
3. Routledge and Kagan Paul, London, 1970.
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attention to the real diversity of the phenomena this serves to throw the
inadequacies of 1,lrs.Foot'sview into sharp relief:
'•••consider how Saint Paul does not think 'thEilthorn in the flesh'
from which he suffered to be a bad thing. At first, he does so regard
it, and prays that it be taken away. Later however, he thanks Godfor his disability, since it was a constani reminder to him that he
was not sufficient unto himself. Or again, consider how warriors,
among whom valour is extremely important, might regard their injuries.
Might not their attitude to their injuries be similar to a soldier's
attitude to his medals? Another example is worth quoting. Brentano
was blind at the end of his life. When friends commiserated with him
over the harm that had befallen him, he denied that his loss of sight
was a bad thing. He explained that one of his weaknesses had been a
tendency to cultivate and concentrate on too many diverse interests.
Now, in his blindness, he was able to concentrate on his philosophy
in a way which had been impossible for him before. We may not want to
argue like Saint Paul or Brentano, but is it true we have no idea what
they have in mind?'~
Phillips and Mounce go on to point out that any attempt to dismiss on
grounds of 'peculiarity' the contexts in which injury is not regarded as
necessarily bad muBt beg the question:
'•••why ppeak of incidental gain in any of these contexts, and why
speak of the contexts themselves as ~eculiar? In doing BO, is not the
thesis that injury is necessarily bad being defended by calling any
examples which count against it incidental or peculiar?,2
They oonolude that the position of people like Mrs. Foot is based on
'elevating one concept of harm as being paradigmatic'. Injury is said to
be neoessarily bad 'at the prioe of favouring one idea'of badaess,.3
Phillips and Mounce's discussion, succeeds in making a number
of points very olearly. In the first plaoe it exposes the error of taking
for granted a simple hedonistio-utilitabian view of human welfare. As
against this tendenoy they rightly insist that 'what must be reoognised
is that there are different conceptions of human good and harm,.4 They
have also shown that in some conceptions the things that Mrs. Foot oalls
'injuries' do not figure signifioantly at all. Hence these oannot in them-
selves constitute reasons for aoting valid for all men. There is aDother
1. Moral Praotioes, pp.56-57.
3. ~. p.58. 2. ~bid. p.57.4. i£j._g. p.53.
-151-
important point which Phillips and r~ounce may be said.to have established.
It is that talk of human good and harm 'cannot be cashed in terms of what
all men want'. I \·lha.tthey have done is to provide vivid reminders of the
fact that the things men want are extremely varied and that no a priori
limits can be set to what may be the case in this respect. Preconceptions
about what men must want are fated to dissolve in the face of the bizarre
and stubborn facts of what they actually wan~. Thus the notion of what
all men want'is as artificial as the common evidence which is supposed
to support it'.2 This conclusion is a significant one for our purposes.
It rules out a way of giving substance to the notion of human. good and
harm that might other~ise be seen as an alternative to Mrs. Foot's utilit-
arianism; the attempt to ground it on the supposedly universal nature of
certain wants. So far the implications we have drawn from Phillips and
Mounce's work have been, however salut~y, of a somewhat negative character.
Essentially what they have provided is a warning against arbitrary reduct-
ions of the notion of human tood and harm. To see if any further guidance
can be obtained we must look more closely at tbe ~ositive aspects of their
case.
.It would be unfortunate for our argument if these had to
be accepted. For the lesson Phillips and Mounce take from the discussion
of Mrs. Foot is that the notion of human good and harm has no useful role
in moral philosophy. In their theory the fundamental concept is that of
a 'moral practice'. A preliminary idea of its function may be conveyed
by listing the more important claims made on its behalf. They hold that
what constitutes a moral reason for acting is determined by the moral
praotioes to whioh the agent belongs.3 Indeed, 'in order to make a moral
judgement at all one must belong to or be related to a moral praotice'.4
There exiats a 'multiplioity of different moral praotioes, some of them
oppos~d to each other's they have an 'irreducible variety·.5 In oases of
1. ibid. P.58.
4. ibid. p.14.
2. ibid. p.60.
5. ibid. pp.44-45.
3. ~. p.12.
-158-
disagreement the ultimate appeal is to what is sanctioned by them: if this
is rejected there is nothing more to be said.l For moral practices provide
the criteria for right and wrong without themselves standing in need of
further jUstification.2
This suMmary of Phillips and Mounce's main contentions is
by no means complete but it should suffice to establish the outlines of
their case. The more significant details will be filled in during the
course of the discussion. There is however an important preliminary point
to be made before embarking on this task. It is that from the viewpoint
of the present inquiry their argument has a serious general weakness. This
is its failure to provide any criteria by which the practices on which all
else depends may be identified. Phillips and Mounce do Dot offer any account
of the concept of a moral practice. Instead they rely on picking it out
ostensively: the most comprehensive list consists of promise leeping,
truth telling and generosi~y.3 This way of proceeding becomes particularly
significant when considered along with another element in their case, the
emphasis on the 'multiplicity' and 'variety' of moral practices. Thus they
can conceive of societies which do not have the practices of promise
keeping and respecting property.4 Presumably they would also admit the
possibility of a society whose moral practices do not overlap at all with
ours. How could the moral practices of such a society be distinguished
from all its other habitual and traditional ways of proceeding? What would
the moral judgements of its members have in common with ours? In the nature
of the case it could not consist in a background of generally accepted
modes of thought and behaviour. One could say, tautologically, that it
is the fact that both are 'moral' but this is little help without an
account of what 'being moral' consists in. Phillips and Mounce make no
attempt to supply such an account. In its absence we cannot apply the
notion of a moral practice with any confidence except to cases they explic-
itly recognise and their near relations. These will be found·to consist
of practices like promise keepin.g whose claim to moral status is for
1. ibid. p.16. 2. ibid. p.19. 3. ibid. p.93. 4. ibid. p.15.
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people in our society intuitively overwhelming. Thus there are definite
limits on tba utility of Phillips and Mounce'. talk of moral practices in
the conte.t of an attempt to delineate the realm of the moral. lihat it
really offers is a restatement of the problem. If taken seriously this
would lead us to conduct the inquiry in terms of practices rather than
principles or jUdgements. But the difficulty of accounting for the distinc-
tively moral elemen~ would remain the same as before. If one now looks more
closely at their case one may begin to doubt whether the new starting JI
point would prove as satisfactory in other eespects as the old.
In the first place there is a disturbingly obscurantist
air about some aspects of the treatment of moral practices. This impression
is due partly to the failure to enlarge anali~cally on the notion. More
important, however, is the refusal to a~low the legitimacp of questions
that arise in a perfectly natural way in connection with it. It is never
quite clear, for instance, why it is improper to try to get beneath the
level of moral practices to something more fundamental or to ask how a
particular practice might be rationally justified. In place of argument
one tends to get confident assertions of what must be the case; in partic-
Ular of what one must see to be unintelligible. Such a procedure is notor-
iously likely to prove indecisive but there are special difficulties about
the present case. ~. For it is not at all easy to understand the use
made by Phillips and Mounce of the distinction between what it makes sense
and what it does not make sense to say. At one point, for instance, we are
assured that 'In our society, for example, it does not make sense to ask
whether honesty is in general good, or murder bad, or generosity admirablet1
Now whatever the merits of this claim it soon becomes clear that Phillips
and ~!ounce do not take it very seriously. For they go on to add:
'If it did not follow as a matter of course that dishonesty was to
be condemned, we should be unable to justify or render intelligible
our condemnation of a dishonest action. For us, therefore, it must
follow in normal circumstances t~at a man who has been dishonest has
done something to be condemned'.
1• .!£!s!. p.11J
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If it makes sense to assert that dishonesty is to be condemned it must
surely make sense to deny that dishonesty is to be condemned. How then
can one rejeft as senseless the question which such claims might be taken
to answer: is dishonesty to be condemned? A similar difficulty arises in
connection with an earlier passage. It was argued that in a society *k
which has the institution of promise keeping 'to ask whether a man ought
to do what he has undertaken to do' is 'to involve oneself in a piece of
nonsense,.l In such a situation 'from ~ fact that a man has undertaken
to do x, the judgement that he ought to do x will follow so inevitably
that to question whether it follows w~ll not even be intelligible,.2 On
a number of other occasions Phillips and l~ounce make clear their allegiance I
to the view that 'within a moral practice certain facts will entail certain
moral conclusions,.3 But if what they say about the dangers of becoming
involved in nonsense is taken seriously it is not easy to see how one
can be entitled to speak of such logical relationships at all here. Is it
plausible to hold that there are degrees of 'inevitability' such that when
a connection possesses them doubts about it become unintelligible? In the
standard cases where something follows from, or is entailed by, something
else it will always mzkI at least make sense to question whether, it does
or not. If doubts about the validity of valid arguments were merely sense-
less how could there be such a subject as logic at all! The study of the
formal structure of arguments would be rendered superfluous by a theory
of meaning. It is Dot unfair to suggest that the appeal to meaninglessness
is the basic device which Phillips and Mounce rely on to enforce their
conclusions. This procedure is tricky enough in the ordinary way but to
resort to it with the facility illustrated here can hardly fail to bring
it into disrepute.
The shortage of solid arguments would be easier to accept
if the conclusion were intrinsically more plausible. But it is at least
not obvious that in the search for rational justification moral practices
1. ibid. p.l2. 2. ibid. p.l3. 3. ibid. p.l5.
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represent rock-bottom. There is no need to attempt a conclusive treatment
of this topic here. It will be enough to mention some of the more obvious
difficulties by way of showing that in the absenae of positive reasons
there is little need to take the claim seriously. Suppose that a person
begins to question one of his moral practices, say promise keeping, and
to wonder whether he ought to continue to follow it. On Phillips and
Mounce's view there is a difficulty in explaining how this can be a moral
problem or how the person can be ~rying to come to a moral decision. For
it 'is only from within such a practice that one can speak at all of
making a moral judgement or decision'. Moreover, 'from within the practice
of promise keeping one cannot ask whether a promise ought to be kept,.1
Since the person in the example has succeeded in raising the question
it follows that he cannot be regarded as being within the practice of
promise keeping and also, it seems, that his ultimate decision can never
be expressed as a moral judgement. But to refuse to allow that a decision
to abandon or retain a moral practice may be a moral decision is surely
to reveal that one is in the grip of a faulty theory. Perhaps, however,
Phillips and Mounce may be resvued from such a conclusion if one emphasises
other aspects of their case; for instance, by taking a hint from the
phrase 'such prafticea' in the sentence quoted above. Thus, it may be
said, while no moral issues can be raised in compleL8 isolation from
practices, all that is necessary to make moral criticism of a practice
possible is that there should be comparable ones to which the person
belongs and which he does not regard as open to question in the same way.
There can be moral doubts about promise keeping provided they are formula-
ted from the standpoint of some alternative to it. The difficulty that
now arises is to reconcile the claim with familiar features of experience.
One might surely wish to say on occasion that a person had lost his moral
bearings completely and was unable to draw on the resources of any estaBi-
ished mode of behaviour. Yet he might be intensely concerned with the
problem of how he should act. Indeed it is the existence of this factor
that giv4s such situations their peculiar character. Phillips and Mounce
1. ~. p.12.
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recognise that the presence of many different moral practices in an
individuals life 'may occasion situations which are moral tragedies',l
that is situations in which the intimations of various practices are
irreconcilably in conflict. The account they ~ive of such di1ernnas is as
penetrating and subtle as any that is available in the recent literature.
Equally tragic situations may however be occasioned precisely by th4
absense of any practices to which the agent can give allegiance. To be
forced to choose between practices to which one is equally devoted is
hard enough, But at least the recognition of them serves to impose some
degree of order on the situation and this may be a consolation in itself.
The case of the person who is unable to discern any structure of this kind
is more poignant still. The essence of the complaint against Phillips and
Mounce is that they are unable to allow that his difficulties may have any
moral significance. Perhaps the rather fanciful metaphor of a race may be
helpful here. One possibility which they recognise is the straightforward
sprint fa» the tapes. This, one might say corresponds to the situation
where the coral practices in which a man was reared serve him satisfactorily
throughout life. They are also willing to acknowledge a slightly more
complicated situation in which the moral life becomes more like a relay-
race. It is however a race in which there is always a perfectly smooth
transition from o~\~~eothe next, one set of practices taking over without
a break from another. But in reality it socetimes happens that, to continue
the metaphor, the baton is dropped. That is, continuity of standards is
lost and the moral agent does not know where to turn for guidance. Yet
the need for it may be deeply felt,for he may believe that a great deal
in terms of human good and harm depends on how he decides. It is surely
difficult not to concede that such a situation has the m~cings of a
distinctively moral kind of tragedy.
It may be worthwhile to approach Phillips and Mounce's
position from a slightly different angle. One of its merits may be picked
1. ~. p.94.
-163-
out by saying that it fits well enough the situation in.stable and orderly
societies dominated by traditional modes of behaviour and inclined to look
on them as part of the natural scheme of things. It is scarvely necessary
to share the existentialist concern with the 'anguish' of choice to feel
that in societies like ours the moral life does not always fall into this
pattern. On the contrary, radical confusion and uncertainty about practices
is familiar enough to us. In this situation it may easily happen that a
person begins to question the practices in whifh he was reared and, perhaps
after a long period of indicision, transfers his allegiance to a new set.
It is not difficult to give this suggestion a more concrete form in terms
of the sorts of moral prattice that Phillips and Mounce explicitly recognise.
There is a conmonplace progression from acceptance of the 'bourgeois'
practices of promise keeping and respecting private property to the view
that property is theft and honouring promises a luxury which the revolut-
ionary can ill afford. The difficulty on P»illips and Mounce's theory is
to do justice to the viewpoint of the person in the transitional stage
between bourgeois and revolutionary. How, for instance, is the eventual
decision to be described? It is presumably not a moral decision for by
hypothesis it is not made from within any existing practices. Yet it may
have the precise feel and weight usually associated with moral decisions.
Indeed for someone not in the grip of a theory the decision to adopt new
moral practices might seem to be the paradigm of a moral decision. Perhaps
Phillips and Mounce would wish to say that there is something conceptually
odd about this case, that the description of it must contain confusion or
inaccuracy somewhere. Dut here once again we are brought up against the
absense of any serious attempt to supply reasons that would justify such
a dismissal. This has the effect of making further pursuit of the general
line of thought unprofitable. Enough has been done to reveal the weight
of the prima facie case against Phillips and Mounce and, in the circumstan-
ces this was all that we required.
There is a final aspect of Phillips and J.!ounce'sposition
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to be noted. It concerns the implications for the task of the moral philo-
sopher. It is sometimes claimed that the vitality of a discipline depends,
at least partially, on maintaining the belief that it can achieve a defini-
tive solution of its problems. In moral philosophy this goal would be
constituted in part by a theory which allows for the rational resolution
of all disagreements. Phillips and Mounce are sceptical of this demand
for 'ultimate agreement, moral finality,l and clearly their kind of concep-
tual pessimism does little to satisfy it. Conflict of practices is bound
to arise and when it does there is nothing more to be said. ~r aiscussion
has suggested that this is to end the search for justifications at a some-
what premature and idiosyncratic point. But there are more specific reasons
for wishing to e.cape the implications of such a view. They arise when
one tries to conceive in any detail what the task of the moral philosopher
would be like if it were accepted. On. the one hand it would consist in
keeping us reminded as vividly as possible of a few simple truthsjall
connected in one way or another with the primacy of moral practic~s. On.
the other there would be the constant need to keep a check on the preten-
sions of those who wish to ignore or circumvent them. In practice this
must lead to a mixture of the banal and the polemical which is unlikely
to provide any real intellectual satisfaction or depth of inderstanding.
~lhat is missing from such a programme is the sense that there is work of
fundamental importance still to be done in moral philosophy. Of course
there may be a great deal to be said for a pessimistic conservatism of
the sort described. But Phillips and ¥.ounce do not provide solid enough
grounds for it and in their absense it is bound to strike one as an unatt-
ractive position. Besides an alternative view is suggested by looking
again at the course their discussion has taken.
Their success in revealing the weaknesses in current inter-
pretations of human good and harm led Phillips and Mounce to look for
solutions in a quite different direction. Since the results they come up
with have proved disappointing it may be worthwhile looking again at the
1• .!ill. p.5l.
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crucial step in this development. For, obviously there is another possibi-
lity here. Instead of drawing the conclusion that the notion of human good
and harm is empty and artificial the blame might have been laid on failure
to reach an adequate understanding of it. Perhaps what is needed is a
more determined attempt to press the question 'what does human well-being
really consist in?' The mere fact of radical disagreement about this does
not show that talk of correctness and incorrectness, truth and falsity,
is out af place. It can hardly be denied that conceptions of human tood
and harm may be more or less valid and enlightening and that advocacy of
them is subject to the ordinary requirements of evidence and ~gument.
One cannot say what one l~kes here however far one may be from knowing
what needs to be said. At this point a number of questions ari~e that
appear to be both legitimate and important. What does human 'flourishing'
consist in? Are there any universally necessary conditions for the tood
life? Is there anythi~g we need simply by virtue of our humanity? These
are baffling enough, but even a superficial concern with them leads to
others still more far-reaching and opaque. For one can hardly begin to
cope with problems about the nature of human welfare without some general
conception of what 'being human' consists in. One is led to ask, how are
we to conceive of ourselves as human beings?, what is distinctive about
human existence?, how is it to be thought of as related to the rest of
the universe? Thus in pursuing the line of thought embarked on here we
find that in the end what is required is nothing less than an account of
what it is to be human, a philosophical theory of man.
It is not merely by trying to eBcape the difficulties we
have been discussing that one comes to see the need for such a theory.
The awareness may stem directly from reflection on the implications of
our gener'3.largument. For one effect of it is to reveal the existence of
a conceptual gap which can only be filled in this way. There are two'quite
different goals to be distinguished here. One is to delineate the field
of morality while the other is to uncover the criteria of truth and
falsity that operate within it and so lay the basis of a SUbstantive
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moral theory. A prerequisite for achieving the first is to recognise that
moral assessment is co-extensive with concepts of human well-being. But
moral philosophers have traditionally aimed at doing more than characterise
morality. They have also wished to ~i8cover principles of moral assessment
and show how disagreements may be rationally resolved. If our a.ccount is
correct it follows that to achieve these goals one must be able to distin-
guish conceptions of human good and harm as more or less adequate approx-
imations tb the truth and ideally be able to say what xo precisely the
truth consists in. To recognise this is to come to see from a different
viewpoint the need for anawers to the questions raised above. Indeed, it
might reasonably be claimed that these represent the really important ±
issues in moral philosophy and that the achievement of a characterisation
of morality 8erves primarily to bring as to the point where they emerge
clearly. Nevertheless this achievement is by no means negligible. It is
essential if the nature of the residual problems is to be properly appre-
ciated. Besides it serves by itself to throw light on some important issues.
Thus, for instance, it enables one to see that some Christians and some
~:txrWVXKB Nietzscheans are offering different answers to the same
questions while others are concerned with different questions. What remains
to be achieved are the insights that will enable as to resolve the genuine
disagreements. But however the verdict eventually goes it is now clear
that its authority will depend on exhibiting errors of moral belief, not
on extruding one party from the realm of morality altogether.
These remarks have a good deal in common with the diognosis
made by Miss Anscombe in her paper 'Modern Moral Philosophy,.l There she
argued that 'philosophically there is a huge gap, at present unfillable
as far as we are concerned, which needs to be filled by an account of human
nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all
of human ·flourishing".,2 Clearly Miss Anscombe is pessimistic about the
prospects for improving this state of affairs. Elsewhere in the paper she
remarks that she is not able 'to do the philosophy involved' and that, in
2. ~.cit. p.194.
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her oplnlon, 'no one in the present situation of English philosophy can
do the philosophy involved,.l The situation has not radically changed sInce
the paper was written and this in itself suggests that there are solid
grounds for her pessimism. There are, however , considerations which might
be taken to en~ourage a different view. In the first place, predicting
the future development 9f philosophy is bound to be risky since what now
seems impossibl~ may well be achieved through advances which, in the nature
of the case, we cannot envisage in any detail. Besides it is important to
bear in mind what the alternatives are to the programme we have sketched.
Roral assessment is necessarily tied to a range of considerations of which
at present we have a quite inadequate understan.dingand to remedy this is
a necessary precondition of progress in moral philosophy. The subject can
hardly fail to become devitalised if tasks of such central importance are
neglected. The implications of this fact are apparent even from the highly
selective treatment of some contemporary views that has been given here.
It has revealed a tacit assumption which connects thinkers so apparently
diverse as Hare on the one hand and Phillips and Mounce on the other that
there is essentially very little to say in moral philosophy and that what
there is may be said with complete assurance. In this situation it may
be important for the health of the subject that it should once again kK,
come to be seen as ooncerned with issues of fundamental importanoe and
of great, perhaps even insurmountable,diffioulty.
There is, however, another gap to be filled before our
conolusion can be regarded as secure. Our aim has been to give a character-
isation of moral assessment rather than to establish the correotness of
any of its principles. Yet the way in which the first task was dealt with
has obvious implications for the second. At the very least it establishes
the general framework within which the problem is to be approached. If
the results obtained by working out these implioations prove not to be
viable this will in its turn shed an unfavourable light on our main thesis.
Besides advocacy of a general programme may sound a bit hollow unless some
1. ~. p.191.
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attempt is made to show how it would work in practice. There is no need
to embark on a full-scale treat~ent in order to remove doubts of this
kind. In principle a fairly tent~tive and limited discussion will suffice
to show that our conclusions do connect up with the moral philosopher's
ordinary concern with the details of his subject. lie shall try to supply
what is needed here with as much brevity as the nature of the task will
allow.
A conventional starting point is provided by the suggestion
that Human welfare is constituted at least in part by the possession of
certain'virtues'. Perhaps these are things that a person needs in just
the way that, to take the usual sort of analogy, a plant needs water?
But immediately we run into difficulties. They arise from a danger that
besets all discussion in this region; that of tacitly relying on assumpt-
ions whose effect is to beg the question at issue. In the present case
suspicion is aroused by what may be thought of as a too facile assimilation
of mankind to the rest of the natural order. Against this it may be said
that the nature of their relationship is, in a sense, the fundamental
issue underlying the whole debate. For convenience we shall identify the
parties to it by the labels 'naturalist' and 'anti-naturalist', their
general significance in this context will be familiar from the literature.
It will have to be conceded on behalf of the naturalist that there may
well be a risk of question-begging in the way the problem has been set up.
But his opponent may wish to press the point fUrther. Perhaps there are
more serious and specific reasons for thinking the analogy with s~ch organ-
isms as plants a dangerous one here? A plant needs water if it is to flour-
ish. But what sort of 'need' is this? It can hardly be functioning as a
normative concept, but rather must mark a causal connection. If a plant
dDes not have water it will not flourish, but perhaps it ought not to
flourish? In the opinion of gardeners all those species which they classify
as 'weeds' ought not to flourish. Surely the Agave plants which the Mexican
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revolutionary Zapata employed to execute his prisoners through the natural
growth of their steel-like spineel ought not to have flourished? The
danger of applying this analogy tb the human case is that it may obscure
from us the fact that we are taking for granted a particular kind of eval-
uation and building it in to what should be factual description. The
assumption in question is that human existence has a positive value.
There is, it may be pointed out, nothing conceptually inevitable about
this. It is a preference not shared by Saint Augustine, Timon of Athens,
and any number of anonymous suicides. Thus our supposedly'neutral' theory
of man has revealed itself to be based on an evaluative premise; roughly
speaking, that life is worth living. Once again the naturalist must allow
some substance to the charge that the situation has been rigged in advance
to suit his case. Clearly if we are to make any progress here we shall
have to approach the issues at a more fundamental level.
Perhaps what is needed is a wider perspective on the circum-
stances of human existence than we have so far achieved. Considering them
in the most general terms possible, there are two features which strike
one as particularly relevant to present purposes. The first is that for
human beings not all courses of action are equally eligible. The alterna-
tives do not present themselves as so many peas in a pod between which
there is nothing to choose. An awareness of considerations which tell in
favour ~f some and against others is inextricably bound up with our appre-
hension of their distinctiveness. A world of which this was not true would
be one where the concepts of action and inaction, deliberation and decision,
achievement and failure, could have no place. Such a world could hardly
contain anything recognisable as a distinctively human form of existence
at all. The first general feature that confronts us then is that some
courses of action are preferable ~o others. The second is that the field
of action in which we operate exerts continuous pressure against our
attempts to do whatever is to be preferred. Friction and resistance are
1. For the details see Edward H~amB, The Gardener's Bedside Book,Faber and Faber, London, 1968, p.196. -
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the natural accompaniments of human effort. Again, this is so fUndamental
and pervasive a feature of our experience that one can hardly conceive
of the possibility of things being otherwise. The ability to translate
preferences effortlesslf and unerringly into action is one usually assoc-
iated with some form or other of super human existence. Thus there are
tktKgEX. things we ought to do, and doing them is characteristically
attended by difficulty. It follows that we need whatever it is that enables
one to cope with difficulty, to pursue in the face of it whatever it is
that ought to be pursued. Perhaps the most suitable term for what is
primarily required is 'courage'; roughly speaking, the ability not to be
rendered ineffective by fear or despair. This is of course a somewhat
technical use of the term. The characteristic traditionally identified
by it involves other things as well, or at least carries a different set
of associations. It is not, for instance, necessarily tied to the perform-
ance of what is to be preferred, but may be employed in the pursuit of
any goal, however base or undesirable. It should be noted that in speaking
of the need for courage we are not committed to a positive evaluation of
human life. Indeed if our lives have no value we have.all the greater need
for courage in order to end them. Courage therefore is something that a
person should have whatever practical assessments he is disposed to make.
The need for it is guaranteed by the very possibility of assessments in
accordance with which his actions ought to be regulated. Thus it is an
essential ingredient of human well-being.
The essentials of this argument may be recapitulated quite
simply. From the fact that there are some things that human beings ought
to do in preference to others and that the performance of them is charact-
eristically attended by difficulty it follows that they need the quality
that enables them to cope with it, that is, courage. At this point one
may be reminded of the dangers of encroaching on the much-disputed territ-
ory of the facts-values debate. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say
that in one form or other this issue has dominated contemporary moral
,
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philosophy: by some it has come to be explicitly recognised as 'the central
problem,.l The debate has nevertheless now reached a stage at which the
supply of fresh insights and lines of inquiry is beginning to slow down.
Most of the moves on each side have become stereotyped and yet no resolution
is in sight. In these circumstances it might be well if the concern with
the facts-values issue were to be supplemented by other perspectives. We
have tried here to sug~est one way in which this might be done. Neverthe-
less the significance conventionally attached to the controversy makes it
difficult to avoid direct reference to it. An adequate treatment of the
topic would be outside our scope but perhaps something should be done to
make clear the implications of our argument for it. ~esides this may throw
a light on the issues which is all the more welcome for coming from an
oblique angle.
A preliminary point is that the ~endency to insist on an
absolute gulf between facts and values is understandable in the light of
our main contentions. Moral assessment is necessarily tied to considerat-
ions of human well-being and our philosophical grasp of their nature is
as yet quite inadequate. It follows that any particular attempt to draw
'evaluative' conclusions from 'factual' premises is bound to have an z.:.
inconclusive air. It will always be possible for the critic to withold
consent from the conception of human welfare that is being appealed to,
confident in the knowledge that closer study will reveal partiality and
arbitrariness. This maneouvre is, for instance, easy to perform with Mrs.
Foot's appeal to the facts of 'injury'. It may then be said quite correctly
that the premises do not suffice to establish the conclusion. But this
need not be due to any logical gulf between facts and values. Instead it
can be explained in terms of the present state of moral philosophy which
ensures that our knowledge of the facts is always inadequate to the demands
1. Note, for instance, the sub-title of the volume edited by W.D.Hudson
which was cited above: lA collection of papers ,on the central problemin moral philosophy.
-172-
the naturalist wishes to make on them. There are too many loopholes in
our philosophical title to the foundations required for evaluative conclu-
sions. Without the kind of rational backing that can only be supplied by
a theory of man, isolated attempts to grasp at them can easily be made to
seem implausible. Thus the whole facts-values controversy is parasitic on
our ignorance in this region.
Support from this conclusion may be drawn from the remarks
made earlier about the desirability of courage. It is impossible to apply
any rigid dichotomy of facts and values here without distorting the pheno-
mena. Even to 'ascribe it as a case in which evaluative conclusions are
drawn from factual premises may be misleading. Such a description may
tend to beg the question against the naturalist in so far as it suggests
that the facts-values distinction is a substantial one. It might be more
accurate to say that what the anti-naturalist calls '~acts' and what he
calls 'values' have been found to merge in a perfectly harmless way into
the total conceptual background of the conclusion. To understand the very
general facts about the human situation to which attention was drawn is
to see them as already charged with moral imporj. One could not be said
to grasp the full significance of the fact that men have obligations
unless one sees that it carries some implications for what should be the
case. Neither the 'evaluative' nor the 'descriptive' elements can be sifted
out and discarded without changing the nature of the data. One must be
particularly careful at this point about the use of question-begging argu-
ments. Foremost among these is the device of coining new terms to carry
'evaluative' and 'descriptive' meanings separately where ordinary usage
provides no warrant for distinguishing them.l Then the.fact that one can
operate satisfactorily with the new terms is taken to be an indication of
the validity of the distinction they represent. If the description-evalua-
tion distinction is indeed a substantial and significant one then it is
of course a legitimate device, though its use is dependent on, and does
1. See for instance R.M.Hare, ch.7. and
'Descriptivism', _PNr_o_c_e_e_d~i~n~~~~~~~~~-=~~~, 1963.
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not establish, this truth. If it is not then one has here merely another
illustration of the ease with which linguistic ingenuity can outstrip the
conceptual resources. Earlier we came across examples of question-begging
in favour of naturalism: here we have to recognise the process operating
in reverse. The obvious lesson is that there is a general difficulty about
approaching the issues at a level which avoids prejudging them in one way
or another. This in its turn is perhaps a reflection of how deeply the
division goes. It is possible to see in conflict here two quite different
ways of viewing the world. Someone who sees the natural order as a medium
for divine purposes or the laws of history can hardly fail to disagree with
one whose fundamental insight is that 'in the world everything is as it
is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value eXists.l A
direct conventional approach is unlikely to weaken these rigidities. We
have tried here to suggest a more oblique method. Our main concern was to
give an account of the concept of morality. We then went on to ask whether
the results have any implications for the facts-values controversy. This
line of inquiry has led naturally to the conclusion that in some areas
at least a rigid distinction between the two can only be main.tained at
the cost of distortion. Those who are not committed on other than rational
grounds are likely at this point to begin to wonder whether the game is
wODth the candle. These doubts may be reinforced by noting a point which
connects with another theme of this chapter, the current state of moral
philosophy. There is a general difficulty about the insistence on the
absolute autonomy of values which even its supporters might be willing
to acknowledge. It is the difficulty of preventing ones moral theory from
becoming thin and abstract, unable to do justice to the complexities of
experience and insufficiently sensitive to the needs of particular individ-
uals with particular problems. It arises bf course, because the insistence
on autonomy makes it hard to retain any linkz with the facts of the human
situation and the psychological springs of human action. The consequences
of this state of affairs would be easy to illustrate from the con.temporary
literature. Clearly it is only through some version or other of the~
1. L.Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philospphicus, Translated by D.F.Pears
and B.F.McGUi ..... , Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
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alternative view we have been sug?'esting that the problem can be overcome.
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Chanter 9.
S~rSI]ILITY AND RULES.
This ch~pter will complete the attempt to show the relevance
of the understanding-assessment distinction to that pervasive dualism
described at the beginning. The contrast it will be concerned with is
usually drawn in terms of a morality of'rules' and 'principles' and one
in which the key concepts are 'imagination','insight' and 'sensibility'.
It will be argued that while there is a genuine distinction to be made
here its nature ha.sbeen generally misconceived. As a result the theoret-
ical conclusions which are based on it tend to prove incoherent when
examined closely. Nevertheless the element of truth in them is important
for an understanding of morality and goes some way to vindicate the
concern with the sensibility-rules contrast. Advocates of it have usually
wished to draw attention to aspects of morality which they feel must be
ignored or distorted by a model constructed around rules and principles.
The complaints are extremely varied in detail but the main Durden is
that such an account cannot do justice to the complexities of moral
eX})erience. It may be sa.id,for instance, that there are practical dilemnas
in which any invocation of principles must appear facile and unhelpful.
Such a move could only reveal a la.ck of sensitivity to the way in which
the situation presents itself to the moral agent. What is required instead
is the sensibility to register nuances and intimations too subtle to be
captured in a formula. Then, perhaps, the problem may be dissolved by a
creative stroke of moral imagination. Where this is not possible the only
comfort may be the rather bleak one to be derived from the insight that
one is confronted lvi th a moral tragedy. The emphasis on rules valid for
all men may be thought to distort experience in other ways. It leads one
to play down the differences that stem from the varied conceptions that
people form of their situation and the varied responses that they find
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appropriate as a result. These are difference of moral 'attitude' or
'vision' or 'sensibility'. The language of inter-personal rules, it may
be said, cannot accor.~odate diversity of this kind. Hence it is Bimply
ignored and, as a result, conventional accounts of morality tend to
impose a spurious uniformity on the data. It comes to be seen primarily
as something which unites people while the equally valid insight that
it is a deeply divisive force is overlooked. In this respect, as in others,
the riles-principles model is open to the charge of building ideals of
a specifically liberal kind into the structure of morality. Clearly many
of the issues raised by this debate call for lengthy discussion. HOlvever
enough has been done to suggest the main features of the opposition to
rules. To complete this preliminary clearing of ground we shall go on to
ask what can be said in a general way of the other side. The residue we
will then be confronted lvith is the real core of the problem and will
have to be examined in close detail~
~ieshall begin by dealing with the exaggerated and inessen-
tial elements that tend to accompany talk about the morality of sensibil-
ity. It is sometimes, for instance, linked with a rejection of universal-
iaability. The freedom with which this concept is interpreted makes it
difficult to deal with s_ch claims in a summary way. But the eBsential
point is made if one explicitly rejects the suggestion that the universa-
lizabi1ity thesis is a substantial one about the status or scope of
moral 1lD7ki:nx :principles. On the interpretation adopted earlierl ex:ponen,te
of universalizability are, in effect, drawing attention to Bome fundamen-
tal features of language. In crude terms they are the tendency for any
particular use of it to commit one outside the immediate occasion and
the need for this commitment to conform to some intellegible pattern.
A morali t,yof sensibility is no more immune to these' »ogical' requirem-
ents than is any other. There is another aspect of the support for such
a morality which should be noted. This is its tendency to rely on a
distorted view of what the alternative involves. Before discussing this
:point it will be useful to make clear the significance we shall attach
1. See ch. 6.
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to the difference betveen 'rules' and 'principles'. There is no uniformity
on this point in the literature but it will be sufficient for our
purposes to adopt the simplest method of distinguishing them that can
claim some currency. Thus we shall treat the difference as essentially
one of degree, so that a principle is characteristically more abstract
and wider in scope tha..?1a rule. Following these hin,ts it will be easy
enough to classify cases at either end of the spectrum. In the middle
there will be an intermediate area where they merge indistinguishably
but this will be harmless for present purposes. Thus our practice will
be to employ whichever term weems to fit better in particular cases
while recognising that nothing of real substance hangs on the choice.
Having principles is sometimes represented by advocates
of sensibility as a matter of applyine rigid standards without any regard
for the distinctiveness of the actual situation. These standards are
~hought of as existing in advance, as it were, of moral experience and
the solution of particular problems .s a matter of subsuming them under
the appropriate heading. Thus practical reasoning is essentially an
exercise in taxonomy. Clearly there would be some justification for
doubts as to whether experience can be cpptured in a net of this sort.
But our discuasion of universalizability has succeeded in absolving the
defender of rules from some elements of the criticism and it is not
difficult to extend this to others. It has already been shown that so
far as Rare, for instance, is concerned there need be nothing prefabric-
ated about rules. The vital link with particular decisions is not that
each one is the implementing of a rule but that it carries rule-like
implications for future decisions. Neither is their any necessity i!or
the use of the rules model to be mechanical or hide-bound. Hare has
given a persuasive account of the way in which a principle may be adapted
to meet changing circumstances, not by becoming loose or empty, but by
incorporating categories of exceptions within itself.I Another suspicion
is that rules and principles must constitute a formalist kind of morality
1. The Language of !viorals,ch3, sec.6, and ch.4, sec.3.
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in which the sieni~icance of the particular case is bound to be devalued.
Again a reference to }i:aresuffices to shoN' that blindness in this respect
is not inevitable: '~le have to consider the parti·cular case and make up
our minds what are its morally relevant features, and what, taking these
features into account, ought to be done in such a case,.l It seems fair
to conclude. that the rules-principles model as interpreted here, could
hardly become more open and ~lexible without wisking a loss of identity.
Indeed one may BUBpect that the sup~osed alternatives would, i~ worked
out in detail, prove to be so loose-jointed as to be incapable of getting
any intellectual grip on the ma.terial. At any rate the natura.l temptation
for a concern with sensibility and insight is to dissolve into passive
contemplation of its complexity. This point will have to be taken up,
later. For the present we shall simply note that the case aeainst rules
has proved to be based, partly at least, on misunderstandine. There is
an elementary consideration which may help to explain why this is so.
It is that there seems to be an understandable tendency to confuse moral
rules with those gleanings of wisdom which may be more appropriately
called 'maxims'. Thus, while rules are dynamic and flexible, products of
individual experience and capable of developing in harmony with~ it,
maxims are prefabricated, inert, the outcome of other peoples reflections,
and offering only the choice of being taken or left. Clearly there may
well be something artificial and second-hand about a moral life governed
by maxims. But such stigmas cannot apply to the creative and imaginative
use of rules.
At this point it nay be helpful to look again at lIare's
reference to the need to consider what are the 'morally relevant' features
of the particular case and what 'taking these features into account'
ought to be done. The notion of moral relevance is a convenien~ starting-
point for it seems reasonable to think of it as fundamental to any s7stem
of moral assessment. Unless some features of a situation were to strike
one as morally significant it could not present a problem of moral
1. Freedom and Reason,.p .•38.
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assessment at all. Thus, for instnace, the dilemna of Sartre's pupil only
arose because he took for granted that in general the interests of one's
parents and of one's country have a bearing lon-decisions about what
should be done. :tithout an awar-enes.sof the presence of such factors the
situation could never have appeared as morally problematic: hothing in
it would call for moral decision. The need,referred to b. Hare, for the
decision to take these features into account is simply part of ~lhat is
required for it to qualify as 'moral'. Obviously it is not enough that
one should make practical judgements if they are entirely based on features
that have no mor-al significance. l!oreover, having picked out the morally
relevant features one cannot refuse to accept their guidance in other
cases. Hhat made the situation: morally problematic in the first place was
the presence of facti>rs that in general have a bearing on practical
decisions. To go beyond lip-service to these factors is necessarily to
respect their element of generality. Thus, it appeazs that the basic facts
which confront anyone wishing to construct a model of moral assessment
are these. People find themselves in situations which strike them as
having morally significant features: that is, features which are generally
»elevant to deciding what ought morally to be done. In reaching a moral
decision these factors are taken into account and tIllSpresup~oGes a
willingness to accept their authority in other cases. But in acknowledging
that all of this is an integral part of our conception of moral assessment
one is surely ,#oing a long way t cwar-daUIlIJ:wmiiwg conceding the case for
rules and principles. For one way of understanding the notion of a moral
principle is to see it as a general specification of a set of factors
that are morally significant in the sense described. Thus, A.Phillips
Griffiths sugbests that moral principles may be thought of as 'statements
picking out those factors of situations' which are 'generally relevant
to what ought to be done' and 'can be appealed to as moral reasons,.l
Here is a central element in our conception of moral principles in that
whatever other tasks they may be expected to perform, this one must be
ascribed to them on the most modest interpretation. Thus to assert that
1.'Ultimate f.IoralPribciples: Their Justification~ Encyclopa.edia.of
Philosophy, gan.ed. Paul Edwards, Collier-Macmillan.
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'stealing is wrong' is a moral ~rinciple is at least to assert that if
a particular course of action would involve stealing one has a moral
reason, though perhaps not an overriding one:in all circumstances, for
abstaining fron it. l:uch of the opposition to principles seems to be
based on the assumption that they must function like axioms in a deductive
system, as major premises from which, with the addition of factual state-
ments, conclusions about what should be done may be generated automatically.
But if they are thought of in the way suggested here this criticism will
lose its point. Their function will then be, not to provide a practical
calculus but, to structure situations in a way that allows the faculty
of moral judgement to get a grip. They serve to individuate features
without which the context of action would lack form and significance so
far as the moral agent is concerned. Clearly it is misleading to talk of
principles in this seIlseas though they represented one possible model
of moral assessment among others. Since they constitute the basic patterns
of order and intelligibility in this area they must provide the structural
skeleton with which any concei~able model has to work.
The conclusion to be drawn is that there can be no adequate
description of the way in which questions of moral assessment arise and
are answered that does not involve principles. One can hardly allow a
com~arable status to imagination or sensibility. It is suDely possible±m
to see that a situation raises moral issues and to know how it shoubd
be assessed without involving these attributes in any significant sense.
Thus, to suggest that they are needed to respond morally to situations
in which children are being tortured for pleasure might be taken as a
bitter sort of joke. In order to avoid having to trivialise the notions
of imagination and sensibility it may be well to admit that moral
assessment is possible without them. Indeed a refusal to admit this would
run counter to some deeply-held vd ews about morality. For whatever else
they may be, they are not gifts that all men possess in equal measure
simply by virtue of their status as moral beings. It would be surprising
if their possession was not correlated with other qua.lities of mind and
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character and, perhaps , with education. I;Ioregenerally, they seem to be
dependent on a social setting which allows people some respite from
satisfying the basic demands of their metabolism. In any developed form
they are, it may be said, the fruits of a civilised way of life. This
makes it difficult to argue that they have an essential role in moral
assessment. There would be widespeead agreement that Km a man may be
conscious of the demands of morality and reflect them in the conduct of
his life without being particular}y well-endowed in respect of these
concomitants of imagination and sensibility. At this point the suggestion
that we have here a rival or alternative to rules looks hard to defend.
Nevertheless, it is impo»tant to guard ggainst the opposit4 error of
assuming that imagination and sensibility Ban have no relevance at all
for moral assessment. It would be foolish to deny the value of imagination
for any enterprise that is concerned with finding solutions to problems,
and sensibility must have a place when dealing with issues that are
intimately bound up with the lives of human beings. These gifts are not
indispensably necessary to engage in moral assessment)n.or is the ability
to zriDDat arrive at moral decisions a proof that one possesses them.
llevertheless when one turns one's attention away from clear-cut situations
and elementary forms of natural goodness their value becomes impossible
to dispute. Althoueh one must reject the claim that imagination. and sens-
ibility can constitute a model of moral assessment their practical value
in the moral life should not be underestimated.
The concession of a role of this kind, however, is unlikely
to satisfy those who have wished to emphasise the contrast with principles.
They would deny that the link with morality is merely external and
contingent in the way described. It may be that claims of this sort have
more substance than we have yet acknow.ledged , For if one turns _ay from
assessment and considers understanding they take on an entirely different
aspect. It is not at all implausible to hold that for some forms of
understanding qualities of sensibility are not just useful adjuncts but
prerequisites of existence. It may be helpful to make a distinction
-182-
between cases in which a person t~~es over an established mode o~
understandine fron some external authority, a Party or Church, and
those in which he pursues his own 'Path towards an independent view.
The co~~ection we have in mind is easier to spot in the second sort of
case. Here it is difficult to see how, without imagination, anything
frxxz genuinely fresh or individual can emerge, or how, without the
disCipline of sensibility, the results could stand up to the demands
of everyday experience. Hence it would not be unreasonable to take success
in the enterprise as a sufficient condition for the ascription of these
gifts. The position in the first sort of case is more difficult to define.
It is temptine to treat it in the same way so as to be able to argue for
a general conceptual link between sensibility and moral understanding.
It might be said that even where the basic concepts and forms of organis-
ation are taken over from outside an exerfise of sensibility and imagina-
tion is needed to transform them into something one could call a personal
mode of vision. Otherl..ise all one has are ideas learned by heart which
do not really inform the individuals view of the world. Hence, it may be
claimed that while religion and ideology make various forms of understan-
dine available no one can possess them for himself without the help of
imagination and sensibility. So these qualities are indespensable for
the operation of moral understanding in any of its forms. This line of
argumant must be granted some weight ant perhaps no harm would be done
by accepting it as it stands. A great deal depends here on how widely
one wishes to stretch the notions of 'imagination' and'sensibility'.
On the Hhole it may be advisable not to let them become too diffused.
They will function best as tools of argument if kept within fairly tight
bounds. Besides the tendency of ordinary :1tsageis to take them as signify-
ing gifts of a rather special kind. It would probably fit in best with
it if one refused to allow that the possession of a traditional form of
understanding is, in itself, a criterion for their application. From
this point of view it would be preferable to restrict them to cases
which involve some element of 'creativity' in a fairly conventional
sense. The orthodox believer or party member would indignantly deny that
his relationship with the official viewpoint comes into this category.
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Hence, we shall not press the general connection with moral un.derstanding.
That is, we shall require not merely that the material should be transmu-
ted by the individual's imagination but also that some at least should
be originally derived from private rather than public sources.
As yet however we have not touched upon the aspect of moral
understanding whcs e link id th imagination and sensibility is most direct
and intimate. It is that which is constituted by all those points of
view that were earlier grouped under the heading of 'aesthetic understan-
ding,.1 Perhaps the paradigm case of an activity which is inconceivable
apart from these qualities is artistic creation. Aesthetic understanding,
a kind of imaginative autobiography in which nothing need be committed
to paper, is as near as those who are not artists can get to the paradigm
case. Piecing together the elements of one's life into a satisfying
pattern is an enterprise that demands essentially the same qualities,
though no doubt at a different level and with less stringent criteria
of success. It is through the medium of this activity that imagination
and sensibility find their true expression in the moral life. Thus their
essential link with morality is that they are indispensably necessary
for at least some forms of moral understanding. Discussion of these
issues has Buffered greatly from failure to draw on the understanding-
assessment distinction. As usually happens in con.temporary philosophy
the dimension of assessment has tended to emerge the more strongly from
the confusion and to prove in the last resort the dominant influence.
Thus, advocates of imagination and sensibility, having seen that there
is some kind of conceptual link with morality, have tried to express the
insight through the misleading and implausible claim that they can offer
, an.alternative to rules and principles. Their opponen.ts, equally dominated
by assessment, have rightly rejected this, and have usually gone on to
draw the erroneous conclusion that sensibility has no necessary connection
with morality at all. All this confusion could have been avoided by the
use of our fundamental distinotion. We must now try to drive the lesson
1. See above ch.3.
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home by considering some particular cases.
A pa.rticularly rich source of material is the symposium
between R.!y.TIepburnand Iris l:urdoch on 'Vision and Choice in f.:orality'
to which reference has already been made.1 The title is significant for
it captures perfectly that basic tension "Iithin morality which rTehave
been concerned to explore. It might be thought that a necessary requirement
for handling this material is to recognise that the language of 'vision'
belongs to what we have called 'understanding' and that of 'choice' to
'assessment'. Unfortunately the symposiasts tend to treat them as entrants
in the same competition,and this failure of perspective has some interes-
ting consequences. While there are isolated insights of great value in
each contribution they fail to add up to a coherent treatment of the
subject as a whole. Crucial points concerning what might be called the
architectonics of the scheme are left obscure, and ther~ is a general
difficulty about seeing how it relates to the regions of conceptual space
that lie all around. The source of the trouble is that the monolithic
conception of morality which Hepburn and Miss 1.1urdochtake for granted
is unable to accommodate all the material they wish to cram into it.
Hence, however the details are adjusted discrepancy and distortion are
bound to crop up somewhere in the result. Since there are important and
distinctive lessons to be learned from each contribution it will be best
at this point to leave the level of general diagnosDs and begin to consider
them in turn.
Hepburn begins by introducing the contrast he will ba
concerned with:
'?,:ostrecent British moral philosophy has been dominated by the
tlrule-obedience" modal: moral judgment as the endorsing of principles,
commitment to universalizable policies ••• however •••very different
models are quite often in.fact held by morally sensitive people _
by those, for instance, who see moral endeavour as the realizing of
a pattern of life or the following out of a Pilgrimage,.2
1. See above 1'.40
2.'Vision ahd Choice in Korality', reprinted in Christian Fatb;cs and
Contemporary Fhilosophy, ed.I.T.Ramsey, S.C.M.Press Ltd,London, 1966 ,1'.181.
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As the argument proceeds one can hardly :fail to be struck by the a:ffinities
between our 'aesthetic understanding' and Hepburn's alternative models.
The terms that constantly recur, 'fables', 'stories', 'patterns', 'symbols',
'myths' and so on would fit naturally into a discussion of either. Besides,
as was noted earlier,l the examples Hepburn gives of the use of his
models may be taken over without any significant alterations to illustrate
aesthetic understanding at work. Thus, the obvious interpretation of his
case is that what ha is commending to our attention is simply a particular
version of moral understanding and in this :fact the significance of his
material for the moral philosopher may be thought to consist. His own
view however is that what he offers is relevant to morality in a quite
general way. It is interesting that in one place he touches upon the
vital distinction, though the point is never seriously taken up. He notes
that 'many people who speak the language of "bringing into being a pattern
in one's life", speak of the pattern or pilgrimage not only as relevant
to the question"what shall I do?" but also to those very embarrassing
questions - "what does my life add up to?" "what is its meaning?" "is it
coherent, integrated, or formless, chaotic?" "have I maintained initiative,
been successfully t!reative; or has life gone past in uncreative passivity"~
That is, the pattern or pilgrimage is supposed to be relevant not merely
to assessment (,what shall I do?') but also to understan.ding (,what does
my life add up to?') Soon however it becomes clear that Hepburn's concep-
tion of morality is for all practifal purposes dominated by the problems
of assessment. Thus he assumes that his subject-matter must connect up
with them to have any philosophical interest. This goes against the
logical grain of his position and, ZEt+ as a result, he is saddled with
some quite gratuitous ~r~)I.zxdifficulties. He feels obliged, for instance,
to guard against the danger of sup,osing that 'if one looks after the
character the actions will look after themselves' to which 'all ethics
which stress the state of mind of the agent at least as much as what he
does' are peculiarly liable.3 This will be seen as an artificial problem
once it is accepted that what Hepburn is concerned with is a form o:f
moral understanding and not an 'ethics' in the sense of a system of
1. ch.3. above.
3. ~. p.195. 2. ibid. pp.18l-182
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practical reasoning. "rore significant, however, is the fact that the line
he takes makes it impossible to give a coherent account of the role of
patterns and fables. I:Donically, in the abaenas of a satisfactory concep-
tual framework the genuine but partial insights seem almost to make
matters worse. Thus he recognises that there is a sense in which the
language of rules must be more fundamental to the business of decision-
making than any alternative can possibly be. He sees the need for the
kind of distinction that we made earlier between two senses of 'rule'.
In one a rule is 'an explicitly formulated elementary rule of thumb';
in the other a rule is 'implied by any universalizable judgement ••whether
or not it eiists as a formulated copy-book maxim·.l In this latter zm%
sense 'and judgement that could be called "feature-dependent" may .be
called the expression of a rule or principle •••,2 Hepburn concludes that
'if the "rule-model" does no more than affirm the feature dependent
na,ture of any moral judgement, then the "parable model" cannot displace
it, cannot even conflict with it; for it assumes it·.3 But having admitted
this much the precise role allotted to the 'parable model' is left obscure.
His controlling assumptions do not allow him to conceive of a"place for
it outside the sphere of assessment. Within that sphere it is impossible,
given the recognition of the indispensability of rules, to see how it
can be an alternative to them. Yet it is clear that he still wishea to
think of it as having such a r~le, that in some sense a person may opt
either for rules and principles or for parables and fables. Thus there
is supposed to be a diff~culty which the 'person who habitually thinks
in terms of parable and fable' encounters and which the 'follower of
principles' does not: it is 'a difficulty about altering an individual
moral judgernent••••4 It must be admitted that Hepburn's argumaat at this
point is rather compressed and it may be that some of the difficulties
he is involved with could be removed by a furth. I t· Itr exp ana 1on. may
however be unprofitable to speCUlate about his real intentions. Instead
we shall try to clear the air by dealing with the substantive point at
issue, the relationship of the language of parables and fables to moral
1. ibid. p.192.
3. loc.ill.
2. l2£.cit.
4. ~. p.193.
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assessment.
There are two rather different ways in which talk of fables
and parables might be thought relevant to moral a.ssessment. Both find an
echo in l-iepburn'sdiscussion though they are not clearly distinguished.
The first possibility is that the agent chooses his courses of action
on aestr.etic grounds. In makd.nr;decisions he is constantly aware of the
fable he has constructed around the events of his life and his main ED
concern is to preserve its coherence. Hence he tends to choose whatever
action can best be assimilated by it or will carry it forward to a new
stage of develoyment. It is a relationship of this sort that He:pbu:bn
seems to have in mind when he speaks of the 'pressure on the fable-
follower not to violate the unity of his pattern,.1 Besides, an impDrtant
part of \-,hathe admires in people like l!uir and Yeats is their apparent
readiness to conduct their lives in this manner. It is clear by now,
ho;.reverllthat such a procedure has nothing to do with morality, but
represents a version of what was earlier called 'aesthetic aSEessment'.
Moral assessment is necessaril~ tied to considerations of human good and
harm. It can only be a coincidence if its results fit in with what would
be demanded by aesthetic criteria. Of course it may hap:p~n in particular
cases that qualities of order, elegan.ce or symmetry may be ascribed to
them. But this is not something that the moral agent is entitled to
strive for and he need not be surprised if the effect conveyed by his
efforts ws boring, repetitive, uneconomical, or in some other way lacking
in aesthetic appeal. Besides there is a profound antipathy between a moral
concern with peoples interests and the standpoint from which they appear
as minor characters in a private drama. Hepburn quotes a remark of Oscar
Wilde's which, when one considers its implications, might be taken. to
epitomise the contrast: 'I grew careless of the lives of others,.2 One
might describe .-;hathappened to Wilde by saying that he grew away from
morality and indifferent to its claims. If the language of patterns and
fables depends for its significance on developments of this kind it can
1. ibid. 1'.193.
2. quoted in Hepburn, £2.£i!. 1'.190.
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offer no help with our main concerns. For to use it in such a way is to
leave the moral realm altogether.
There is, however-, another way in 'vhich parables and fables
might be thought relevant to moral assessment. It is this second possibil-
ity that Hepburn seems to have particularly in mind when he discusses
the use of religious parables: 'in parable, a characteristically religious
mode of moral reaching, a whol e slice of life is presented , not an
isolated maxim; and the effects of the prescribed conduct (often too
1the effects of its omission) may be built into the one economical story'.
In a later passage he suggests that 'in part at least the propositions
of the Christian religion can be construed as the specification, through
fable, of a \Vay of 1ifel•2 On. the view suggested by these rema:bks the
point of parables and fables is that they are a source of moral wisdom
and guidance. They have lessons to teach which are all'the more effective
for being invested with concrete detail and presented in a dramatic form.
Hence they may be of greaj value to a person faced with a moral di1emna.
He may have exhauseed the resources of his private stock of practical
reason and sti1l be unable to see his way clear. Hhat he may need is
the kind of stimulus to the imagination that reflection on the parable
can provide. Or, if it really is a repository of moral wisdom, he may
do best simply to accept the authority oftwhatever it intimates for his
particular case. There would surely be nothing odd or objectional about
proceeding in such a way. Practical reasoning is a difficult business
and it must happen often enough that a person cannot reach a decision
in spite of his best efforts. This possibility is \"I'ellrecognised by
moralists and many remedies have been suggested. One may be advised to
be gUided by the intimations of a traditional mode of behaviour or to
put ones trust in God, or to rely on the virtues inculcated by a public
school education to see things through. These are all devices intended
to reduce the risk of serious moral error when the ordinary resources
of individual reason fail. The parables of the great religious leaders
1. ibid. p.181. 2. ibid. p.193.
'"
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may function admirably in such a role. Even when interpreted in a secular
spirit they may be seen as embodying the reflections of someone whose
practical wisdoo and experience far exceed one's own, Besides one might
well be impressed by the fact that they have retained a grip on peo~le's
imagination for many centuries. In practical reasoning one needs all the
help one can get and it might be foolish to ignore a source of this kind.
But there is nothing here that need disturb our account of moral assess-
ment. If the parable is a genuine source of moral wisdom it will be so
in virtue of the fact that reflection on it has some tendency to encourage
choices that promote human well-being. The decision that eventually
emerges from ones reflections "l-1illbe universalizable in the ordinary
way if it is to count as a moral decision. Used in this manner parables
may well have a legitimate role in the moral life. But if this is how
one should conceive of their .link with morality it is hard to accept
Hepburn's presentation of the case. For one thing the suggestion that
there is a sense in which 'fable-follo~ving' may usefully be contrasted
with 'principle-following' is quite misconceived. Eesides one can hardly
be entitled to speak of a 'parable model' even.on the most generous
interpretation of the phrase. Parables may be a useful standby in moral
reasoning but they do not shed any light on its logical structure. No
doubt many of Hepburn ':6 difficulties could have b:een averted had he made
the distinction described here between using stnries as a source of
moral inspiration and treating the events of one's own life as constitut-
ing a story. The fact that one of these activities has a legitimate, if
secondary, role within morality may help to account for some of the
confusion. But whichever vie\'1is taken of the language of stories and
parables it is now clear that it can never constitute a rival to that
of rules and principles so far as moral assessment is concerned. This
conclusion will be particularly sl·gnl.·fl·can.th ld th kw en we conSl er e wor
of Hepburn's fel1ow-symposiast.
lIissHurdoch's contribution may be seen as an attempt to
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draw out the implications of some of the lines of thought suggested by
Hepburn. She beGins by remarking that she agrees very much with the
general direction of his argument and that her-rma.Incriticism is that
'he has not made enouGh of his case,.l The charge is developed with the
help of a distinction which has striking affinities with that between
understanding and assessment. These extend ±E even to some points of
verbal formulation. Thus, lass r-:urdochinterprets Hepburn's purpose as
being to suggest that 'morality is understanding, interpretation ~~d
reflection as well as "chof ce" ",2 At Many points in the paper there are
valuable cornnents on this contrast as she conceives it. There are, for
instance the implications drawn from it for our conception of what a moral
difference is. Hiss I:urdoch notes that, 'It is proposed on the current
view that '\'le regard moral differences as differences of choice, given a
discussable background of facts'. 3 But if one takes -account of the fresh
material to which she draws attention they, 'look less like differences
of choice, given the same facts, and more like differences of vision,.4
The point beine made here is vital for an understanding of the role of
moral differences in human affairs, and it may be true that it has been
unduly neglected in contemporary philosophy. lass r.Iurdoch'scomments
would provide a useful starting-point for a discussion of it within the
co~e~t of our general thesis. Unfortunately, she is condemned to misrep-
resent the significance of this material because of inadequacies in the
conceptual framework imposed on it. She sees herself as gi>in.gbeyond
Hepburn precisely because she wishes to argue that the effect of thinking
of morality as 'understanding, interpretation and reflection' is to displace
the notion of choice. Thus, she remarks that she has 'attempted to offer
an alternative view of moral concepts which shows moral differences as
5differences of vision not of choice'. Having mentioned the other aspects
which Hepburn wishes to set beside choice, she goes on:
'lIreHepburn is cautions, however, in that he seems content to regard
these as merely preliminaries to choice. Whereas I would argue that
we cannot accommodate this appect of morals without modifying our
view of 'concepts' and 'meaning';6and when we do this the idea of
choice becomes more problematic'.
1. ~. 1'.195.
4. ~. 1'.203. 2. ibid. 1'.203.-5. ibid. 1'.213. 3. lli~. p.202.6. ibid. 1'.203.
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As the discussion proceeds it becomes clear that 1,:is6l~urdoch's purpose
is to establish that there are 'models' of morality in which, in contrast
to the'current'ane, the notions of choice and universality have no
significant place. Thus, she wishes to art~e that 'certain moralities
1make use, positively, of a quite different model', and that there are
'poedtive and radical moral conceptions which are unconnected with the
view that morality is essentially universal rules,.2
There is no great difficulty in seeing how this situation
should be interpreted in the light of our general ±k%xixz argument. We
-are faced vd th a tendency, natural enough in the absence of an adequate
philosophical grasp of morality, to concentrate on one or other' of its
basic components. Those who are most impressed by the connection with
practical reasoning will emphasise the labguage of 'rules' and 'choice'.
Those who are most impressed by the connection with the ways in whd.ch
a person may form a systematic understanding of his activities will
speak instead of -!-vision'and 'insight'. What Miss 1>;urdochwishes to say
is that we have here alternative and incompatible moral conceptions.
The truth, however, is that we have a contrast be tween two sets of
correct but partial insights which are not really in conflict at all.
There is no conflict because they are not focussed on the same objects.
A proper grasp of the concept of morality wou'ld enable one to see that
the lanGUage of vision and the language of choice complement each other.
Both are indispensable to the reflections of the ordinary moral agent
and to the everyday workings of the institution of morality. In spite
of its prominent and unmysterious role it may well be true that the dimen-
sion of morality for which we have appropriated the term 'vision' has
been unduly neglected in contemporary philosophy. Hence, lilissMurdoch
has performed a. service in drawing attention to is. But this leaves
things no bett ..r than before if its cost is the supplanting of our concern
for the aspect of morality which is suggested by talk of 'choice'. A
satisfactory account would have to accommodate Niss Murdoch's insights
1. ~. p.205. 2. ibid. p.208.
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and those of the people she criticises. To say this is just to say that
it would have to acco~odate both understanding and assessment. Although
it is easy to see in a general way.what are the implications of our
thesis for t.~issJ·Iurdoch'scase it would be foolish to end the discussion
of it at that stage. The real test of our interpretation is whether it
can acconmodate points of detail smoothly and without distortion. Besides
the process of seeing i:fthis is so can teach a good deal that cannot
be acquired in any other way.
One might begin by looking more closely at the kind of
model that becomes available when the obsession with choice is overcome.
What are the 'positive and radical moral conceptions that are neglected
on 'the current view'? Niss lIurdoch explains: 'I have in mind moral
attitudes which emphasise the inexhaustible detail of the world, the
endlessness of the task of understanding, the importance of not assumin.g
that one has got individuals and situations -taped", the connection of
knowledge with love and of spiritual insight with apprehension of the
unique,.1 Obviously, some of the issues this raises have implications
that extend beyond moral philosophy. It is clear from other evidence that
Hiss Nurdoch believes that the contrast she is concerned with is the
reflection of quite fundamental differences:
'There are people whose :fundamental moral belie:f is·that we all live
in the same empirical and rationally comprehensive world and that
morality is the adoption of universal and openly defensible rules
of conduct. There are other people whose fundamental belief is that
we live in a world whose mystery transcen.ds us and that morality is
the ex~loration of that mystery in so far as it concerns each indivi-
dual' •
Moreover, these differences are irreconcilable: it is inevitable that
morality should be a disputed 'concept:
'There is perhaps in the end no peace between those who think that
morality is complex and various, and those who think it im simple
and unitary, or between those who think that other people are usually
hard to understand and those "Iho think they are usually easy to 3
understand. All one can do is to try to lay one's cards on the table'.
1. ibid. 1'.208. 2. ibid. 1'.208. 3. ibid. 1'1'.211-218.
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The ~ain sUGGestion that has been offered as a guide in interpreting
IUss l:urdoch is that her advocacy of a.lternatives to the rules-choice
model ma.ybe seen as an attempt to draw attention to the dimension of
morality we have called 'moral understanding'. If this idea XEZ is sound,
one would expect to find that the main problem for her new material,
Conceived as a model of morality, is to accommodate the business of
deciding what one r:lorallyoueht to do. For it is not easy to see how
the alternatives of conceiving of morality as vision and as choice could
be reflected in distinctive approaches to this matter. How can the
implications of the contrast be such as to make us want to use quite
different explanatory models? The situation is not made easier when one
takes account of the hints that are given as to the specific nature of
tilealternatives to choice. Ho\'lprecisely should a sense of the inexhaust-
ibility of the wor-Ld and the mysteriousness of other people affect one t s
anproach to practical reasoning? Perhaps there will be a tendency for
people who are i~pressed by these considerations to have a distinctive
style; slow to reach judgement, tentative about its status, disinclin.ed
to press the implications on others and so on. ]ut n.othing in this is
incompatible with explanation in terms of rules. The differences must
surely be more substantial to justify f.1issl1urdoch's position. There is
no attempt in her paper to work out solutions to these problems in any
detail. At the crucial points where questions arise as to the place of
reasoning about action in her scheme of things, she is in.clined to appeal
to ordinary moral experience: 'Here all I can say is that in this compli-
cated.matter most moral agents know how to proceed,.l But the philosophical
problems arise precisely because although we may know how to proceed we
disagree as to what account should be given of our procedure. The appeal
to practice settles nothing here because in the relevant sense 'l-ledo not
know what we are doing. Now of course it would be correct and easy to
say that failure to supply details is hardly surprising since the task
is not really feasible. As has been shown, to be seriously concerned x
with moral assessment is necessarily to be involved with rules and
principles. Thus, the alternative that lIiss Nurdoch seems to be envisaging
could never be coherently worked out. The plausibility of its claim to
1. ~. 1'.204.
-194-
represent a distinctive conception of morality depends on a refusal to
focus on the realm of practical reasoning. But once again it may be
felt that this is a someHhat bland and dismissive way to deploy a conclu-
sion. To use it like this is to fail to do justice to Niss r.:urdoch's
work and, hence, to deprive oneself of the elements of value in it. In
order to dig a little deeper we shall enquire whether some still more
fundamental considerations do not underlie the views which we have been
discussing.
Let us note again the key phrases in the description of
what she wishes to set against the 'current' view. She is concerned with
attitudes which emphasise 'the inexhaustible detail of the world, the
endless of the task of understanding, the importance of not assuming
_.that one has got individuals and situations "taped"". These attitudes
are connected with the belief that 'we live in a world whose mystery :t
transcends us'. Zlselvhere lUss Nurdoch remarks that, 'The insistence
that morality is essentially rules may be seen as an attempt to secure
us against the ambiguity of the world,.l A useful starting-point is to
note that there is a: sense in which this last claim is quite certainly
correct. But in this sense any enterprise with an intellectual or cognitive
content may be described as an attempt to secure us against the ambiguity
of the world. Simply to re.enact its ambiguity would be pointless. ~ie
reduce experience to order by picking out discrete elements in it,
grouping them under concepts, and linking the concepts within larger
forms of organisation. There is a sense in which this process necessarily
involves abridgement, a reduction of detail, and so reveals something
less than absolute reverence for the mysteriousness of the world. It
must do this if it is to fulfil its purpose. A perfect mirror-image of
the manifold of experience would be as chaotic and unman.ageable as its
original, and leave us no better off than before. This is as true of the
form of'organisati on we call morality as of any other. Indeed, it might
be argued that, at least in its manifestation as practical reason,
morality is particularly likely to be intolerant of'delay in imposing
1. ibid. 1'.210.
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its conce:ptual apparatus on the phenomena. By its very nature it is perp-
etually forced to run the risk of t1'hatrass Nurdoch might regard as
premature conceptualisation. For while a sense of the importance of not
assuming that •one has got individuals and situations "taped'" may create
no tensions for a purely theoretical mode of reasoning, practical reason
cannot suspend judgement indefinitely. Decisions have to be made un.der
a time-limit and failure to reach them will itself have consequences
~~ that must be bo~e in mind by the agent. Moreover, there is a sense
in which it is characteristic of practical judgements to be premature,
to be based on an imperfect grasp of the situation. For the typical
situation in wh'ich a need for them arises will have a dynamic character.
It will be constantly liable to change under the pressure of the beliefs
and actions of oneself and others. There is a paradox here which helps
to give practical reasoning its distinctive character. The longer one
delays in the hope of achieving a perfect grasp of the situation the more
likely are the conclusions to be out of date as soon.as they are formulated.
There is, therefore, a special difficulty for moral assessment in adopting
the kind of patience that litss }.1urcochcommends. It may perhaps be seen
as another reflection of the general weakness of her theory where this
dimension of morality is concerned.
The difficulties extend, however-, beyond assessmen t., It
is equally hard to see how morality as a form of understanding can be
accommodated on lass l:;urdoch'saccount. At this point we come upon the
crucial issue. Her opposition to'the current view' only becomes fully
intelligible against the background of the ideal of a morality which
would not be subject to the limitations we have described. It would be
a perfectly faithful mirror of moral experien.ce, infinitely receptive to
every nuance of detail and ever willing to let action wait upon reflection.
for fear of a prematare resolution of issues. As we have seen this is an
inappropriate ideal for any attempt to get an intellectual grip on the
material. Yet even if we are right in suspecting that it underlies l,uss
rr;urdoch'sposition something more remains to be said here. It might be
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sUeGested that her real purpose is to commend a certain kind of attitude
to the world, roughly speaking, one of reverence and humility in the face
of its mysteriousness. It would not be unfair to characterise this as
a 'mystical' attitude; perhaps even, if one takes seriously the references
to the trahscendent nature of the mystery, a specifically'religious' one.
Such an interpretation could calIon the support of some hints in the
text. Thus at one point Niss J·'urdochsuggests that the effect of ta1dng
her new material seriously is that of 'inducing humility and being an
1expression of love'. A similar import may be attached to the reference
to 'the connection of knowledge with love and of spiritual insight with
apprehension of the unique'. However one interprets the notion of 'appre-
hending the unique' there is a difficulty about giving a description of
it in a public language. The attempt can on~y get 'tarted if one can
relate the experience significantly to others by means of common features,
analogy, family resemblance or in some other way. But success here must
be destructive of'the claims to uniqueness. It is appropriate that lIiss
l:urdoch should suggest that the experience is the fruit of spiritual
insight rather than the more mundane faculties of cognition, But i~ is
not easy to sec how one could seek an understanding of it through the
form of public discourse that must be used in philosophy. And it is not
easy to see how a concern tor the attitudes she recommends can.be opposed
to any secular attempt at p~i10sophica1 understanding. It seems that
the element of theory in her case has a tendency to dissolve bn close
inspection. ~f.hatwe are then left with may be interpreted as advocacy
of a shift of sensibility rather than ideas. But if this is so it cannot
con£lict with acceptance of any philosophical account of morality.
In particular it cannot conflict with acceptance of 'the
current view' based on the idea of choices governed by rules. Such a
view is perfectly compatible with a sense of the mysteriousmess of the
world and of other people. All that seems to be required is the assumption
that the mystery is not utterly impenetrable and that the notions of ~rules'
and 'choice' are the essential tools of moral assessment in exploring it.
1. ibid. p.209.
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At this point, however, we touch upon what may well be a legitimate
complaint against some representatives of 'the current view'. The point
invoLved here goes some way to account foj, the distinctive tone of 1;:iss
l:urdoch's criticisn. It is that the view in question has not always been
associated vd th the kind of humility that these insights make appropriate.
Sometimes, and perhaps ~±t%g ~articularly in the period at which she
~Tote, it has been invoked with a deeree of facility, even glibness, to
which one might resonably take exception. The sugeestion arises that her
real objection is not to any theoretical defects in 'the current view'
but to the spirit in which it has sometimes been applied. This would
fit in with certain other aspects of her case. For instance, it may help
to explain why she regards 'the current view' as an expression of ?~ a
distinctively 'Liberal' ideal.l The 'liberal' is sometimes suspected of
a desire to minimise the difficulites with which human life is attended
and a reluctance to admit that any may be quite intractable. There are
indications in }.:iseNurdoch's paper that it is a suspicion she shares.
It may be that what she finds objectionable is the tendency to approach
problems of practical reasoning in this spiri t. ~fuat she misses is a
proper sense of the weight and density of the issues. The arguments~ we
advanced earlier may serve to reinforce this point from another direction.
Practical reasoning is a difficult enterprise and at present we lack
an adequate philosophical grasp of its foundations. To advise hUmility
and caution is a perfectly appropriate response to this situation. But
in accepting the advice one must be ''laryof some other possibilities r
latent in lass ff.urdoch's position. It is easy for the attitudes she
commends as an antidote to a facile optimism to develop their mm kind
of glibness. The appeal to the unique, the ineffable, the transcendent,
can degenerate into a device for putting a stop to argument. A sense of
difficulty is valuable 1f it makes one aware of how much remains to be
achieved, but dangerous if it induces passivity or obsourantism. In the
quasi-theologioal Language of Miss ~:::urdoch's paper what is needed here
is a path bein'leendespair and presumption.
1. See especially pp.2l3-2l6.
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It was noted earlier that Eis6 lIurdoch makes, inadvertently
as it Here, a number tJfillur:linatinecommen.ts on the distinction 'between
understanding a~d assessment. By way of conclusion we shall consider
one uhich is p3.!'ticularlysignificant in the present state of the argument.
At one point she remarks that:
':lhenwe apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only
their solutions to specific practical problems, we consider somethin.g
more elusive which may be called their total vision of life, as shown
in their mole of speech or silence, their choice of words, their
assessments of others, their conception of their own lives, what
they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny: in
short, the configurations of their thought which show continually
in their reactions and conversation. These things, wnich may be II
@vertly and comprehensively displayed or inwardly elaborated and
guessed at, constitute what, making different points in the two
metaphors, one may call the texture of a man's being or the nature
of his personal vision,.l
}·:issIv:urdochdoes not spell eut the differences between the points made
in the two metaphors. Nevertheless, the subsequenm discussion makes
clear that she regards the notions of 'being' and 'vision' as intimately
related. Thus, usually she does not bother to single them out for separate
treatment. Instead she speaks of moral insight as 'communicable vision
or•••quality ofbeing',2and of '''personal vision" or "moral being'It.3
Rnough has been said to show how our argument Ban accommodate talk of
'vision'. At this point it may be worthwhile to bring the language of
'being' within its scope as well. There is a quasi-conceptual point to
be made and an epistomological ane. In the first place one can say that
a person's vision of his life is, partly at least, constitutive of his
being. This is not to commit oneself to the view that a person just is
whatever he conceives himself to be. There are limits that may not be
transcended by any amount of taking thought. Ne~ertheless,. in noting
that there is an internal relation between a person's conception of
himself and what he is 'really like' one is drawing attention to an
important and distinctive feature of human existence.4 The second p~int
1. ibid. 1'.202. 2. ibid. p.204. 3. ibid. p.205.
4. These remarks have been in£luenced by the argument of A.PhillipsGriffi ths, 'Kant on J.fasturbation',(unpubl. paper).
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concerns our kn ol'lledgeof other people. Its significance is brought out
clearly by }·:i6sr:urdoch's way of stating the matter. ~'lhenwe 'apprehend
and assess' other people what we consider are 'the coni'igurations of
their thought which show continually in their reactions and conversation'.
It is by fitting this evidence together that, as rass r.7urdochputs it,
we arrive at a conception of their 'total vision of life'. It is precisely
the same process that yields our knowledge of what others are 'really
like'. These are the ways in which the 'being' of other people is revealed
to us and we have no other means of access. Hence, the epistomological
point is that the sources of our knowledge of 'being' and of 'vision'
are identical. It is not surprising that the terminology appropriate to
either concept should be available in describing the results.
lHss r.:urdochasserts that we not only consider other peoples
solutions to practical problems but also their 'vision of life'. Putting
this point in our terms one can say that in apprehending other people
as moral beings we take account of modes of understanding as well as
styles of assessment. When restated in this way the significance of her
claim becomes clear: it is a reminder or the rundamental role or moral
understanding. In general the commendation of 'insight', 'sensibility',
'imagination', 'patterns', 'fables' and 'symbols' may be seen as making
a similar point. It corresponds to nothing that is integral or vital so
far as moral assessment is concerned. Yet without these concepts no
satisfactory account can be given of the most charactej,i:sticand developed
forms of moral understanding. The conclusion to be drawn is that the
emphasis on the contrast between a morality of sensibility and one of
rules is a confused and oblique way of drawing attention to the distinction
bet\"1eenunderstanding and assesrment. The contrast is seriously misrepre-
sented if it is seen as forcing upon us a choice between self-contained
and irreconcilable conceptions of morality. The natural result of presen-
ting the issues like this is that we are led to reduce morality either
to understanding or to assessment. One way of interpretinf the central
weakness in r:iss lliurdoch's case is to see it as a victim of the tenden.cy.
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As we have shown the place of ascessment in her scheme of things is
quite unsatisfactory. It is, however, the opposite error that has been
the more serious risk in contemporary philosophy and JUss J'urdoch's
paper may perhaps be seen as a somewha.texageerated reaction against it.
Kany writers display a vague and inchoate awaz-eness of the dimension of
moral understanding. Eut when it comes to the point of presenting the
sUbstance of their theories and spelling out the detailed implications
the dominance of assessment constantly tends to re-assert itself. It
would be possible to trace the unfortunate consequences of this tendency
in many different areas. Here we shall have to be content l·dth discussing
a particular aspect for l"hich the ....ray has been prepared by Hiss l:urdoch's
talk of 'being'.
As a preliminary statement of the criticism one might say
that the human image in contemporary moral philosophy is entirely
inadequate. The picture it presents has admirable qualities of clarity
and economy, but the overall impression is closer to that of an X-ray
photograph than to a recognisable likeness of a living entity. The
individual' B intellectual concerns are vrholly absorbed by the need to
Bolve specific practical problems. He lives in a world of other practical
beings whose lives are equally dominated by the demands of choice and
action. His relations with them are conducted by means of a form of
discourse whose primary function is the :besolution of conflicts and
dilemnas. Obviously, this is a one-dimensional picture. It is by no means
true that our intellectual life can be fully understood in terms of its
orientation to practical reasoning. But the real objection is not that
l'lhatwe are offered is inadequate if seen as an attempt at a comprehensive
and rounded picture of what human beings are like. It is that it is
defective in a quite gratuitous way as a working model of morality. With
such a model we cannot hope to do justioe to its role in human affairs.
A mant s morality is something that, one might say, 'goes deep'. It is
a vital part of what makes him the person he is and differentiates him
from others. If our attention is fixed on attention alone we shall never
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be able to acco~odate these truths. For one thing there is the tendency
:forpeople to agree on the practical issue o:fwhat should be done \vhile
having radically dif:ferent conceptions o:fthe sig.ni:ficanceo:fthe action.
This is particularly likely to be :fo~tndin societies which are dominated
by the sort of liberal consensus of which r,:issI·:urdochcomplains. In
such cases the general tendency, which was given its classic de:fende
by J .S.IIill, is for people to be allowed to think \-Thatthey like provided
that their actions do not infringe too drastically on the interests of
others. A difficul ty arises hare as to how a persons individual morality
can be the individuating factor that one might naturally suppose. In
the nature of the case it cannot be resolved merely by attending to the
answers he gives to particular practical questions. There is, moreover,
a deeper point involved. In an important sense his answers to practical
questions can only be contingently related to anything more fundamental
This is so precisely because nor-at assessmen.t employs a :form of objective
public discourse. Our purpose in engaging in it is to produce answers
that are not merely idiosyncratic, not more intimately related to our
own distinctive characteristics than to those of anyone else. They should
be such that anyone appraised of the relevant facts will, in so far as
he is rational, assent to them. It follows that there is an inherent
tendency t:or this form of public discourse, if allowed to operate freely,
to bring about agreement on all disputed issues. No doubt this is an
ideal not to be realised in ordinary circumstances since ignorance of
facts and reluctance to be guided by reason are so hard to eliminate
:from our situation. Nevertheless, in so :faras they are in:formed and
rational, people who engage seriously in moral discourse will come to
agree. The exclusive concern of recent philosophy with assessment
vi~tua1ly :forces such a view upon us. From the standpoints it offers
it is very di:f:ficultto think o:fmorality except as something whose
tendency is to unite people, and as, pctentially at least, an instrument
of complete harmony. Its divisive aspects are bound to be neglected.
Yet a man's individual morality is one o:fthe most distinctive things
about him: it lies near the heart of what makes him the person he is.
It is s~ely a mistake to think o:fit as a purely contingent element,
..
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waitine to be dissolved under the impact of rational argument. Ordinary
moral experience offers no supyort for such a view. Sometimes at least,
when a disagreement strikes one as being characteristically'moral' there
seems to be an element involved that is deep-rooted, and unamenable to
argument in a way difficult to account for if one supposes that all that
can be at stake are conflicting practical jUdgements. To take this
view would be to trivialise the notion of a moral difference. Besides,
we do find it natural to thinl: of a man'slmoral being' as something
elusive and individual, something that we may find difficult or impossible
t~ grasp and that differentiates him more profoundly from us than his
views on particular practical issues ever could. One cannot avcount for
these aspects of experience if morality is thought of exclusively as
practical reason. The dimension of understanding is indispensable here.
lioreover, to be seriously concerned with it is necessarily to be involved
with such notions as 'sensibility', 'insight', 'imagination' and 'vision'.
The conceptual links which we have explored give them an essential place
in any account of its functioning. However awkward or embarrassing this
material may prove it is now clear that without it we cannot remedy the
radical defects in the image of the moral life and of man as a moral
agent that is reflected in our philosophy. Some encouragement may be
f'ound in the fact that the general distinction between understanding
and assessment, with the ramifications explored in this chapter, provides
at least the rudiments of a set of conceptual tools for handling it.
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Chanter 10.
'J.1HS UNITY OF }:'ORALITY.
The effect of the discussion so far has been to emphasise
the diversity within the concept of morality. }le have insisted on the
need to make distinctions if the philosophical issues are to be understood.
In the climate of contemporary moral philosophy this emphasis has much
to commend it. The chief obstacle to progress ie a tendency to treat
morality as a more homogeneous concept than it really is. Discussion
then centres on the problem of deciding which of the many individual
accounts that respect this character is correct. It is important to
break the hold of this assumption and our main effort has been directed
to that end. Nevertheless there is a !tanger that,in the process one may
lose sight of the essential unity of the concept. It would be un.:fortunate
to leave the impression that it consists of almost entirely separate and
self-contained parts. Our ordinary use of the concept is compatible with
the view that it is diverse and complicated and an attempt has been made
to account for this. But it also seems to require an assumption that
the diversity is the reflection of unity at some level, that morality
is not a hopelessly incoherent concept. tiemust now try to accommodate
this aspect :II:f:tk±In: of things as \'Tell.In doin.g so we shall have to
deal with such questions as these: what is the precise nature of the
connection between moral understanding and moral assessment?, what is
it that justifies the use of the term 'moral' in each case?, and what
entitles us to regard them as the components of the single concept we
call 'morality'?
There is a connection which is intuitively easy enough to
grasp but is difficult to articulate satisfactorily. It may be introduced
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by noting atTainthe es~ential f'eatures of'understanding and of assessment.
To have moral underst~~ding is to see the world of'human action as
explicable in terms of concepts whdch de:pend on it for their existence.
To ene~,ge in mi:lralassessment is to be guided by considerations of human,
good and harm. Perhaps the connection is best conceived of in terms of
the nature of the boundaries and of what is excluded in each case. Putting
it crudely, one can say tl:atthey are, in their different ways , co-
extensive ''liththe dimension of 'the human': what they exclude is any
appeal to the transcendent, to concepts whose link ''lithit is :purely
external or to interests whibh are thought of as 'above' or 'beyond' the
interests of human beings. One can say that morality is an intellectual
enterprise which accepts the human realm as autonomous and self-containdd
and this is'reflected in a distinctive mode of vision on the one hand
and a dietinctive form of'practical reasoning on the other. These remarks
are true so far as they go. It may even be the case that they contain
the essence of all that needs to be said here. Uevertheless they will
not do as they stand, and this is not merely due to the abstract and
generalised way in which they have had to be formulated. It is not just
a working out of details that is needed. There is a more interesting
explanation of their inadequacy. Even on their own terms there are Borne
awkward phenomena which they f'ail to fit.
The point may be brought out in the following way. It can
be argued that the connection between moral understanding and moral
asr:essment which we have noted is a particular instance of a general
relationship between modes of understanding and systems of assessment.
Thus, for example, a similar pattern may be traced in the case of religion.
The traditional Judaeo-Chrisi;ian version of religious understanding in
which a crucial r~le is played by the concept of 'God' falls, as we have
1seen, outside the range of the moral. Noreover, a sense can be given to
the notion of a system of practical assessment which would be specifically I
religious rather than moral in character. Judgements would fall into
1. See ch.2. above, pp.13-l4.
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this category in so far as they were based on a calculation bf divine
interests and ignoring all other considerationsl some illustrations of
this possibility were given earlie~. Thus there is a point of general
significance involved here. There is a systematic parallelism between
the basic concepts around which modes of understanding revolve and the
sorts of consideration tha.tdetermine the nature of'systems of assessment.
To note this point is to be off'ered a hint as to where our account of the
moral case falls short. It fails to explain ~lhy the components should
be linked in quite the distinctive way that in fact they are. In our
society the functioning of morality is rather diff'erent in this respect
from that of religion. One can characterise the difference in a way that
is adequate for present purposes by saying that in the religious case
understanding and assessment do not cohere with anything like the same
tightness and precision. Understanding al~ne represents a going concern,
and it functions perfectly well without its conceptual twin. Traditional
believers seem content to see the general significance of their lives
as inextricabl~ bound up with the concept of '@od' without allowing
considerations of His interests a distinctive and dominant place in the
making of practical decisions. No· widespeead sense of intellectual
discomfort is felt in connection with this practice. The problem we face
in the case of morality is set by the fact that it must be understood
as containing two entire!y viable components which, taken together,
constitute a highly unified and homogeneous concept. Later we shall
suggest an explanation of this contrast between the religious and the
moral cases. The fact of its existence is what is significant for present
purposes. Although there is some substance in the connection we have
traced between forms of understanding and systems of assessment it fails
to prepare one for the variety that is encountered in practice. Different
ways of combining understanding and assessment can be used without giving
rise to any suspicion of incongruity. To note this serves to give the
link between moral understanding and moral assessment a disturbing air
of' contingency. One would surely have to draw them together more tightly
tha.n this for a. completely convincing account. };Ioregenerally the possib-
ility of theie being various combinations raises in an accute form the
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question of why the elements of morality should combine in just the way
that produces the concept that we in fact have. The source of the diffic-
ulty, one may suspect, is that hitherto the attempt to trace the link
between moral understandine and moral assessment has relied on an
Impor-bant but isolated insight. lIhat is needed at this point is a compre-
hensive and integrated background for it.
The task of providing the background will be approached
by considering the relevance of our general argument to an area which
has traditionally been closely linked with morality. Some of the most
aceute and interesting moral problems arise in connection with the
education of young people. An account of the concept of morality is
bound to have implications here, particularly for the question of moral
education. Hence the discussion should have the useful side-effect of
establishing whether our thesis has any explanatory value in this
conceptually rich and important field. But our main purpose .·dl1be to
use it as a ste~ping stone towards exhibiting the unity of the concept
of morality.
account:'llienone begins to consider the relevance of bid!:n:mu:::qc:t
of morality to education a difficulty arises which it may ba wall to
tackle at once. It sternsfrom the fact that much recent writing is
dominated by a misleading assumption about the relationshi"p between
education and values. The influence of this vie.,.lis pervasive enough to
make one wish to deal \·Iith it directly and eo avoid the risk of it being
an unackn oul.edgedpresenoe in the discussi on. Besides its charm will be
found to depend on the fact that it misrepr4sents a.."l important truth.
To disentangle this element will be a useful step towards a satisfactory
theory. The view we are concerned with may be formulated roughly by
saying that the link between education and values is a conceptual one,
or, to put it another way, that 'education' is itself an evaluative
concept. Though common enough in the literature such claims are EaX
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not easy to assess. In part this is because they have achieved such a
degree of'acceptance that supporters seem to f'eelno need to supply
arguments in their favour. r.~oreover,they tend to be piched at a level
of'abstraction that makes it hard to see What sorts of consideration
could possibly tell for or against. In view of these difficulties it is
convenient to be able to refer to the account given by R.B.Peters in
Ethics and Education.l It offers reasons rather than blank assertion and,
by spelling out some implications of the claim, enables one to bring
discussion of it to a manageable level. This is, on other grounds, a
suitable work to examine. It gives an account of the concept of education
which deserves to be taken very seriously. },;oreover,it would probably
not be unfair to suggest that its in~luence foes a long way to explain
the populari tJ' of the view wi th which we are concerned.
Pepers states the general claitJiin this ,.,ay:'''Education''
implies that sonething worthwhile is being or has been intentionally
trazwmi tted in a morally acceptable manner'. He goes on: 'It would be
a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he
had in no ...ray changed for the better, or that in educating his son a
man was attempting nothing what was worthwhile,.2 This statement deserves
close attention. Peters offers it as a self-contained illustration of a
general theme and then carries straight on with the main line of'argument.
Thus, the context offers little or no guidance as to how the claim should
be interpreted: it stands or falls on its own merits. In order to bring
the issues as sharply into focus as :possible we shall begin. by concentra-
tine on one aspect of it; the reference to the man educating his son.
The cLadrn to be considered is this: 'It would be a logical contradiction
to say that in educating his son a man was attemptizgnothin.g that was
worthwhile'. To begin uith it should be noted that there is an element
of ambiguity here. This has little interest in itself and would not be
worth mentioning but for the fact that it may have some general signif'icance,
2. lli.<.!. p.25
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For on one interpretation what Peters sa~s is almost certainly true,
though, as we shall,see, this has no implications for the concept of
education. On another interpretation it is equally certainly false. It
is tempting to point to this ambivalence as one source of the plausibility
of the claim.
The situation arises in the following way. There seems to
be a fairly straightforward distinction to be made between 'wbat is
worthwhile' on the one hand and 'the transmission of what is worthwhile'
on the other. It would surely be unreasonable to insist that every attempt
to pass on what is worthwhile must itself be regarded as worthwhile. In
general this would presumably not be the case where the attempt is 'bound
to fail at great cost, or where it can only lead to results that are
the opposite of those intended. Although a love and appreciation of Bach
may well be worthwhile an attempt to get a tone-deaf child to share it
might bot. It would surely not be worthwhile if the only result is to
turn his indifference into active hostility. l,le can distinguish, it seems,
between judging the worthwhileness of the activity of trying to transmit
something and judging the worthwhi1eness of the content of what is
transmitted. Thus, there are two things that might be said about the man
educating his son. The first is that his efforts l-Terenot worthwhile
where this has no implications for the value of the material he is
concerned with. If one takes what Peters says in a literal way this
seems to be the most reasonable interpretation of tbe statement he
wishes to reject. It may well be agreed that it involves something
rather like a logical contradiction. The other claim is that what the
man is trying to pa.ss on is not itself worthwhile. This is the interpre-
tation to which Peters is more firmly committed by virtue of his general
position. It will be argued that if the statement is taken in this way
there is nothing contradictory about it. Let us consider each version
in turn.
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On the first interpretation the claim might be formulated
in this way: it would be a logical contradiction to say that a man's
attempt to educate his son was not in MY way worthwhile. To help in
as~essing it we shall have to ask some questions that may seem almost
facetious but have a serious put-poae, ~jould it be a logical contradiction
to say t~4t a man's attempt to educate his daughter was not in any way
worthwhile? The history of girls education would surely reveal many who
were prepared to make just this claim. No doubt their vievrs were wrong-
headed or obnoxious but it seems hard to maintain that they were incoher-
ent. Indeed it might be difficult to make senseof the history on this
assumption. The opposition to girls education was formidable :precisely
because it was not open to refutation on :purely logical grounds. Would
it be a logical contradiction to assert that there was nothing worthwhile
about a man's attem:pt to educate his mother, or commanding officer, or
next-door neighbour. Surely, so far from involving any logical difficulty,
the advice to abstain from such attempts on the grounds of tbeir lack of
worthwhileness would be eminently sensible. It seems that when we begin
to consider persons other than the man's son the charge of logival
contradiction may become implausible. This is odd as the contradiction
is supposed to stem directly from the nature of the concept of education.
Why should it make a difference who the benificiaries of the man's
educating zeal happen to be? To raise this question is surely to begin
to doubt whetter there can be a conceptual point about education involved
here. Yet the fact remains that, as originally formulated with reference
to the man's son, Peters assertion is difficult to dispute. Indeed it may
well strike one as almost certainly correct. How is this to be accounted
for?
Let us consider the formula: it would be a logical contradic-
tion to assert that A's attempt to educate X was not worthwhile. Some
Bubstitutes for X produce an assertion that seems obviously incorrect;
for instance,'his mother' or 'his va.let'. llith others the result is
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considerably ~ore plausible; for instance where X is replaced by 'his
son'. Uhat distinguishes those values which lead to acceptable results
from those which do not? A plausible sUGgestion is that the claim is
legitimate only where X is a person related in such a way to A that A
has a responsibility for his education. The standard case arises when X
is A's son. Taking up this hint one might generalise the contention in
the following way, it would be a logical contradiction to assert that
a man's attempt to educate someone for Whose education he had a responsi-
bility was not in any way worth~'1hile.This statement is surely plausible
enough. Yet the impression of contradictoriness is adequately accounted
for by the conceptual links between the notions of worthwhileness and
of discharging responsibilities. Doing one's duty is always worthwhile
in one respect at least; that is, in so far as what one does is one's
duty. It would also be a contradiction to assert that a man's attempts
to punish or indoctrinate those whom he had a duty to punish or indoctrin-
ate \orerenot in any way worthwhile. Clearly, the possibility of arriving
at a contradiction by this route indicates nothing Hhatever about the
concept of education. In particular, it has no tendency to show that
it has worthwhileness, as it were, built-in. Nevertheless, the fact th~t
one interpretation of Peters does produce a genuine contradiction is of
general significance here. It is hard not to believe that it goes some
way towards explaining the initial plausibility of what he says.
The sevond interpretation presents us with this claims it
would be a logical contradiction to assert that in educating his son a
man was trying to transmit nothing that was worthwhile. Here worthwhileness
is t~~en to characterise the sUbject-matter rather than the man's attempts
at being an educator. The nature of the concept of education is assumed
to be such that in accepting the description' educatin.g his son' one is
already committed to valuing the content of what is passed on.•lIence the
contradiction is seen as arising in a perfectly straightforward way: it
is being simultaneously affirmed and denied that somethin.g is worthwhile.
At this point we reach the core of the thesis which is our main concern.
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The difficulty is to see how this central contention may be rationally
discussed. For the situation which was avoided earlier begins to threaten
again. The risk is one of becoming involved in an interminable round of
claims and counter-claims which rest only on rival intuitions about usage.
However, hopes of avoiding stalemate are raised by another feature of
the general thesis developed in "Sthics and Education. This is the connec-
tion that is established between the concept of education and the achieve-
cent of certain kinds of knowledge and understanding.l Perhaps we may
find here a l'layof coming to grips with the elusive doctrine that
education is an evaluative concept. Our pur-pose in exploring this :possib-
ility is not simply to expose a source of tension in Peters's account.
Since the argument will depend on accepting that what he says about
knowledge and understanding is substantially correot, and indeed goes
right to the heart of the concept of education, its conclusion will have
a :perfectly general significance. Because Peters is right beout the links
between education and certain kinds of knowledge and understanding it
follows that education is not an evaluative conce:pt.
In order to work with as much detail as possible we shall
concentrate on a particular element in Peters's case. He argues convinci~
ngly that one of the criteria for the central uses of the term 'education'
is supplied by what he calls 'cognitive perspective'. The notion is
introduced in this way. He suggests that a man might be highly trained
in the eminently worthwhile activity of science, be devoted to it and
have a good grasp of its :principles, and yet we might refuse to call
him an educated man. The question is what could be lacking in such a
case. Feters answers:
'It is surely a lack of what might be called "cognitive perspective".
The man could have a very limited conception of what he is doing.
He could work away at science without seeing its connection with
much alse, its place in a coherent patter~ of life. For him it is
an activity which is cognitively adrift'.
He toes on to point out that the popularity of tha slogan 'education is
of the whole man' bears witness to the 'conceptual connection between
1. See esp. ch.l. sec.3. 2. ~.£i!. p.3l.
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"education" and seeing what is being done in a perspective that is not
too limited'. 1 This is surely a persuasive argument and we shall accept
that it succeeds in establishing its conclusion. The procedure to be used
now is quite simple. The flilrststep is to offer reminders of the possibi-
lity of sincere and intelligent people holding views which attach little
or no importance to cognitive pers?ective. Indeed on certain presupposit-
ions it might be seen as a positive evil. lioreover, it may be argued,
its nature is such as to contaminate everything in.towhich it enters as
an essential ingredient: it is the fly that always ruins the ointment.
Hence in so far as education is necessarily COncerned with acquiring
cognitive perspective it can involve the transmission of nothing that
is worth1.yhile.1n so far as possession of cognitive perspective is essen-
tial to the state of being educated the achievement of that state must
be regarded as thoroughly undesirable. Of course, to make such claims
is to reveal one's substantive commit.ments: our contention is that to
deny them is to do so too. That is, the connection between education and
worthwhi1eness can only be established by a normative judgement, not by
conceptual analysis. The view that the link is necessary seems to derive
much of its force from a readiness to accept a restricted view of the
data. It should prove difficult to maintain once their diversity has
been realised. :1hat is needed is not so much straightforward philosophical
argument but rather the pointing out of neglected facts. Such a procedure
must derive its force from the weight of accumulated detail. The full
effect is perhaps impossible to achieve within our present limits but
enough &flI been done to convey a sense of its persuasiveness.
The various kinds of opposition to cognitive perspective
may be classitied in terms of whichever aspect is singled out for partic-
ular attention. The categories that this gives rise to will overlap
rather than be rigidly exclusive. Nevertheless some general tendencies
are easy to discern. One possibility is that criticism may focus on what
is taken to be the excessive rationalism of the cognitive perspective
thesis. The objection is to its emphasis on grasping connections between
1. ~. p.32.
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activities and mapping their relationships within some overall pattern
of living. This may se~m to allow too large a role for diocursive thought
to suit so~e people. Such an attitude ~ay be found in, for instance,
the writings of D.lI.Lawrence. The distinctive feature of the position is
its irrationality: basically the objection is to the very notion of
trying to form a reflective and comprehensive view of one's activities.
There is a related but more formidable line of criticism which one
associates ...ith pe ople whose main interests are religi ous or aesthetic.
In such cases the objection is to the degree of sophistication whd ch the
noticn of cognitive perspective implies. It involves, it may be said,
an excessively abstract way of a~prehending experience, the erection of
a screen of theory between ourselves and the world. As against this,
attention is drawn to the virtues of simplicity, directness, freslmess
of vision, 'the innocent eye' and so on. Thus we are told that salvation
depends on us becoming as little children. Poetw and artists warn of the
dangers of losing sight of the particular and tho concrete. It may be
said that in coming to see how things are connected together one is
prevented from seeing anything as it really is, in its unique, individual
existence. Significantly, rn~y who incline to such a view seem implicitly
to agree \Olith Peters in taking breadth of perspective as the mark of the
educated man. \-Therethey differ is in regarding its possessi:on as
undesirable. Their remedy is in line with whaf one might expect. It
consists in rigding ourselves of the burden. of our education. and recover-
ing the vision of the world which we are supposed to have enjoyed before
it'tTas so painfully acquired. FinallY,one might mention views which
stress for practical purposes the value of total absorbtion in an activity.
It may be felt that the kind of distancing needed :hE to see it in.a wide
perspective must mru{e one a less effective participant. Hhat is sought
instead is the intensity that comes through a deliberate narrowing of
the field of vision. Perhaps the most obvious examples are provided by
people whose interests are mainly political. It would, for instance, be
difficult to combine cognitive perspective with following Lenin's advice
to 'live, eat and breathe' revolution, and this, of course, finds no
shortage of takers.
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The conclusion to be drawn is that some ways of in.terpreting
human activities have no place for cognitive perspective: on the contrary
they value what might be called 'cognitive narrowness'. They include a
number of familiar and well-established modes of thought. It would surely
be difficult to argue that all this opposition is incoherent, that to
deny the worthwhileness of cognitive perspective is to be involved in
contradictions. At any rate there is no evidence that Peters would wish
to hold anything of the sort. Thus, he would have to admit that one can
without any logical blunder regard cognitive perspective as a positive
evil and insist that anything that includes it as an in.tegral part must
be an evil alsol Hence this is true of education in SO far as it necessar-
ily involves cognitive perspective, and Peters has made a convincing case
for the view that it does. For someone who rejects that case it may be
useful to state the position we have reached in a different way. This
will have the incidental advantage of throwing some light on the struoture
of the argument. One might see it as being concerned to present a dilemna.
One can insist on the neoessity of the links either between education
and what is worthwhile or between education and cognitive perspective.
But one cannot have both) for there is no logical difficulty about denying
that cognitive perspective is worthvlhile. Hence it may be dended that
anything into which it enters as an essential element can be worthwhile.
The dilemna may be stated in a more general form. Someone who wishes to
give an account of the concept of education is free to treat it as
'evaluative', as having worthlihileness built-in. But it then becomes
impossible for him to give the notion any further substance '-lhatever.
Alte natively he may try to explain it by specifying the substantive
criteria governing its use. The prLce to be paid now is the abandomment
of the claim that it contains an evaluative element. Apart altogether
from the reasons there are for holding that education is necessarily
tied to oognitive perspective, there could surely be little difficulty
about the choice in practice. One could hardly rest content with remarking
on the evaluative role of the term 'education' while attempting no further
characterisation of it. To do so would give rise to the odd suggestion
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that it might rival 'good' as the most general term of commendation.
One is left therefore \vith the second alternative. ~·lliatevercriteria are
s:pecified it will be open to anyone to regard them as ones :i:x whd ch it
would be undesirable to try to realise and to view any state of affairs
in which they are realised as being unfortunate. Nor is this a remote
and merely theoretical :possibility. In the :particular case of education
it seems inevitable that any list of criteria that is at all :plausible
will be anti:pathetic to well-established systems of belief. Thus, many
people will hold that there are good reasons for regarding the conditions
which give substance to our concept of education as ones which ought
never to be satisfied, and that whatever is transmitted in the course
of trying to satisfy them cannot be worthwhile. Of course, others will
be inclined to make a different assessment. But their :position also will
u'ltimately be grounded on a normative committment, not on the nature of
the concepts involved. Nothing is lost by recognising this. Indeed to
someone who is concerned with education as something worthwhile it may
well seem a pity that this allegiance should be obscured under the guise
of a conceptual point. He may think that his values are quite capable of
standing on their own teet. Besides failure to see that the connection
between education and what is worthwhile has to be made by a ncrmative
judgement may have unfortunate consequences in practice. The comfortable
belief that the value of education is somehow grounded in the nature of
our concepts may make it difficult to appreciate how feN people care
about it at all. Besides it may lead to underestimating the opposition
which one is forced to !1ecognise. One may see it as merely a sym:pton of
intellectual muddle, and, hence, not worthy at serious consideration,
~ather than the formidable outcome of clear-headed error. Failure to
grasp this point must suret,y reduce the effectiveness of one's support
for what is valuable.
A number of points remain to be clarified before any
lessons can be drawn from this discussion. It has been argued that there
a.reno conceptua.l links between education and worthwhileness. But the
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opposite view has been widely accepted and it seems desirable to be
able to account for its plausibility. Perhaps it will be found to contain
an element of truth that is significant for our purposes. Besides the
discussion is incomplete in another way. It has been suggested here that
What Peters says about the cognitive aspects of 'education' succeeds in
identifying some of its essential features. One might now ask l-lhatneeds
to be added for a complete account. Eis remarks about knowledge and
understandint may be correct within their limits but it would be surprising
if so elusive and :perplexing a concept as llducation 1'1erecompletely
captured in the~. This point is connected with the previous one. It may
be that the charm of talk about in-built worthwhileness is due to the
fact that it seems to supply what is missing. Thus, we have to supplement
Peters's criteria: of know'ledge and understanding for a complete account
of the concept of education, and justive must be done to any genuine
insights that may underlie the concern with worthwhileness. It would be
agreeably neat and economical if these demands could be satisfied together.
One attraction of the view that education has v.!orthwhileness
built-in is its value as a tool of argument. It enables one to dispose
of some rather unprofitable controversies. There is, for instance, the
confusion that often surrounds talk about 'aims' inr::connectionwith
education. Sometimes at least this may be construed as a request that
the point or purpose of education should be explicated in terms of an
extrinsic goal. Peters deals with this by remarking that 'as "education"
implies the transmission of what is of ultimate value it would be like
asking about the purpose of the good life.' Besides, in so far as things
like science and carpentry are regarded 'as part of someone's education
they are regarded ipso facto as having value,.l Thus one advantage of
treating education as an evaluative concept is that it enables one to
cut through the fog surrounding the notion of 'aims'. One can say with
Feters that much of the confusion comes about 'through extracting the
normative feature built into the concept of education as an extrinsic
2end' • The attractions of thi:sargument are obvious t but as liehave
1• ..!.£i!!. p.29. 2. ~. 1'.27.
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denied that education has any in-built normative features lie are debarred
from using it. It may help to advance the discussion of one looks for
an alternative ..lay of dealing \1ith the problems it disposes of so
efficiently.
One may note to begin with that~PeterlJ's hostility to any
kind of 'instrumental' or 'utilitarian' view.of education has a good deal
of support in the philosophical literature. It is often felt that the
attempt to locate the point of the educational process in some external
goal is inimical to the spirit which should animate it and the social
and intellectual climate which it needs in order to flourish. Eesides
it may be thought that to view the content of education exclusively
from this angle is to be condemned to miss its point. To value eduaational
activities solely fOD the changes they bring about in the world is to
fail to see what they really have to offer. Thus, in the course of a
general attack on 'utilitarianism' in education, Alisdair f!a.clntyre
remarks that, 'Above all the task of education is to teach the value of
Iactivity done for its own sake'. A.Phillips Griffiths regards it as an
essential feature of universities that in them 'subjects are pursued
as ends in themselves,.2 It is obvious enough that in spite of verbal
differences Peters, lr-acIntyreand Griffi the are united on what they see
as the essential point that needs to be made about education. There can
be still less doubt that they would agree in identifying the forces
hostile to it. The difficulty is to formulate their basic insight in
a.satisfactory way. One can hardly fail to be struck by the similarities
between the versions they offer and the attempts to characterise the
3 .moral point of view that we earlier considered and rejected. The
objections that proved decisive then are relevant once more. Difficulties
arose when we tried to spell out what could be meant by talk of activities
which are 'end~ in themselves' or 'constitute their own end'. The
~.1. 'Against Utilitarianism', in Aims in Education, ed T.H.B.Hollins,
Manchester Un iversity Press, 1964, see p.21.
2. 'A Deduction of Universities' in Philosophical Analysis and Education,
ed. R.D.Archambault, Routledge and Kagan·Paul, London, 1965, seep.200.
3. ca.r. above.
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discussion developed into a general criticism of attempts to state the
position in terms of the notion of 'ends'and its inseparable, though
sometimes silent,cornpa.nion'means'. There are many activities which
cannot readily be captured in such a net. They include some which may
be thought of as distinctively 'human' and, it may now be added, as
highly relevant to education. It is, for instance, only at the cost of
some distortion that one can describe the activity of listening to music
'"'-
in these terms. There is an additional difficulty in the case of education.
It arises from the temptation to explain the point involved here by
speaking of activities which are 'pursued for their own.sake'. This is
itself not altogether perspicuous, and an obvious way to interpret it is
in terms of the notion of what is 'intrinsically worthwhile'. It might•
then be sup,osed that a concern with activities which have intrinsic x
worthwhileness represents a basic conceptual feature of education. Thus
we arrive back at Peters's position and become liable to the objections
that were discussed above. A conclusion of a somewhat negative kind may
be drawn at this point. It is that one should try to formumate the basic
insight about education without involving the idea of value or the category
of 'ends and means'. Perhaps the reference to the account of moral
understanding can provide a clue to the way ahead. The analogies are
sufficiently striking to suggest that perhaps there is some sort of
conceptual link betl'leeneducation and what we have called ~the moral
point of view'. Let us see how this idea might be developed.
What is ccmmon-rt o the educational philosophers we have
mentioned is the desire to warn against 'external' or 'instrumental'
views. Their tone conveys the impression that they feel themselves to
be up against a common error, that in the ca.seof education it is all
too easy to find oneself on the outside looking in. This in turn suggests
that education is a self-contained world and one bound within fairly
narrow limits. We shall work towards a less metaphorical way of speakin.g
by considering the form of discourse that is appropriate to this world
and, in particular, the kind of rational argument that it makes available.
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~{hat,for instance, would count as an educational reason for studying
history? It may be easier to begin by saying what, on the position \<le
are considering, would be excluded. Obviously it \<1i1lnot do to cite
considerations that involve treating the study of history as a means to
dome external goal. Thus if someone were to defend his interest in it
by saying that he hoped to establish his tight to a legacy, or obtain
material for political propAganda he would not be offering educational
reasons. He cannot, one might say, be considering the study of history
from an educational point of view. It might be thought that to exclude
any approach of this kind is to leave oneself with a fairly restricted
range of possibilities. Uevertheless it is easy to suggest ones that
will qualify.For instance it might be said that a reason for studying
history is to increase hiztorical understan.ding. Of' course, if one is
pressed to say more, perhaps by way of explicating the point of having
historical understanding, one may soon have to give up dealing in educat-
ional reasons. It may be impossible to satisfy one's questione~ while
keeping within the limits they impose. Thus, it 1S characteristic of
educational discourse that in it the giving of reasons comes to a stop
with a peculiar sort of abruptness. ~f.hatis distinctive about the reasons
one is left with is that they fail to establish any point of reference
outside the activities they justify. As the example of historical study
shows they do little more than redescribe the activity, But these are
precisely the complaints levelled against the kind of reasons that are
1acceptable to the moral point of view. It seems that educational reasons,
like moral reasons, are forced to rely on concepts that are parasitic on
the activities they relate to. The link may be made stronger by taking
up the reference to the notion of an 'educational point of view'. One
can now say that to see activities from the educational point of view
is to see their significance as inherent in their nature and n.otdependent
on any external goal or purpose. That is, the educational and the moral
points of view operate, as it were, fDom the same position in conceptual
space though they are focused on different regions of it. Perhaps it
would be still nearer the truth to say that the educational point of view
is the moral point of view as it relates to the distinctive activities
1. See ch.1 above, pp.6-8.
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and processes that belong to education.
This conclusion has far-r~aching implications for the
philosophy of education. To trace them in detail would be outside our
scope. Nevertheless, one of the purposes of this discussion was to reveal
something of the explanatory value of our general thesis in a new area.
1'1eshall have to concentrate attention on a single aspect if it, 'but
this should be enough to establish the main point. Public discussion of
education tends from time to time to be invaded by slogans which are
fel t, often in a confused way, to represent important truths. Mention
was made earlier of an example given by Peters, 'education is of the
whole man'. We are now in a position to see the significance of anbther
member of this group, 'all education is moral education'. There is a
genuine insight struggling to find expression here. But in practice it
has often been confused with some fairly dubious hypotheses. The element
of truth behind the slogan does not consist in the fact that education
is, or should be, a training in moral assessment. still less that it should
always be accompanied by homilies, or the drawing of 'morals'. It is not
even accounted for by the rather more plausible claim that all education
has a moral purpose, in that its ultimate aim is to produce good men or
good citizens. These extrinsic goals are as foreign to the spirit of it
as is the desire to produce lfrage-slavesor fanatical adherents of a
party line. We are now in a position to appreciate the genuine insight
behind the slogan. It is that to be educated is to be introduced to
the possibilities afforded by moral understanding. This may be achieved
by concentrating initially on subjects such as mathematics and history
whose suitabi~Y on grounds of intrinsic interest and inexhaustible
resources has long been recognised. The task of the educator is to bring
his students to see the business of engaging with them from the educational
point of view, to appreciate it for reasons which have nothing to do with
the results it may achieve in the world. The lesson of padagogic tradition
and of ordinary experience is that this is impossible without enlisting
emotions and wills as well as intellects. In practice a grasp of the
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educational point of view is usually conjoined with devotion to some
particular discipline. The significance of achieving it is that the
student now knows what it is like to view some of his activities in the
light of morality. The first vital step by which he is brought on the
inside of this mode of understanding has been taken. It remains for him
to enlarge his moral vision by bringing other activities within its
scope. Thus the surface content of a lesson in moral education may be
drawn from cooking or astronomy: what gives it moral significance is
its place in the process by which a distinctively moral way of viewing
the world is transmitted. Education, one can say, is that part of the
institution of morality which is concerned with ensuring its perpetuation.
There is, finally, one other feature of educational discussion which
we are now in a position to appreciate. It is routine for commentators
to stress such points as the significance of the personal factor, the
relative unimportance of direct instruction, the fact that the most
en~uring rewards of an education often seem. to be picked up inadvertently.
It is difficult to account for these factors if one thinks of education
as primarily a matter of acquiDing knowledge or mastering a technique.
They become intelligible when one realises that its essential purpose
is to comnunicate a way of looking at the world, a mode of vision. For
this is something that a person cannot be bullied, cajoled, or reasoned
into. Its acquisition is bound to be a somewhat haphazard affair in that
there can be no formulas guaranteed to give success. Fut there can be
rules of thumb,and perhaps the safest is that the moral point of view
is most likely to be acquired from someone who has it already. An aware-
ness of this underlies the concern with personal relationships and the
widespread recognition that the best teacher is the one with a disinteres-
ted devotion to his subject. For his practice will exemplify in the most
vivid way the charm of that mode of understanding which it is the business
of education to transmit.
At this point we shall return to our main purpose of us~ng
th9 discussion of education as a means of demonstrating the unity of
&
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morality. The course which the discussion has taken has been largely
determined by the wish to sUP:9lement what Peters says about the cognitive
aspects of education. It was argued that while there is a necessary link
between education and loJ'hathe calls 'cognitive perspective', there is
nothing conceptually odd about refusing to value either of them. On the
contrary it was suggested that hostility to cognitive perspective is
susnicioncharacteristic of some familiar ways of viewing the world. The ~t:%rli::Elll
naturally arises that perhaps some fairly coherent set of ideas and
attitudes may underlie the support for it. It is easy to accept that this
is indeed the case and, when one takes into account the tone and content
of :peters's remarks as well as the nature of the opposition, a convenient
label comes readily to mind. Concern with cognitive perspective is surely
typical of the outLeete of 'liberal humanism'. Another reference to
education may help to underline the point of this suggestion. Cognitive
perspective is an essential feature of the concept and, in addition tit
is now being claimed that it represents a distinctiVely liberal humanist
attachment. If this is correct it ,..ould follow that in so :far as one
values ed.ucation one is subscribing to a liberal humanist view of things.
That some connection of this kind does exist is well regogniaed in
discussions of the subject. The history of education would provide ample
evidence for the claim that people who may conventionally be described
as'liberal humanists' have been greatly -concerned with its advancement.
The contemporary situation suggests a similar conflusion. No doubt there
are many I>Tarxistsand religious believers who have a genuine attachment
to education. But that merely testifies to the dbminance of liberal
humanist values in this area. Nothing in.the nature of their official
views would lead them to attach any intrinsic significance whatever to
it. On the contrary, what would seem to be Dequired is that their attitude
~RiX should fluctuate according to whether it proves instrumentally
valuable for promoting the revolution or the power of the Church. In our
attempt to apply the distinction between moral and non-moral forms of
1understanding it was found convenient to make use of the term 'humanism'.
It was employed in a wide sense which, roughly speaking, embraced any
view of the world that refUsed to see its significance in religious terms.
1. See above, ch.2.
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Hence we were able to deal with the intellectual fortunes of l!arxism and
of Darwinianism under the same general heading. The discussion of educat-
ion has led us to include still more within the category of 'humanism':
we would now wish to speruc of it as being rationalistic ,and individualistic
as \iell as merely secular in character. It was shown earlier that both
l:arxists and Dar\vinians can be distributed between the moral and the non-
moral camps. It may be useful to inquire whether this is true of liberal
humanism also. It would be easy to illustrate the moral version from
any contemporary journal of organised humanism. The non-moral case however
presents the same difficulty as was encountered earlier. Because of what
appears to be a general movement from non-moral to moral forms of unders-
tanding it is difficult to refer to recent examples. But it is easy
enough to see what, in principle, would constitute one: suppose that
someone were to hypostatise 'Reason' or 'Liberty' and treat them as
members of an autoDomou8 realm of flatonic entities. Some representatives.
of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment perhaps come closest to exemplify-
ing this possibility. At any rate the mention of it is enough to establish
the conceptual point that the distinction between the moral and the non-
moral can be drawn with liberal humanism also. Hence to recoenise this
viewpoint calls for no fundamental change in OUD concept of 'humanism'.
It merely enriches it by bringing important new material within its
scope.
Nevertheless it must be admitted that the category which
is being denoted by the term ~humanism' is unsatisfactory in a number
of respects. For one thing it embraces a considerable diversity of views,
including representatives from each side of what would otherwise be
thought of as the quite fundamental distinction between the moral and
the non-moral. Besides its identity has to be defined in a negative way,
in terms of its exclusion of any kind of religious outlook. We remarked
earlier on the 'conventional· nature of the category and on the fact that
ascriptions to it are made 'loosely,.l It is now time to draw out the
implications of these hints and begin to refin.e the concept of 'humanism'.
1. See above, p.13.
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Essentially this will be achieved by getting rid of its non-moral
elements. ~~eshall argue for a close conceptual link between morality
and a body of ideas and attitudes that may be called 'humanist' in a
somewha~ technical, but perfectly appropriate, sense. A useful hint is
provided by the example of moral assessment, that method of assessment
whicn is founded ultimately on considerations of human good and harm.
Its connection with the idea of k 'humanism' is obviou~ enough. If a
person sa.ino reasons for taking such considerations into account, and
instead gave priority to accentuating the elements of order in the world
or to serving the interests of supernatural beings who spoke to him in
dreams, it would be hard to see what SUbstance could be conceded to his
claim to be a 'humanist'. Noral a.ssessment is the natural expression of
a humanist outlook in the sphere of practical reasoning. It must consti-
tute a common element between our did category of humanism and any
possible refinement of it we might Hish to suggest while retaining the
name. But the transition from the one to the other has a more complex
aspect. The discussion of education has served its purpose in putting
us on the track of the insights needed to complete this account of
morality. But it still has a directly useful part to play in exploring
the relationships between the two kinds of humanism. For each may be
said to 'overlap' with it, though, significantly, the common ground is
different in the two cases. The 'old' humanism overlaps with the feature
of cognitive perspective and the new with 'the educational point of view',
which 1s identical in the sense already described with the viewpoint of
morality. The pattern of relationships here is a complicated one. It is
worth noting, in particular, that a person may be a 'humanist' in either
sense without valuing education as a whole, for he may regard one or
other of its components as a positive evil. Besides he may be convinced
of th~ worthwhileness of education and yet it would be misleading to
call him a 'humanist'. For in so far as he operates any systematic mode
of practical assessment it may be of an aesthetid or religious, rather
than moral character. The lesson so far as the concep-t of education is
concerned is that its complexity prevents it from being the inevitable
~
accompantment of any particular world-view. This does not affect the
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usefulness of the concept for present purposes. One might describe its
role in metaphorical terms by comparing it to a bridge between two
countries which is half owned by each. It werves the funftion of connecting
them while it cannot be assigned in its entirety to either. In what is
perhaps an analogous way the concept of education has eased our transition
from the 'old' to the 'new' humanism while retaining its identity and
independence. Its staKe in that concept is part of what gives each its
'humanist' character. In this fact lies the source and explanation of
the general connection between humanism and education which has been
widely recognised in discussions of these matters.
So far we have been considering suggestions which, however-
useful as guides, must in themselves be inconclusive. The essential points
may now be made quite simply. Noral assessment is necessarily tied to
human interests while moral understanding takes the world of human actions
to be autonomous and self-justifying. It was suggested earlier that the
adoption of individual codes of assessment may be regarded as a half-way
stage in the development of individual morality.l We are now in a position
to set this remark in a wider perspective. To stop at assessment creates
a sense of incompleteneBs because it suggests a failure of nerve or of
insight at a crucial stage. The primacy for human claims for decision-
making has been accepted b~t the larger significance of actions continues
to be located in external sources such as divine purposes or the laws
of history. The natural course of development has been arrested because
of a loss of confidence in the possibilities afforded by human existence,
or an inability to see what is intimated by the steps already taken. To
complete the process there has to be a resolve to trust the world of
human o..&tivitiesto generate its own distinctive kind of significance
and a refusal to allow that it needs any supplement whatever from outside.
That is, moral understanding must be developed as well as moral assessment.
:lhenthis stage is reached a person's code of assessment may be described
AS 'humanist' because it takes human interests to be fundamental in
practical reasoning, while his mode of understanding is 'huma.nist'because
1. See ch.5. esp. pp.78-88-
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it confines itself to the human framework in achieving its ends. r,lorality ,
one may say, is a distinctively humanist institution in the sense that
it is an expression of complete confidence in the resources made available
by human existence. If one takes morail assessment and moral understanding
together they may now be seen.as a systematic response to an important
aspect of experience. The unity of morality consists essentially in the
fact that it is a coherent and comprehensive attempt to deal \d th the
intellectual problems ra.ised by the wor-Ld of action.
In suggesting the term 'humanism' for this body of ideas
and attitudes one is no doubt departing fo some extent from conventional
usage. Of course it may be said that, provided one grasps the significance
of what is being referrod to~the labele hardly matter. Certainly it would
ba unwise to pretend. that anything vital hinges on the particular one
we have chosen. Nevertheless it is highly suitable for the purpose and
one would be reluctant to give it up. It conveys very well the distinctive
nature of the enterprise and its use cab be given a persuasive rationale.
Let us therefore consider in mora detail how great a strain would be put
on conventional usage by retaining it. This line of enquiry will have
the additional advantage of enabling us to tie up some loose ends left
over from the discussion. Perhaps the most obvious point of difference
is that while there is some tendency for the conventional use of the
term to be associated partifularly \iith a aecu'lar- view of the lvorld ours
would include 'humanised' versions of religious belief. It has already
been shotVn that some forms of religious understanding come within the
I
realm of the moral. It was also remarked tha.t even a superficial acquain-
tance with the evidence indicated that in this area a general transition
from the non-~oral to the moral has characterised the last century or so.
At the very least the investigations entitled us to suggest that it
might be re~arding to approach the data with this hypothesis in mind.
i/eshall n ow try to complete the picture by considerin.g the case of moral
assessment. The vi tal :points to be made are conce:ptual ones, but as
before we shall try to make them more vivid by drawing in an uncontroversd.al
1. See ch.2. pp.14-l9.
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l-Tayon the history of ideas.
The first point to be made is that the use of 'ihat one
might call a distinctively religious style of practica.l assessment does
seem to belong to forms of religious belief that have reached their
most characteristic stage of development outside of modern Europe. The
idea of a deity whose ways are inscrutable and whose wishes must be met
whatever the cost in human·terms is familiar enough in the Old Te~ent.
It is present in, for instance, the story of Job and of Abraham's
attempted sacrifice of Isaac. In some of its forms at least the practice
of human sacrifiee may be seen as an extreme expression of the l-Tillingness
to put divine interests first. It is surely reasonable to associate this
practice with the more primitive varieties of r4ligious belief. One
might argue that in the evolution from religious to moral styles of
assessment the advent of Christianity marks an important s:kage. Thus, it
may be said,that the fundamental idea of 'incarnation' represents a
coming together of the divine and the human in an entirely new way.
!(oreover, some of the sayings of Christ seem to point forward unmistakably:
'The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath', 'Inasmuch
as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have
done it unto me', and, of course, 'Love thy neighbour'. No doubt the
later history of Christianity did not always live up tb the promise of
these remarks. But in the modern period, at least among more sophisticated
believers, attachlTlentto an.ything one could call a distinctively religious
mode of assessment has not had a prominent place. For the sense of tension
between divine and human. interests in the making of practical decisions
has lost much of its urgency. Instead there is a tendency to emphasise
that the promotion of human welfare is the form that God's purposes
take in the world. Thus, the possibility of a con£lict of interests is
removed: ~erving one's neighbour is what coun.ts as serving God. And,
significantly in the present context, the notion of 'Christian humanism'
is acceptable in a way that Would have seemed at least paradoxical at
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oast periods in the past. Perhaps at this point we may bring to an end
the attempt to pick out some uncontroversial elements from a particular
theme in,the development of religious belief. Enough has been said to
suggest that the his~orical background of the contemporary situation
incorporates a movement from the non-moral to the moral in the case of
assessment as well as understanding. That this should be so fits in with
the claim that moral understanding and moral assessment constitute a
single, coherent intellectual structure. Moreover our historical common-
places have the effect of suggesting that the developmen.t of moral versions
of assessment preceded that of moral understanding. Putting the poi~t in
the crude terms to which the enquiry has limited us, it can be said that
a crucial step for one was taken.with the advent of Christianity, while
the other had to await the post-medieval period in Europe. However much
an historian of ideas might wish to refine this chronology it seems
unlikely that the order of sequence could be altered. ""thistoo is what
our general argument would lead one to expect. If one thinks of the whole
process in terms of the development of mans'" self-confidence, the
willingness to give priority to human interests in practical reasoning
falls naturally into place as a preliminary step. It is in itself a
significant achievement and it points the way forward to the next stage
in which the elements that are constitutive of un.derstanding ~e made
to correspond. Thus at the heart of the development of what we have
called 'humanism' there is an intelligible inner process, a movement
of ideas. \f.henthe stage of moral assessment has been reached the ~logic
of the situation' drives one on to moral understanding. It is the working
out of what is intimated by the progress already made and of what would
be demarlded by the free play of ideas. In modern Europe, with many
exceptions and set-baCks, the life of the mind has on the whole been a
allowed the freedom to take this natural course. But there is nothing
inevitable here. The development of our concept of morality conforms to
a rational pattern but the process as a whole remains contingent and
vulnerable. It is always liable to be arrested or reversed by forces x
which have little regard for the operations of reason, and this is, of
course, a theme for which history can supply many illustrations.
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This chapter has been concern.ed to draw together the elements
of our fundamental distinction and so reveal the unity of the concept of
morality. It has argued that this consists essentially in the fact that,
taken together, the elements constitute a coherent and systematic approach
to a particular area of human experience. Its distinguishing characteristic
is an insistence that the inherent resources of the area in question are
sufficient for its purposes. Reasons which justify individual actions
and interpretations of the mul tiplici ty of actions that ~o to make up
a persons life must alike draw their content and inspiration from t-1ithin.
It was sugeested that this may be regarded as a 'humanist' approach. Of
course, the label one chooses is of little significance in itself. All
that really matters is an understan.ding of what it denotes. Nevertheless
this usage is particularly convenient, and some considerations that tend
in its favour have been advanced. If it is accepted one can.now say that
morality is a distinctively humanist form of consciousness: it is the
response of humanism to the demands of the practical world.
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